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Preface
Just at the end of the nineteenth century, before
"modernism" proper, Thomas Hardy published his short poem
"Neutral Tones" (1898). It begins:
We stood by a pond that winter day,
And the sun was white, as though chidden of 
God,
And a few leaves lay on the starving sod;
— They had fallen from an ash, and were 
gray. (13)
The poem enacts the title; whites and grays predominate—
we imagine that even the "smile on your mouth" would be
bluish-gray. So too, the poem's own tone goes more
towards neutral, resolute puzzlement than felt elegy.
Life and death bleed into each other indistinctly: that
smile was "the deadest thing / Alive enough to have
strength to die. . . . "  The gray, ambiguous neutrality is
broken only by the last stanza— or is it?:
Since then, keen lessons that love deceives
And wrings with wrong, have shaped to me
Your face, and the God-curst sun, and a tree,
And a pond edged with grayish leaves. (13)
The moment of clarity, the sharp insight about love that
allows a memory to come to form, only gives back the same
vague scene, and all resolves into the same dull tones— "a
pond edged with grayish leaves." The "grayish" is
particularly flattening, as if even to predicate "gray" of
the scene were to be too lucid, too expressive. Yet for
all this, there is a steely, bright clearness to the poem,
a "keen lesson" that is present in much modernist
literature.
iii
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This dissertation attempts to show how Romanticism 
and modernism enact the dialectic between clarity and 
ambiguity. It started in an attempt to find a convenient 
way to frame some issues in philosophy and literature.
The admittedly artificial opposition "clarity/ambiguity" 
was chosen to indicate a spectrum that seemed to appear in 
both literary texts and theory, both aesthetics and 
ethics, ontology and epistemology. Further readings soon 
indicated that perhaps these terms were not so artificial 
and reductionist as they first appeared. They each had a 
linguistic history and a certain small body of critical 
commentary; each had a life in the history of ideas. The 
ancients and medievals were aware of and commented on 
them; the American pragmatists expressed interest in 
ambiguity or "vagueness" in favor of its contrary clarity. 
What is more important, these terms— or things— appeared 
in literature, and it is here that this study focuses.
Chapter I traces a historical overview of the terms 
from Plato to Kant. Chapter II takes up the Romantic era, 
when the terms clarity and ambiguity are transvalued. 
Chapter III describes the modernist reaction to this 
transferal. This historical overview will be as 
responsible as possible within the author's limitations. 
While it is admirable to preserve the singular qualities 
that inhere in each time's language, and verboten to 
efface distinctions for the sake of one's argument, 
history comes to us already effaced and re-imprinted. It
iv
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would be pointless for me to outline a history of these 
terms if I thought there were no connections among their 
various incarnations. So when I do make connections, I 
endeavor to draw them loosely, and with the knowledge that 
while I argue that these connections are not accidental, 
they are certainly conventional and contingent.
Chapter IV examines Henry James' The Ambassadors in 
terms of how it enacts a tragicomedy of vagueness.
Chapter V investigates Wallace Stevens' poems to determine 
what an aesthetics of clarity can mean in an age of a 
modern reality of decreation, and a short conclusion 
speculates on these possibilities of clarity.
v
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Abstract
Clarity, in all its various guises, was before the advent 
of Romanticism looked upon as an unquestioned focus of 
attention and irrefutable goal of human endeavor. 
Conversely, ambiguity was seen negatively: it was in 
language an obstacle to communication; in ethics, an 
indecisiveness failing action; and in ontology and 
aesthetics, a slovenly disorder. With Romanticism, this 
basic consensus regarding these terms ends. No longer an 
expression of censure, ambiguity is imagined as a 
liberatory force. Clarity, if attainable at all, is 
dismissed as mere rigidity. The works of Americans Henry 
James and Wallace Stevens embody and enact this tension 
and transferal between ambiguity and clarity to a singular 
degree. Henry James's The Ambassadors instances a 
tragicomedy of vagueness, while Wallace Stevens' lyrics 
reimagine and reinstate clarity in a modernist age 
of decreation.
vii
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Chapter I. "Resolve me of all ambiguities" 
Introduction
When in the Republic Book VII Socrates tells Glaucon 
and his audience "let me show in a figure how far our 
nature is enlightened or unenlightened," he gives the West 
both its main purpose and its governing metaphor (376).
The drama of the "Myth of the Cave" seems to remain our 
drama. On one level, what has been thought of as the 
"enlightenment project" has been with us from the 
beginning, and in fact, forms one of the grounding 
metaphors, one of the foundation myths of what we have 
come to call the West. One might even observe that the 
persistence of this singular action of moving from 
darkness to light— of "enlightenment"— is sufficiently 
pervasive in our intellectual history, so self-evident as 
a pursuit, so central to human affairs, as to be 
completely irrelevant.
Yet what the "enlightenment project" uncovers is far 
from simple or even consistent, as poststructuralist 
criticism has indicated. Socrates' "know thyself" falls 
as self becomes sub-ject; the divine as transcendent 
signifier is largely irrelevant to discourse; the very 
notion of "rationalism" itself is critiqued. What it 
means to lead a "life of the mind" is questioned, and the 
answers lend themselves to parody. And yet, 
notwithstanding the inevitable poststructuralist rejoinder 
and even a biblical admonition (does not St. Paul say we
1
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2see "through a glass darkly"?), the mind casts about in 
naive hope of some sort of epistemological advance. It is 
this basic premise that informs my pursuit, that humans do 
not just want to know (classical) or to be enlightened 
(modern) but wish to fix their gaze on an object of 
clarity. The clarification of the moment, the time, the 
predicament, is the perennial and often painful object of 
desire.
Clarification
The notion of clarification itself has a rich and 
diverse critical history. As I shall show, it asserts 
itself first in antiquity as a part of dramatic structure 
(catharsis); in the middle ages as an element of beauty 
(claritas); later as an epistemological criterion (Rene 
Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas"); bound up in the 
name of a whole historical period ("The Enlightenment," in 
German "Auf klarung"); and lastly in the localized event of 
modernist "insight" (James Joyce's "epiphany").
If these various "events" of "clarity" do not on 
first glance share a great deal of inner cohesion, our 
response to them has: for "clarity" as a concept has been 
universally approved, taken as a term of value, 
appropriated, valorized, and legitimized. And where 
"clarity" appears, the complementary concept of 
"ambiguity" also appears in tandem as a spoken— and 
sometimes unspoken— interlocutor. But if clarity has been 
accorded a certain privileged status, ambiguity has been
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3shunned, though accepted as a perhaps dissatisfying but 
unavoidable end-point.
But perhaps this neat dichotomy is somewhat of an 
oversimplification, and partakes in what Michael Levenson 
calls "the modernist urge toward dualistic opposition" 
(ix). For in Romanticism and modernity we witness 
something of a shift in perspective in both terms, and in 
this shift we arrive at the crux of the present analysis: 
the attempt to show, using Wallace Stevens and Henry James 
as two axes, that one of modernism's "projects" was to re­
evaluate, even transvalue, both the idea of clarity and 
ambiguity, and that in this transvaluation lies embedded 
one of the central tenets of modernist aesthetics. Both 
Stevens and James (as tentatively emblematic of Romantics 
and modems taken as a whole) manifest a contradictory 
impulse at once to clarify and to render problematic what 
may be termed an epistemology of aesthetics.
But to see how the terms of this opposition 
"clarity/ambiguity" shift in the Romantic era and 
modernity, it is necessary first to get a sense of how 
they have been used in history, to discover the variable 
shifts in meanings that the terms have undergone. This 
first chapter will survey some of the most salient 
characteristics through a selective history, instances 
that will help focus the discussion on how literary 
modernism ultimately employs these terms. The material 
covered in this chapter will include both general themes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4and specific texts; the arrangement will be chronological, 
but will not be— at least primarily— a study of sources 
and influences. Therefore, though clarity and ambiguity 
appear in the disciplines of philosophy, history, and 
literature, here the emphasis will center in the end 
(though perhaps not in the beginning) on the relationship 
clarity and ambiguity have in the generation of an overall 
aesthetic.
In brief, this dissertation will give a history of 
the ideas of clarity and ambiguity; see how they are 
transvalued, so that ambiguity comes to define the 
literary in twentieth century criticism; read Stevens and 
James in terms of how they enact this debate; and finally 
ask what kind of clarity the aesthetic affords, and what 
kind of role the critic plays in rendering "the literary" 
clear.
Catharsis as Clarification
One of the foundation myths for Western philosophy 
is Plato's "Myth of the Cave," which firmly establishes 
the didactic power of the action of clarification. For 
Socrates,1 to gain insight, to become enlightened, is at 
once simple and difficult, for the source of darkness is 
materiality. The body in particular, because it is 
material, is a fundamental epistemological obstacle for
1 That is, Socrates especially of the Republic Book VII, 
the Phaedo, and Crito. I prescind here from any discussion 
of Platonic influence on Socratic thought, or vice versa, 
and use "Platonic" and "Socratic" interchangeably.
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5Socrates- The individual soul (psyche) therefore requires 
a dying to the world in order to achieve insight. This 
dying to the world is in the Phaedo called catharsis r and 
is the process of stripping away, of clarifying, those 
things which encumber the soul. Once freed from earthly 
distractions and concerns, the soul can ascend (or return) 
to partake of those things with which it has the most 
affinity, the ideas, or forms.
Plato's most famous student of course rejects 
Socrates' disdain for the body and the material world. 
Aristotle's meditation on friendship in the Ethics, the 
opening of the Politics ("Man is by nature a political 
animal" [1253al]), his affinity for classification in 
natural science (On the Parts of Animals) all point to a 
concern for the workings of the world and culture lacking 
in Socrates.2 It is for this reason— in addition to their 
more obvious disagreements— that for an understanding of 
poetry Aristotle has been thought friendlier, and 
ultimately more authoritative, than Socrates.
It is perhaps appropriate then that the present 
discussion begins in the Poetics and particularly in its 
selection of Oedipus Rex as the stable foundation for the 
interpretation of all literature. The Poetics shows most 
vividly how one cultural institution, the Greek drama
2 There is too a "constructivist" strain in Aristotle 
lacking in Socrates, one that accounts for his stressing 
the importance of cultural institutions (of education, for 
example) precisely because they are not a priori, but 
contingent and fragile. See Ethics Bk. I, Ch. 3-4.
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6played in Athenian theater, effects learning through art, 
through cathartic clarification.
Catharsis is usually translated as "purgation" (or 
"cleansing," or "release"). The word is full of 
resonance, emphasizing a tactile, visceral quality 
altogether characteristic of Aristotle. On one hand it 
seems oddly emphasized as a term, conveying little about 
the ostensible subject of the Poetics: the structure of 
drama. Rather, it seems to tell us about psychological 
events in the audience (in what is perhaps the first 
critical instance of a reader-response theory). It is for 
this reason (to redress the apparent misplacement of 
emphasis on the term) that Leon Golden writes that the one 
way of bringing the emphasis back to the internal workings 
of drama is to translate catharsis as "intellectual 
clarification." For this Golden claims etymological 
justification, and more importantly, structural necessity: 
for throughout the Poetics catharsis is the stated goal of 
tragedy, the imitation of an action that leads to 
learning.
This shift in emphasis from audience response to 
overall formational effect has considerable implication. 
Catharsis as clarification ties mimesis to the "final 
cause of tragedy" (Golden 146). The clarifying ability of 
art implicit in Aristotle's conception of mimesis is 
brought into relief when contrasted with the Platonic 
signification of the same term. John Jones is correct in
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7his assessment (in his On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy) 
that at the heart of the Platonic/Aristotelian 
disagreement regarding art is the issue of representation, 
an equivocation regarding mimesis. For Socrates (for 
example in Republic Book X), because artistic renderings 
are copies of things in the material world, which are in 
turn copies of the forms, they are twice-removed. This 
repetition does not clarify, but like a photocopy, only 
becomes duller the further it is removed from its 
original, its arche, the ideas. When there is mimesis 
occurring over time there is an inevitable deflection, a 
dulling of the representative quality of the image. For 
Socrates, artistic rendering is a movement opposite the 
enlightening ascent from the cave.
Aristotle can accept a role for artistic rendering—  
mimesis— because he rejects the ontological priority of 
the forms. While for Plato they are the fullest being, 
for Aristotle, they lack the actuality (energeia) that all 
"real" things should possess. In Jones's words, 
Aristotelian mimesis helps to see not the "heaven of real 
forms," but the "type," the "principle of indwelling form" 
in the real world (23). However, while Jones sees mimesis 
as the disjunctive between Plato and Aristotle on art, 
Golden claims that even Plato admits a role for mimesis in 
learning, in cathartic clarification. When the prisoner 
in the Myth of the Cave is led out, he is blinded by the 
sun, and must see the reflections and copies of things
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8before he can see the sun, the good itself. The images,
the reflections of things aid him in seeing the thing
itself. For Golden there seems little difference between
mimesis in this type of learning and mimesis in art.
Aristotle's rubric of tragedy emphasizes the
intellectual enjoyment that one gets from seeing the forms
of an action (praxis) revealed or clarified:
Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness 
is that in contemplating it they find 
themselves learning or inferring, and saying 
perhaps, "Ah, that is he." (4.5)
As Jones points out, it is not the character3 that
Aristotle stresses; such concern with the "hero" is a
personalistic Romantic importation. Nor is it the
audience that undergoes catharsis. Rather, because the
Poetics is clearly about dramatic structure, it must be
the action of the drama that gets clarified, as the
mimesis, the imitation, reveals the type in the
particulars: for Plato, mimesis blurs; for Aristotle,
mimesis clarifies.
Clarification in Oedipus Rex
The translation of catharsis as clarification makes
sense in both the structure of the Poetics and in its
relationship to both Platonic and Aristotelian
configurations of mimesis. But this clarification of the
subject forces a larger issue to the fore: the troubling
presence of the ambiguous object concretized in the tragic
3 ", . . there is no evidence— not a shred— that Aristotle 
entertained the concept of the tragic hero . . ." (13).
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9result. The dramatic clarification is necessary because 
the Greeks were aware of the tragic potential of 
ambiguity. The runic, the oracular, the occult holds a 
riddling fear, most obviously in Aristotle's main example, 
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. The play at base is about 
Oedipus' too-public unfolding of the ambiguous Pythian 
oracle's true meaning.
Thebes lies under a plague, but Oedipus the king is 
confident in his ability to discover a cure for the city's 
woe. He had done so before, outwitting the riddle of the 
Sphinx. In the opening lines he shows himself sure of his 
political and epistemological positions. But further: 
Bernard Knox and others have pointed out that Oedipus 
takes for himself semi-divine attributes (159). It is to 
him, not directly to oracles that the supplicants come. 
Oedipus certainly accords himself a sort of divination 
when he not only insists that "I'm willing to give all / 
that you may need" (line 11), but also that "I have known 
the story before you told it / only too well" (59). In 
time, the play's action comes full circle to show Oedipus 
that he did not know as much as he thought he knew; in 
fact he finally sees that he is the referent of the 
"pollution grown ingrained in our land" and "that dead 
man's [Laius's] murderers" (97, 107). After blinding 
himself, Oedipus sees that his own curse was self- 
referential: "To this guilt I bore witness against myself" 
(1384).
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To translate catharsis as clarification has of 
course much justification in the play's vision/blindness 
imagery. Yet more importantly, the tragedy of Oedipus is 
clarifying in a particular way; it is the making clear to 
the characters and the audience what the gods want. It 
makes Oedipus' usurpation of semi-divine stature more 
ironic; but here we find one of the many ironies of the 
play: why is what the gods want unclear? As a matter of 
fact, when Creon returns directly from the oracle he 
emphasizes twice within ten lines that what the gods say 
is clear:
King Phoebus in plain words commanded us 
to drive out a pollution from our land. . . . 
(97-98)
The God commanded clearly: let some one 
punish with force this dead man's murderers.
(106-107)^
But of course this is not clear at all, for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, why the disjunctive? Why does it 
command either to drive/or to expiate by blood? Does 
Thebes (i.e., Oedipus) get to choose? Secondly, why not 
specify the pollution/murderer(s)? They could refer to 
"anyone" (just as the "some one" of line 106 most likely 
means the ruler of the city, Oedipus). Despite Creon's 
insistence, the oracular pronouncements are vague by 
nature; if we are to believe the chorus, even the prophet
4 The Greek words here imply that the oracle's 
pronouncements are self-evident: "plain" is related to 
ephanoi, to show forth; "clearly" is related to episteme, 
to know.
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Tieresias can get them wrong: "I know that what Lord 
Tieresias / sees, is most often what the Lord Apollo / 
sees" (284-285, emphasis added). And Creon, more politic 
if not less reaching than Oedipus, will take no chances 
when the favor of the gods is at stake. After the 
blinding, though Oedipus begs for exile (in fulfillment of 
the original oracular pronouncement), Creon demurs:
Creom Be sure, I would have done this
had not I wished first of all to learn from 
the God the course of action I should follow.
Oedipus: But his word has been quite
clear to let the parricide, the sinner, die.5
Creon: Yes, that indeed was said. But in
the present need we had best discover what we 
should do. (1438-1443)
In addition to being a good actor in the drama, Creon has
been a good spectator. He has no interest in repeating
through his own mimesis Oedipus' fate. Oedipus has
learned painfully "what [he] should do"; Creon obviously
hopes that the oracular pronouncement to come will be more
clear about what he is supposed to do.
As Knox and others have pointed out, by showing that 
the ultimate authority is in the end vague, Sophocles 
protects the numinous nature of the gods from the 
rationalism of the incestuous Oedipus and Jocasta. (And 
further, as both Eric Havelock and Knox have pointed out, 
this new spirit attends the systematization of philosophic 
thought through the onset of literacy.) What the tragedy
5 The Greek word here for "clear" is edelothe, to be 
manifest, again emphasizing self-evidence that in 
hindsight is surely ironic.
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clarifies is the action of a life lived under the auspices 
of gods who are not clear on what they want, but who are 
clear on what they will. In the case of Oedipus Rex, they 
will the destruction of a man through his hamartia, where 
that term means less moral failure than intellectual 
misprision.
Aristotle's use of Oedipus Rex implies that the play 
has gained a normative stature. In a sense, then, this 
movement from ambiguity to clarification appears to be the 
C/r-plot of all drama. One could object that this is 
already covered in the Aristotelian terminology of 
complication/resolution (Poetics Ch. 13). However, the 
terms are not identical, for these latter refer more 
specifically to the play's internal dynamics; their status 
remains as a practical concern. The movement from 
ambiguity to clarification covers much more ground, and 
refers not to the inner workings of the play but to the 
outer workings of characters' situation in respect to the 
cosmos.
The Stoics on Ambiguity in Language
"Ambiguity" has a Greek origin (ap<j>ipoko£), from amphi
+ blema (to throw or cast in two ways), and came into 
English most likely through the Latin ambi + agere (to 
drive in two directions); it can also mean "encompassing"; 
"attacked on all sides"; "double-pointed"; "doubtful"
(Liddell and Scott's Greek— English Lexicon). Catherine 
Atherton remarks that Aristotle "seems to be the earliest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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extant author to use ' ambiguity' in the narrow linguistic 
sense" (15). For example, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle 
notes that some laws need interpretation: "Or if a law is 
ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which 
construction best fits the interest of justice or utility, 
and then follow that way of looking at it" (1375b.10).6 
In the Poetics, he explains ambiguity as one instance 
among several "critical difficulties" (Ch. 25). These 
examples and others Aristotle points out have a strictly 
linguistic meaning and are scattered throughout his works. 
Though Aristotle is aware of ambiguity, he does not 
present a systematic taxonomy. That project is left for 
the Stoics.
The ancients were aware of the distinction between a 
strict linguistic use of the term and the more "common- 
language" use of it, between an ambiguous term and, say, 
an ambiguous situation- Their interest in ambiguity was 
also a "practical" concern: for example, in rhetoric, in 
constructing sound arguments, persuading, etc. The Stoic 
formulation of a definition is typical in bringing these 
two concerns— linguistic and practical— together. The 
notion of "practical" must, writes Atherton, be widened to 
include— even primarily to mean— the ethical life. The 
Stoics share this linguistic concern, but their facility
6 The example he gives is interesting: for laws to work 
they must be univocal. The possibility of multiple voices 
is precisely what Aristotle abhors in democracy, which he 
calls the worst form of government (Politics Bk. 4. 4).
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for system and desire for an independent, coherent thought
gave special importance to ambiguity and its role in the
life of the whole person. Atherton explains:
One of the central tenets of Stoic philosophy 
is that the universe is a divine, rational and 
coherent ordering. The Stoic god, who is also 
providence and fate, is the immanent active 
element in this ordering. . . . (51)
Our diminished understanding of the "Stoic" makes it
synonymous with "ascetic," but it is above all a measured
and rational— not merely discomfited— life. And although
Stoic ethics are governed by rational principles, one's
participation is hardly self-evident: "the path to virtue
is difficult, none the less, and exhaustive philosophical
training seems to be necessary" (52). This is because of
the existence of ambiguity:
If the information on which assent must be 
grounded is insufficient, unclear, irrelevant, 
or otherwise unsatisfactory, the danger arises 
that a poor decision may be made. (56)
Such decisions of course affect one's fortunes for good or
ill. Ambiguity is the enemy of ethical life and fortune's
favor. The actual Stoic definition of ambiguity seems
artificially narrow:
Ambiguity is an utterance signifying two or 
even more pragmata, linguistically, strictly, 
and in the same usage so that several pragmata 
are understood simultaneously in relation to 
the utterance. . . . (135)
This narrowness of definition may appear at odds with the
importance of ambiguity's role. The Stoic definition
exhibits both a faith in the mind's capacity to encompass
reality and a realization of the potential for tragedy.
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One must be attuned to the world precisely because it is
similar to, and therefore open to mind; not to do so is to
invite tragedy. That is why it is important to note,
retrospectively, the lack of ethical tone in hamartia? it
is more miscalculation, error, or frailty than "sin."
Preserving its non-moral character allows one to see the
tragic potential in the failure to be correctly seated in
a world that is ordered toward rational stability and
connectedness. Again, Atherton writes:
What distinguishes [the Stoic] conception of 
the cosmos is its pervasive, radical 
rationality: the reason that the world is 
knowable to any degree by the human mind is 
precisely that it too is by nature rational.
(404)
The Stoic definition of ambiguity is important for at 
least two reasons. It represents how the Greeks typically 
viewed their situation in the cosmos. Individuated human 
minds were related to a wider structure that remained 
intelligible despite what the gods will. In addition, it 
shows the important relation between linguistic experience 
and ethical life. It is because ethics and rhetoric are 
related to a reasonable cosmos that the elimination of 
linguistic ambiguity is paramount for the ethical 
stability that was the goal of Stoic philosophy.
Aeschylus' Agamemnon gives a representative instance 
of the classical attitude toward the danger of ambiguity. 
Agamemnon, home from the Trojan war, is killed by his wife 
Clytaemnestra as he bathes. Soon after, she triumphantly 
describes the scene to the chorus:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6
Thus have I wrought the deed— deny it I will 
not. Round him, like as to catch a haul of 
fish, I cast a net impassable— a fatal wealth 
of robe— so that he should neither escape nor 
ward off doom. (123)
The Greek word "casting-net" (ajujupTuicrcpov) is 
etymologically related to "ambiguity" (a|x<|>i{3oX.o£): to be 
surrounded by a deadly garment, to be attacked on both 
sides, to be in doubt, driven in two ways, are all 
related. The dangers inherent in ambiguity would not have 
been lost on the audience. Ambiguity, like a casting-net, 
can "catch one up," and "bring doom" to one's ethical 
life.7
Augustine on Interpretative Abundance
Aristotelian and Stoic treatments of ambiguity were 
at core motivated by the forming of logically coherent and 
rhetorically persuasive arguments and countering others' 
arguments. If one could interpret "rational discourse"
{logos) (Atherton 41) so as to eliminate ambiguity, one 
could ultimately lead a rational and therefore ethical 
life. This discursive (internal to discourse) need was 
pressed into service as an aid in directing one's life.
With the spread of the Christian Church, a slightly 
revised version of this need was foregrounded: the 
interpreting of Logos, the word of God. We have already 
seen this function (the interpretation of divine word) in 
use as Oedipus and Creon interpret the oracles of Delphi.
7 J. P. Vernant's essay on Oedipus Rex, "Ambiguity and 
Reversal," though mentioning in passing Clytaemnestra's 
trap, seems to miss this etymological connection (104ff).
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Further, the interpretation of the word of God intensifies 
in the rabbinical tradition, though the midrash is a 
looser, more suggestive and imaginative exposition.8 But 
with the framing of the Bible— "the book of books"—  
interpretation takes on a preeminence it had not had 
previously. Exegetical energy is narrowed to one written 
text that is self-contained, all-encompassing, both alpha 
and omega. All history is collapsed in its narrative 
structure. It begins with the beginning, Genesis, and 
ends with the end, Apocalypse; it was therefore end- 
stopped, and will not be added to. Interpretation 
therefore self-consciously takes on heightened importance 
once it finds this centering text.
Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana was written as a 
handbook of how to interpret scripture.9 In codifying the 
interpretive process, it forms a middle way between the 
traditional rabbinical process of midrash and the Stoic 
system. It is perhaps because he is influenced by both 
Athens and Jerusalem, Hellenistic systematization and 
Hebraic midrash, that Augustine sees no necessary peril in 
multiplicity of meanings. "When, however, from a single 
passage in the Scripture not one but two or more meanings 
are elicited . . . there is no danger . . . " (3.27.38).
8 Jacob Neusner writes in The Midrash that mere exegesis 
is not the goal of midrash: rather, reading was 
performative, "defined by a faith under construction and 
subject to articulation" (xi).
9 See John D. Schaeffer's "The Case of Book 4 of 
Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana.
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For both Aristotle and the Stoics, ambiguity leads to
error in the form of fallacy or hamartia. For Augustine,
ambiguity in the Scriptures gets subsumed into a
systematic that is governed by caritas and transformed
into a signal of divine grace:
For what could God have more generously and 
abundantly provided in the divine writings than 
that the same words might be understood in 
various ways which other no less divine 
witnesses approve? (3.27.38)
Aristotle was aware of course of "metaphor," as is evident
in other works. Already in his Poetics he addresses the
causes of "ambiguity" in drama, but he passes over these
phenomena without passing judgment on their potential
literary value. Clearly, in Augustine there is the
appearance of something new. Multiplicity of meaning is
taken to be a sign of generosity and abundance rather than
dangerous equivocation. Yet immediately a problem arises:
in the absence of strict meaning, what actually governs
interpretation? Augustine gives a determining criterion
for scriptural exegesis:
Therefore in the consideration of figurative 
expressions a rule such as this will serve, 
that what is read should be subjugated to 
diligent scrutiny until an interpretation 
contributing to the reign of charity is 
produced. (3.15.23)
That is, in deciding which interpretation is the preferred
one, one ought to have an eye to charity. It would be a
mistake to take "charity" too lightly, and ascribe too
little importance to Augustine's use of the term. For him
it was central. Augustine uses caritas to describe the
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entire network of relations that tie a person to an ordo 
amoris, an order of love.10 Reading is tied to the divine 
in at least two ways: ambiguity is seen as a sign of God's 
generosity, and interpretation requires the exercise of 
charity. This reign of charity exists always in God, but 
is simultaneously brought about by the work of 
interpretation, the individual interaction with the word, 
an interaction that remains open to the interposition of 
additional meaning from outside of the interpretive 
rubric, from the reign of charity.
Thomas Aquinas: Onto/aesthetic Clarity
So far, ambiguity and clarity have operated in 
imperfect opposition to each other, where the one seems 
best defined as the absence of the other. Perhaps now 
however, some further delimitations can be put forward. 
Augustine re-evaluates ambiguity as an abundance of 
meanings which, instead of indicating human pitfalls, 
points to divine generosity. There is here some 
accordance in Augustine with Sophoclean ambiguity, for in 
Oedipus Rex the oracles display a multiplicity of 
meanings. Ambiguity in both texts at some level is 
associated with the mystery of the divine.11
10 Augustine's massive City of God can be seen as an 
attempt to render an explanation of history in terms of 
caritas.
11 Rudolph Otto's The Idea of the Holy describes this 
cross-cultural notion of the "wholly other," indefinable 
aspect of the divine as the "numinous." Sophoclean and 
Augustinian ambiguity also emphasizes the immanent aspects 
of the numinous.
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Two entangled yet distinguishable meanings of 
clarity take shape. To summarize, clarification is used 
as a governing metaphor to describe the process that has 
been the goal of Western intellectual life; this 
epistemological movement has been tied since Plato to the 
soul's ascendancy (which in the Phaedo is called 
catharsis), and therefore has ethical and theological 
ramifications. A second more specific meaning goes in the 
direction of aesthetics. As the term catharsis hints, and 
as clarity's status as a property of language in 
opposition to ambiguity indicates, this second meaning 
refers to clarity as associated with beauty. Augustine 
hints at the pleasure of the text as it unfolds its 
meaning and moves from figurative ambiguity to clarity:
"The more these things seem obscured by figurative words, 
the sweeter they become when explained" (4.7.15). And yet 
clarity in this second sense takes ambiguity as a 
dialectical "other" rather than as merely the absence of 
"itself." Figurative ambiguity takes on significance as 
an interlocutor with clarity.
This second orientation of clarity towards 
aesthetics finds perhaps its fullest explication in Thomas 
Aquinas (1224-1274 A.D.). The word claritas was used in 
ancient Rome variously to describe an element of good 
rhetoric, or earthly renown, or bright color. In fact, 
the term had some currency in medieval philosophy and 
theology, but was not the subject of much attention until
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Thomas Aquinas. According to Umberto Eco, the non­
existence of systematic investigations of this and similar 
aesthetic terms indicates not their irrelevance, but their 
omnipresence: "It was a natural and everyday fact of life 
that the world was conceived of aesthetically." For 
Aquinas himself, "it was something spontaneous, effortless 
and habitual" (Aquinas 116). This explains both the lack 
of systematic analysis and the vagueness of the word as it 
appears in medieval thought. There were a variety of 
meanings attached to claritas in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, some carried over from classical 
Rome: Eco delimits four types of clarity:
(1) light and physical color; (2) the light of 
reason that makes things known, lumen 
manlfestans; (3) the shining forth of earthly 
renown; (4) the celestial glory of the 
glorified bodies of the blessed, Christ's 
transfigured body, and the objects when they 
are renewed at the end of time. (104)12
Clarity before Aquinas shows itself to be largely in line
with Platonic and Stoic thought regarding divine
emanation. Conversely, clarity sometimes quite simply is
associated with light and color. This is by no means a
superficial or literalistic understanding: Eco offers the
Gothic cathedral's stained glass as a typical expression
of the role clarity plays in the aesthetic of the time— it
marked off how important color was for an understanding of
divine space. Similarly, in The Mind's Journey to God,
12 These distinctions follow the typical medieval fourfold 
level of interpretation: the literal, the allegorical, the 
moral, the anagogical.
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Bonaventure associates light closely with divine 
emanation. Elsewhere, clarity is treated as the light 
emanating from a certain body's inherent ratio, proportion 
or form.13 Finally this fourth meaning ties clarity to 
apocalyptic renewal in the sense of ultimate clarification 
in judgment.
What concerns us here is how Aquinas narrows these
broad materialistic and ontological meanings of clarity.
Eco describes Aquinas's modification:
In thirteenth-century light metaphysics, 
clarity was not just an aesthetic concept, but 
a constitutive principle of reality. For 
Aquinas, by contrast, clarity had nothing to do 
with the objective structure of being or 
creation: he restricted its significance to the 
problem of beauty. (112)
One of the features of Greek thought that Aquinas inherits
and assumes is Aristotle's matter/form distinction.
Original material, "prime matter," is shaped by
substantial form. Beauty is the quality of
"resplendence," the object when it has fulfilled its
nature. This much of the notion of the beautiful is
inherent in thought previous to Thomas. What Aquinas
adds, however, is a crucial reference to the knowing
subject. The beauty of an object's form discloses itself
as clarity only in the presence of a perceiver. When a
beautiful object is confronted by a viewer, Eco explains,
13 Ratio and forma are often synonyms in scholasticism. 
Eco's gloss of ratioz "an almost untranslatable word, some 
of whose meanings are: reason; . . . intelligibility; 
definition; form; essence; . . . "  (Aquinas 280).
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there is "a new and essential type of proportion, this 
time between the knowing subject and the object" (118).
Eco arrives at a definition gleaned from Thomas's 
writings: "Clarity is the fundamental communicability of 
form which is made actual in relation to someone's looking 
at or seeing of the object" (119). Thomas's synthesis of 
the Hellenic philosophy and Christian doctrines narrows 
his implicit understanding of "clarity" such that two 
elements are encompassed here. His description of clarity 
is steeped in the tactile, lived experience of medieval 
life— as seen in the subject-relatedness of the aesthetic 
presentation (visio). But it is also perfectly rational 
in that it is a vision of the ratio of a thing. His work 
in this area is important here, for it draws together both 
the rationality of the formal system and the everyday 
experience embedded in medieval theories of color. To 
quote Eco once more: "The rationality that belongs to 
every form is the light which manifests itself to 
aesthetic seeing" (119).
Aquinas's formulation of clarity unifies two 
divergent meanings of the term: clarity as an ultimately 
rational perception of form and clarity as aesthetic 
moment. This interpenetration, tenuous as it is, 
incorporates a fundamental paradox. On the one hand 
clarity is radically ontological; it is a quality of the 
object's internal structure, in the object over against 
the knowing self. On the other hand, it requires for its
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full expression a relationship to the self. In other 
words, the aesthetic visio of the form co-generates 
clarity. Clarity is ordained, ordered, and presented 
exclusively to the self. This formulation of the question 
— that there exists a dynamic interaction between subject 
and object in the aesthetic vision— is the crucial point 
prior to the ontological grounding of the aesthetic 
experience: form.
Ockham and the Extension of the Proper Name
For Thomas then, clarity was the aesthetic vision of 
an object judged to be beautiful. Clarity in turn was an 
element of, and dependent on, form. This description was 
subject to a contemporary debate concerning the 
ontological status of those forms. If a Platonic position 
were held, where an ideal "blueprint" determines 
individual actually existing things, then grouping objects 
based on similarity to that ideal would be easy enough.
If however there were no ideal, but only actually existing 
things whose form could not be related to any universal 
standard, grouping the objects would be more difficult, if 
not impossible. The debate had two sides: the realists, 
who argued for the "real" existence of universal forms, 
and the nominalists, who denied any extra-mental existence 
to the forms.
William of Ockham (1285-1349) argued the nominalist 
position against the "realism" of Duns Scotus. It is the 
relationship between the one and the many that causes
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Ockham the greatest problem: how could a substantial being 
be predicated of an (in principle) infinite number of 
existing objects? It is impossible: therefore "A 
universal is not a thing outside the mind" (35). Rather, 
the universal is a mental construct, a "thought-object";
"The case would be similar . . .  to the activity of an 
artist" who sees likenesses and creates a picture (41).
That is, the mind sees in particular things vague 
similarities, not self-identical, communicable forms.
Things cannot share "natures"; when universals of natures 
exist, they exist not really, but only formally in the 
mind.
The consequence of Ockham's nominalism is quite 
revolutionary: all classifications become based on 
perceived likeness. Therefore, all names become proper 
names. When names become unmotivated, they become 
dependent on the will of the namer. In this system the 
"cause" of ambiguity is greatly furthered, for if there is 
no ground for naming, then the world becomes 
systematically atomized. With no clear criteria by which 
to group objects, each object becomes in effect like a 
new-born, waiting to be addressed by a freely choosing 
addresser. Power shifts from the named to the namer, from 
the creation to the name-creator. The nominalist 
position, therefore, while ostensibly motivated by the 
desire to preserve the freedom of God's will, actually 
abrogates to the individual psyche the power to address
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creation. The individual person is more highly contrasted 
to and confronted with creation.
That is, the metaphysical basis for this fundamental 
interaction with the world— naming— becomes radically 
undercut. For Aquinas and previous medievals, seeing the 
form was a tacit act. As noted for Aquinas, seeing the 
form under the species of the beautiful was to see its 
clarltas. With Ockham's emphasis on the particularity of 
form, objects become increasingly discrete and 
disconnected from other objects. Form is no longer in 
concordance with ideas in the Platonic sense, or even with 
natura, as it had been in Aquinas's Aristotelianism.
There is here a strange resurgence of Adam's prelapsarian 
responsibility to name, with the added ambiguity that 
there can be no groupings, only discrete animals, each one 
awaiting its own proper name. The proper name supplants 
form.
Drawing a Clear Line with Descartes
For much of pre-nominalist philosophy the universal 
had been the guarantor of clarity; at some level, there 
was existence "as such," free from the ambiguities of 
actual spatio-temporal existence. For Socrates and the 
Platonists, clarity presupposed a realm of ideas; for 
Scholastics like Aquinas, clarity inhered in forms of 
individual existing things. The nominalist challenge to 
both Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics signaled the 
evacuation of the grounds of clarity. With this
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development, as Louis Dupre writes in Passage to 
Modernity, "Obviously, the trust in the essentially 
rational quality of nature that had supported traditional 
epistemology, has collapsed" (40).
Rene Descartes confronts this challenge to 
philosophy by taking clarity quite far away from its 
medieval formulations as an aspect of all being. For 
Descartes, clarity becomes a criterion of certain 
knowledge. This movement was prepared for by the 
skepticism of Ockham which made the form of a thing 
singular and discrete as opposed to representative and 
participatory. Yet its radicality is easy to miss, for 
the cogito in a sense contains nothing new. The history 
of philosophy contains many such arguments against 
skepticism based on the immediate grasp of an indubitable 
state of affairs. Thus it often seems that Descartes is 
pilloried for making the same distinction and fighting the 
same skepticism that Augustine had more than one thousand 
years earlier. Augustine's arguments for certain 
knowledge from his Contra Academicos rely on disjunctive 
(one can be certain one exists or not) or on appearance- 
quality ("There is no deception"; "I know this appears 
white to me" [3.26]). Descartes' formulation from the 
second Meditation is quite different; it depends on the 
supposition of a "highly powerful, and most cunning 
deceiver" from whom the only safe haven is "Ego sum, ego 
existo"; it is "necessarily true, so long as it is uttered
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by me or conceived by my mind" (17). To see how these 
quests for certain knowledge are distinct, it must be seen 
how they go through the dismissal of form in Ockham. When 
form as a criterion of grouping is voided, then there 
arises a world whose sole identifying feature is the 
proper— and therefore unmotivated— name generated by the 
subject.
The ratio of a thing no longer discloses itself in 
concordance with the human mind as it had with the Stoics, 
for example, or in Aquinas' aesthetics. Rather, because 
ratio as form inheres only in highly individualized 
objects which can only be signified in an unmotivated 
fashion, anything over against the self was open to doubt 
by that same self. That is, clarity as an aspect of an 
object— as it is clearly for both neo-Platonic and 
Scholastic thinkers— can, according to Descartes, 
conceivably be the blinding light of an evil spirit. 
Significantly, when in his arguments in Contra Academicos 
Augustine entertains the exceptional cases—  
hallucinations, misperceptions caused by disease, etc.— he 
implies an assumed stable center of knowledge. However, 
Descartes takes the exceptional case as the normative 
center of all knowledge— not only perceptions, which can 
always be justifiably doubted— but any evidence that does 
not present itself in a clear and distinct fashion. The 
implications for the possibility of clarity are great.
Here Dupre is helpful:
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Descartes' theory of ideas marks the watershed 
where the tide of cognition ceased to flow from 
the real to the known and turned from the ideal 
representation toward the extra-mental reality. 
Threatened by the loss of certainty that had 
originated in late medieval thought, Descartes 
tried to regain a sure foothold by sacrificing 
the ancient concept of truth as participation 
in being and instead concentrated on the nature 
of representation and its internal criteria. 
Philosophy has mostly remained on this 
epistemological track ever since. (86)
Augustine's argument seems to be a specific retort to the
cry of the occasion, the skepticism of Carneades the
Academic. Descartes on the other hand sees his method as
the beginning of philosophy per se. In addition,
Augustine accepts as evidence the mere presentation of his
being; there is an adequacy to his own self-presence.
Descartes takes clarity and distinctness as the criteria
for certain knowledge; with this, notes Dupre, "The
foundation of both the mind and the world is conceived in
accordance with the condition and needs of knowledge"
(88). And the only things that can fulfill that criterion
with perfect clarity are the mind's own existence and its
own creations such as mathematics.
Upon such indubitable foundations, the structure of 
knowledge could be deduced and built. The architectonic 
drive of Descartes' thought has received much attention.
His major metaphor is that of a house of knowledge whose 
foundations have to be re-investigated. Claudia Brodsky 
Lacour, however, claims that while many critics of 
Descartes see his radicalism as the relatively simple 
process of razing the structure to get at foundations, it
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is even more radical, and has a more direct influence on 
modernist aesthetics.
Descartes' architectural metaphors, Lacour 
maintains, are not figurations to express thoughts. In 
fact, in Descartes, "architecture functions as anything 
but an expressive motif in the origin of method of modern 
philosophy" (4). Rather, "Like the Geometrie, the 
Discours de la methode, produces discursively the 
possibility of drawing a line— call it "I"— based on no 
previously available figure or form" (5). Descartes' 
position is a philosophical standpoint, literally; from 
one point, a point without extension, he draws out a line 
of thought. This architectonic line cannot represent 
anything, and must break with all modes of representation, 
"whether the coin of imitation be categorized as copy, 
type, or archetype . . . "  (8). Or, in the words of Ernst 
Cassirer writing in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 
for Descartes "all being, in order to be clearly and 
distinctly conceived and to be understood in pure 
concepts, must first be reduced to the laws of spatial 
intuition" (282).
There are two interacting instances of clarity of 
interest here. The epistemological certainty that "clear 
and distinct" ideas yield depends on the non-extended 
stand-point of the "ego." In Lacour's reading, Descartes' 
project requires a non-representational start: "The 
discursive beginning of modern philosophy, the founding of
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the subject of thinking occurs not as a linguistic picture
or image, but as a line, an iconoclastic line, a 'line of
thought'" (8). These lines of thought themselves yield
simultaneously the clarity of the linearity of the
discourse. This second aspect of clarity is not the
clarity of certainty, but a specifically aesthetic
quality; ironically, despite Lacour's claim that
Descartes' line was an attempt to get outside of
representation, the line becomes a foundation not just for
thought, but for a representational aesthetic:
The linearity— as opposed to the pictorality—  
of other modernisms may now be apparent to us, 
the modernism of painting, sculpture, dance and 
architecture itself. (8)
Thus Descartes is midwife not only to the birth of modern
philosophy, but modernist aesthetics.
The movement through Descartes then is a collapsing 
of clarity toward the mind, a restriction to the mental.
To quote Dupre once more, "Jean-Luc Marion has shown how 
the father of modem thought began by transforming 
philosophy from a science of first things to an 
epistemological investigation of the first principle of 
knowledge" (87). Philosophy takes a turn from ontological 
issues towards epistemological ones. Clarity is still 
valued, but its purview is restricted entirely to an 
intra-mental existence.
Clarity and the Birth of Aesthetics
There are then two directions in Descartes' thought: 
the centripetal reduction of clarity to the mind, and the
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mind's centrifugal extension of propositions deducted
therefrom. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762 A.D.)
inherited the rationalism of Descartes and sought to
investigate a realm on which Descartes was silent: poetry.
Poetry is certainly not deduced in the same way that the
Cartesian apparatus is. On the contrary, poetry concerns
precisely that which Descartes called into question: the
immediacy of sense experience, which was by nature
manifold and unfocused. Yet in the introduction to his
1735 work Reflections on Poetry (Meditationes
philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus),
Baumgarten states his intention to put the two disciplines
in communication:
I wish to make it plain that philosophy and the 
knowledge of how to construct a poem, which are 
often held to be entirely antithetical, are 
linked together in the most amiable union. (36)
Baumgarten's original focus, poetry, is widened in the
work itself, but his thought has even broader
implications. He is the first to use the term
"aesthetics" to describe that certain field of study.
However, it refers not directly to beauty as such, but to
its original Greek etymology, "perception." His study is
not simply an investigation of beauty, but a part of the
rationalist program to evaluate all elements of
experience. For Baumgarten, that element of poetry which
makes it a distinctive thing unto itself is precisely its
appeal to the "lower part of the cognitive faculty": sense
perception (38). Therefore to dismiss perceptions is to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 3
dismiss a whole realm of experience— verse— which "wise 
men" say "ought never to be neglected" (35). What 
Baumgarten attempts in his aesthetics, in Cassirer's 
words, is the "legitimation of the inferior powers of the 
soul" (349).
Baumgarten tries to show how the sensuousness of 
art, as perceived by the senses, can have its own clarity, 
a clarity distinct from the confusion of sense 
perceptions, yet a clarity different from logical clarity.
To be exact: Baumgarten asserts that of ideas or sensate 
representations, both can be either clear or obscure; 
clear representations can be either distinct or confused.
But where clear and distinct representations are the 
province of philosophy, "philosophy pursues conceptual 
distinctness above everything else" (42), clear and 
confused (or rather fused14) representations are the 
province of poetics and the philosophy of poetics. The 
poem is "perfect sensate discourse" (39). But being 
"fused" is different from being "obscure." A poem that is 
"obscure" is inferior: "This should take care of those who 
wrongly suppose that the more obscure and intricate their 
effusions, the more 'poetic' their diction" (41).
It is with "clarity" that Baumgarten's thought 
encompasses the rationalism of Descartes (along with that 
of G. W. Leibniz), taking the common "clear and distinct"
14 See Aschenbrenner and Holther’s "Introduction" to the 
Reflections on Poetry for an explanation of this "fusion,"
21.
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appellation and situating poetic discourse within its 
scope. Baumgarten distinguishes two types of clarity: 
extensive clarity is proper to poetry; in more extensively 
clear works, "more is represented" (43). Intensive 
clarity on the other hand belongs, as it does for 
Descartes and Leibniz, to cognition (43). Baumgarten to a 
degree rehabilitates sense perception by attributing to it 
a meaningful content. His distinction between extensive 
and intensive clarity mirrors Descartes' distinction 
between res extensa and res cogitans. The former rightly 
belongs to sense perception, the latter rightly belongs to 
cognition.
Baumgarten is usually dismissed as a promoter of the
inflexibility of classical aesthetics. However, his first
interest is to do justice to the phenomenon of the poetic
by making it part of a rationalist schema; he puts the
poetic into communication with the other human faculties
of perception and judgment. The importance of this is
evident in Immanuel Kant's shift in reaction to the
possibility of aesthetics. In the Critique of Pure Reason
(1787), he addresses aesthetics only to dismiss it:
This usage [of aesthetics] originated in the 
abortive attempt made by Baumgarten, that 
admirable analytical thinker, to bring the 
critical treatment of the beautiful under 
rational principles, and to raise its rules to 
the rank of science. But such efforts are 
fruitless, (quoted in Simpson 4)
As David Simpson notes in his Introduction to German
Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, Kant's opinion of
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Baumgarten's project changed to such a degree that he
found it necessary in his third Critique to attempt a
similar resolution to a problem he had previously
dismissed. Baumgarten's legacy then is the thematizing
and formalizing of a relationship that had always been
intuited: the relationship between the clarity of
philosophy and the clarity of the poem. More importantly
for the present study, Baumgarten's endeavor implies that
not rationality, but clarity is the center of the personal
enterprise. For this reason alone, he seems worth
attention. And yet Kant's original opinion regarding the
incompatibility of aesthetics and rational investigation
is perhaps more historically prevalent: Karl Aschenbrenner
and William Holthier perhaps overstate the case somewhat
in their Introduction to the Reflections, but it is
generally true that
before the end of [Baumgarten's] century the 
doctrine of the supremacy of feeling, of 
feeling as the essence of art, was already in 
command. There followed an endless succession 
of aesthetic theories based on emotion, play, 
fancy, pleasure, the unconscious, the 
irrational, and so on. (8)
This development was perhaps somewhat inchoate in
Baumgarten anyway, and therefore inevitable.
It is worthy of note, however, that toward the end 
of his Reflections, Baumgarten introduces the term "vivid" 
to further describe poetry: "We call that vivid in which 
we are allowed to perceive many parts either 
simultaneously or in succession" (76). This sort of
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vividness (vividum) is inherent in his under standing of 
extensive clarity and perhaps contains the seed of later 
Romantic vitalism. It is only with the modernist lyric 
of, for example, Ezra Pound, H. D., and especially Wallace 
Stevens that a "clarity" close to Baumgarten's 
understanding as a central element appears as a governing 
aesthetic motif.
From Mirror to Lamp with Kant
If in a sense "enlightenment" has always been with 
us, what does the "Enlightenment" add? It seems it could 
add little: Socrates describes the ascendancy of the soul 
to God as enlightenment, as does Bonaventure fifteen 
hundred years later; in their unsystematic aesthetics, 
medievals viewed clarity as that aspect of a thing shining 
(as beauty) to the mind. Descartes' distrust of the world 
of the res extensa took the search for clarity to the 
moment of thought and therefore restricted its meaning to 
epistemological certitude disconnected from any structure 
aside from the mind's own existence and the corollaries 
derived from it.
What distinguishes the "Enlightenment" from this 
previous history becomes more fraught when considering 
that it is, like all historical periods, susceptible to 
revision. It would therefore be tempting to engage in the 
common rhetorical move of pluralization, and merely posit 
there is not one Enlightenment, but many "enlightenments."
The widespread translation and exportation of the term
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during the eighteenth century seems to support this 
pluralized interpretation. Enlightenment is a translation 
of the German Aufklarung, but the word found its way into 
Italian, Illuminismo, and French, Lumieres. Yet despite 
these localisms, the light metaphor remained throughout 
the European (and American) understanding of the 
expression.
The perdurance of the light metaphor in the 
expression implies a unity— however plastic— in the 
phenomenon. Yet though the light metaphor endures in the 
Enlightenment formulation, it undergoes a change in 
orientation. The most important element that 
distinguishes clarity of this period occurs in 
epistemology where one witnesses the movement from a 
receptive to an active epistemology. M. H. Abrams traces 
this shift as it occurs in representations of 
representation. In his study, The Mirror and the Lamp:
Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition, Abrams argues 
that the mirror, in various guises, was until the 
eighteenth century the main metaphor to describe artistic 
activity. The mirror described as well the relationship 
between the mind and the world: both "mirrored" or 
"imitated" nature. This was a stable interpretation of 
the role of art from Plato's emanation theory to the 
"classicist" formulations through the seventeenth century.
Even Baumgarten still held to an imitative account of 
poetry: "Hence, the poem is an imitation of nature and of
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the actions depending on it" (76). And while art as 
imitation of nature did not necessarily lead to a strict 
realism associated with the nineteenth-century novel, it 
still imitated as classical aesthetics imitated things; 
that is, ideally, as they "should be."
In the eighteenth century there was a shift to a 
more expressivist understanding. What accounted for the 
shift in metaphor from mirror to lamp was to a large 
degree the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. What 
distinguishes both cognition and artistic activity before 
and after him is the direction of epistemological flow, so 
to speak. Instead of mind receiving data from a given, 
the mind informs through administering a priori 
categories. Kant's "Copernican turn" is pivotal; yet it 
was prepared for in previous thought (just as was the 
first Copernican turn). For example, not only did Aquinas 
introduce subject-relatedness in the visio of beauty, but 
his epistemology itself broke down on several levels. In 
his terms, the active intellect does not receive objects, 
but sense impressions out of which active intellect forms 
a phantasm, which the passive intellect then knows. At 
this point, the mind is two steps away from the object, 
and Aquinas' epistemology contains the seeds of latent 
empiricism and idealism. But however tenuous the balance 
between subject and object, it was a balance.
Kant's epistemology redefined what constituted 
knowledge by relating it to the act of knowing itself.
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Kant's own What is Enlightenment?— a work ostensibly on 
religion and history— attests to this shift toward mind as 
an autonomous lamp. For the ancients and medievals, the 
answer to the question "What is enlightenment?" would have 
inevitably involved relating the person to the 
intelligibly ordered world over against the self.
"Enlightenment" would be a process— much like exiting 
Plato's cave— of becoming more in concert with the cosmos.
It would reveal itself in theology as an accordance with 
divine will, and in epistemology as a correspondence 
between mind and thing. For Kant, however,
"enlightenment" has less to do with clarification in terms 
of external concord than with the "escape of men from 
their self-incurred tutelage" (91). Instead of imbibing 
the received ideas of "books," "clergy" and "physicians," 
men must argue amongst themselves and use their own 
understanding. This requires a radical autonomy: "For 
this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but 
freedom" (86). Cassirer describes the spirit of the age:
"Reason is now looked upon rather as an acquisition than 
as a heritage" (13). "Enlightenment" in its broadest 
sense is the movement from self-tutelage to self- 
governance .
For Kant, this requirement of self-governance lies 
at the heart of the disinterestedness found in his 
Critique of Judgement. In order for our judgments of 
taste— i. e. of the aesthetic— to be valid, they must be
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disinterested: "[W]e must not be in the least prejudiced 
in favor of the existence of the things . . . "  (§2). On 
the other hand, judgments of the good or the pleasant are 
highly interested (§3,4). They have a to me or for me 
character to them, while "the judgment of taste is merely 
contemplative" (§5). Yet despite the radical 
disinterestedness and its subjectivity, the judgment of 
taste is "imputed to everyone" and therefore universal 
(§8). The emphasis both here and in What is 
Enlightenment? is on the preservation of autonomy in a 
realm where the self is freed from external deflection.
Kant's importance in the clarity/ambiguity dialectic 
takes two forms. Firstly, by making taste a subjective 
imperative he does much to privatize the relationship to 
art, and therefore gives what Abrams calls the 
"expressivist" mode of cognition and imitation 
philosophical justification. The source of clarity is the 
self— the mind as lamp. Secondly, despite the fact that 
his epistemology is to a degree a reaction to the 
empiricism of Hume (seen for example in Kant's rejection 
of the identification of the pleasant with the beautiful), 
his aesthetics nevertheless incorporates the sensations 
into the overall project of enlightenment. Thus according 
to Cassirer, after the empiricist challenge, "taste is no 
longer classified with the logical processes of inference 
and conclusion but placed on a par with the immediacy of 
pure acts of perception— with seeing and hearing, tasting
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and smelling" (304). This accounts for the paradox in 
Kant that judgments of taste must both be thoroughly 
subjective and imputed to everyone. While Descartes and 
Leibniz value system and deduction, as enlightenment 
thought progressed, it came to address the inductive 
analysis of experience; the internal foundations of 
Descartes inevitably confronted external impressions.
Perhaps Kant's contribution can be framed in terms 
of disciplinarity. Up to Kant's time, philosophy's 
position had always been assured, either as queen of 
sciences or as handmaid of theology. But because it was 
seen (at least through Scholasticism) in terms of the 
soul's ascent, philosophy carried with it the hint of 
Socratic catharsis, and with this came the tendency to 
denigrate the empirical. Clarity was the goal of 
philosophical activity: sense knowledge was the realm of 
the "confused and indistinct" (Cassirer 340)— that is, the 
realm of the ambiguous. Clarity had become then strictly 
associated with "objectivity" in Descartes, but the 
nominalism of Ockham, the empiricism of Hume as well as 
the new science of probability made the eventual 
disassociation of clarity from objectivity easier if not 
inevitable.15 Baumgarten's and Kant's efforts can be seen
15 Barbara Shapiro writes in her Probability and Certainty 
in Seventeenth-Century England'. "Experience, conjecture, 
and opinion, which once had little or no role in 
philosophy or physics . . . now became relevant and even 
crucial categories for natural scientists and 
philosophers" (4).
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broadly as an attempt at the resolution of the tense and 
ongoing dialectic between aesthetics and philosophy, two 
fields of human knowledge and activity. But the Romantic 
installation and valorization of ambiguity indicates just 
how short they fell.
This change in perspective will be the topic of the 
next two chapters. By now, however, a pattern of sorts 
ought to have emerged: clarity in all of its disparate 
forms— linguistic, aesthetic, or epistemological— is not 
only considered possible but valorized. Yet while 
ambiguity remains in the background, after Descartes it 
begins to take on shape as the repressed, as if it were 
the object of the West's guilty conscience. What had 
begun as an intuition (that ambiguity could be a source of 
potentiality as Augustine proffered in De Doctrina 
Christiana) was still unrealized in thought. But with the 
Romantics, as the attitude toward clarity and ambiguity 
becomes much more fraught, it becomes possible for 
ambiguity to achieve a new and more sympathetic hearing. 
Othello, Our Contemporary
If clarity had reached the height of its persuasive 
power in its eponymously named age, "The Enlightenment," 
it is also precisely then that there seems to be a 
redetermination of the boundaries of what constitute 
"clear" and "ambiguous." Certainly the desire for 
complete clarity (as "objectivity") becomes the lust for 
mastery over an object, the Faustian bargain ("Resolve me
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of all ambiguities"), what Nietzsche calls the libido 
sciendi. But by the end of the eighteenth century, 
clarity had little other meaning. By way of transition to 
Chapter II, and to show how the transition in reaction to 
clarity and ambiguity occurred, this chapter closes with a 
brief discussion of a text that seems to evince this move: 
Shakespeare's Othello. Shakespeare condenses many of the 
concerns of the age, marking the watershed transition 
between late medieval and early modern— especially 
Enlightenment— thought. Recent historical criticism seems 
to confirm this demarcation, as for example, Stanley 
Cavell's Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare, 
where he notes that "the advent of skepticism as 
manifested in Descartes' Meditations is already in full 
existence in Shakespeare" (3). Here, brief mention of 
Othello will perhaps delineate somewhat further the terms 
of the shift if not the shift itself.
Renaissance drama is deeply concerned with how 
knowledge gained through analysis affects the object.
Oftentimes it investigates the limits of certain types of 
clarity; Hamlet's attempt at the triangulation of 
knowledge during The Mousetrap is one often-cited example.
At the same time, spousal fidelity (along with bridal 
virginity) is one of this period's favorite themes; it is 
of course full of dramatic potential in itself and has a 
pre-Renaissance literary history. But in light of the 
epistemological concerns of the age, it bears other
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interest for us. If Shakespearean drama seems fairly 
obsessed with fidelity as object of knowledge, it is 
because its constitution is such that it resists analysis 
to such a degree that it crumbles upon the wrong type of 
sighting. For example, when Leontes in A Winter's Tale 
tries to analyze his wife's fidelity, it dissolves, as if 
it retracts all evidentiary expression.
In Othello classicist aesthetics and empiricism 
meet. Othello, tempted by Iago, tries to analyze 
Desdemona's fidelity in terms of the claims of empirical 
evidence, "ocularNproof." Yet as Iago says of the 
handkerchief that will condemn Desdemona: "Trifles light 
as air / Are to the jealous confirmations strong / As 
proofs of Holy Writ" (3.3.317). The desire for perfect 
knowledge of his wife's honesty becomes the desire for 
empirical clarity. In Othello's case, this perfect 
clarity (which is in principle attainable), resolves into 
a confusion of forms. One sign of the situation's 
irresolvability is the occurrence of meaningless 
repetition; in fact, repetition becomes a method of Iago's 
dissembling. He merely repeats, questioningly, Othello's 
questions; at one point Othello shouts, "By heaven, thou 
echoest me . . .  " (3.3.106). Later Othello tells Emilia 
that Iago was Desdemona's accuser. Emilia is stunned and 
disbelieving. To her questioning, Othello retorts, "What 
needs this iterance? Woman, I say thy husband" (5.2.147).
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Othello's desire for a momentary stay against 
confusion is more understandable in light of his 
expectations. For him Desdemona is a redress against all 
other elements of his character: his military life, his 
African-ness, his suffering. Upon her foundation, he 
builds his life. Strangely, Othello's aesthetic world is 
one of classical ideality: the skies are "yond marble 
heaven," (3.3.457); this heaven is filled with "chaste 
stars"; he is reticent in murdering Desdemona to "scar 
that whiter skin of hers than snow / And smooth as 
monumental alabaster" (5.2.5). The heaven, the stars, and 
Desdemona become linked in a clear, frozen complex of 
aestheticized statuary. Contrasted to this are images 
(more real and more ambiguous) of Desdemona as fluid:
Othello says on the one hand that she is the "fountain 
from the which my current runs" (4.2.57), and on the other 
hand she is as "false as water" (5.2.133). The 
indeterminate quality, the formal ambiguity of water and 
of his wife galls Othello. He may be an outsider in 
Venice, but he has appropriated classicist aesthetics.
When confronted with the impossibility of empirical 
certitude, he despairs at the unprovability of fidelity.
Othello has brought a certain strand of clarity to its 
logical conclusion, and as the reader is told, chaos will 
come again. Thus if at the center of the tragedy of 
Oedipus Rex lies linguistic ambiguity (and more broadly 
the ambiguity of the gods), then at the heart of the
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tragedy of Othello lies the desire for, and the 
impossibility of attaining, a clarity which unites the 
aesthetic and the epistemological through Enlightenment 
principles.
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Chapter II. The Vagaries of the Romantics 
"The Systematic Winckelmann": The Neoclassical
Othello's aesthetic regard of Desdemona attempts the
resolution of all ambiguities into the clarity of a still-
life. Such a vision of aesthetics would find its fullest
expression in the writings of Johann Winckelmann (1717-
1768). His studies of Greek and Roman sculpture and
painting, especially of the Laocoon statue group (Greek or
possibly Roman, rediscovered in 1506), convinced him of
the relative superiority of the ancient aesthetic
understanding of harmony of form. In his On the Imitation
of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks (1755), he
identifies what he considers the formal effects that
establish the supremacy of Greek art, and puts forward
what has come to be regarded as the exemplary formulation
of neo-classical1 aesthetics. In comparing Greek art
favorably with "modern" (contemporary) art, he focuses on
the Laocoon group's "expression":
The last and most eminent characteristic of the 
Greek works is a noble simplicity and sedate 
grandeur in gesture and expression. As the 
bottom of the sea lies peaceful beneath a 
foaming surface, a great soul lies sedate 
beneath the strife of passions in Greek 
figures. (72)
With this formulation, "noble simplicity and sedate 
grandeur," Winckelmann argues for the sublimation of 
fierce turmoil into a tranquil still point. Like
1 Jeffrey Perl, developing Ernst Curtius, gives a list of 
the many and often contradictory meanings of "classical" 
in his The Tradition of Return (66ff).
47
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Othello's, Winckelmann's aesthetic requires the 
subsumption of ambiguity into simplicity. Thus for 
Othello, the ambiguous feminine (which is "false as 
water") becomes stilled— indeed, sepulchered. Winckelmann 
criticizes anything that detracts from "noble simplicity"; 
ornamentation, disharmony of composition, anything rogue2 
is to be avoided, for "beauty consists in the harmony of 
the parts" (95). (This insistence on pure simplicity 
motivates Winckelmann to criticize the baroque style of 
Bernini for its grotesque "exaggeration.")
Winckelmann's stance is an emanationist view— beauty
descends from Divinity to human mind to matter. In his
History of Ancient Art, he writes,
This idea of beauty is like an essence 
extracted from matter by fire; it seeks to 
beget unto itself a creature formed after the 
likeness of the first rational being designed 
in the mind of the Divinity. (118)
This understanding is highly mimetic; man's artistic
creation mirrors the rational creation of the divine. Yet
it is not rough nature itself that should be imitated, but
an idealized form. The genius of ancient art for
Winckelmann was that empirical observations were "raised
above the reach of mortality according to the superior
model of some ideal nature" (65).
2 There are of course in the history of literature 
examples of "delight in disorder"; but the foundation of 
that delight— mimeticism— is still not questioned until 
the German Romantics.
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Winckelmann is important because he is on the
threshold, intellectually as well as chronologically,
between classicism and Romanticism. Remy Saisselin, in
The Enlightenment Against the Baroque writes of
Winckelmann' s classicism:
This was not the self-imposed discipline of the 
true classicism such as obtained in the 
Renaissance and the Baroque, the creation of 
order in the face of tendencies towards 
disorder, disintegration, exaggeration, 
multiplicity and unbounded imagination, but 
rather a neoclassicism requiring that certain 
works be imitated and imposing doctrinal 
standards from outside. (20)
The implication is that Winckelmann's is a degenerate
ideal soon to be outmoded.
There is a tendency to draw too sharp a line between 
a neo-classical aesthetic and a Romantic one. One might 
observe that Winckelmann himself often has highly 
subjective, emotional passages in his writings, as well as 
observations that show an appreciation of cultural 
specificity.3 Yet the fact remains that Winckelmann 
proffers "noble simplicity and sedate grandeur" as a 
universally applicable criterion of the beautiful. Here 
the epistemological meets the aesthetic in the 
confrontation between clarity as epistemological certainty 
and clarity as classicist ideal. Precisely because the
3 That history and culture (material conditions) influence 
artistic production is not a recent insight. As David 
Irwin points out, Polybius, Kant, and Winckelmann all 
mention, for example, the influence of climate 
(Winckelmann 4 2 ff).
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rules are intelligible, perceivable, and universally 
applicable, clarity is regarded as an aesthetic value.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that Winckelmann's 
attention (as well as the attention of this study) is not 
limited to one aesthetic field. Winckelmann's writings 
refer not only to certain elements of specific arts 
(sculpture, painting, etc.), but rather are meant to be 
broadly applied. Further, in his comparison of ancient 
and "modem" cultures, he speaks not only about specific 
techniques, but also of the "soul" of a people. Thus when 
Winckelmann praises the assuredness of the Greek sculptor, 
it is in terms of a generalized cultural certainty:
"Surely hands so steady, so secure, must of necessity have 
been guided by rules more determinate and less arbitrary 
than we can boast of" (76). The rules were somehow more 
clear to the ancients, and there is "but one way for the 
modems to become great, and perhaps unequaled: I mean, by 
imitating the ancients" (61). Two millennia separate the 
modems and ancients, but Winckelmann begs for a trans- 
historical and trans-disciplinary reference point: "Let 
the artist's pencil, like the pen of Aristotle, be 
impregnated with reason; that, after having satiated the 
eye, he may nourish the mind" (85).
A Vagrant, Unending Arabesque: Friedrich Schlegel 
and Novalis
Kant's Critique of Judgement solidified both 
aesthetics as a discipline and the individual subject as 
the sole judge of beauty. By "subjectivizing" aesthetic
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judgment, he does much to undermine Winckelmann. In §17
Kant writes:
To seek for a principle of taste which shall 
furnish, by means of definite concepts, a 
universal criterion of the beautiful is 
fruitless trouble, because what is sought is 
impossible and self-contradictory. (68)
If Winckelmann investigates the universal, formal rules 
that govern the expression of the "sedate soul," the 
Romantics emphasize those elements that point to the 
"foaming surface." To say that German Romanticism, 
following Kant, kindled awareness and interest in the non­
rat ional in art, thereby exposing the universal 
applicability of neo-classical ideals as a question of 
taste rather than of strict aesthetic necessity, is so 
well established as to be undeserving of comment. But 
what is less established is the Romantic affinity with 
ambiguity in terms of both epistemology and aesthetics.
The Kantian turn from a receptive to an active 
epistemology emphasizes the power of the illuminating 
intellect of each person and thereby renders a universal 
criterion for the beautiful impossible. Thus the 
appreciation for ambiguity as a positive linguistic and 
aesthetic phenomenon grew out of the idealist and 
empiricist critique of rationalism such as that 
represented by Descartes. Conversely, the depreciation of 
clarity occurs with the degradation of clarity from its 
status as an aesthetic "resplendence of form" to a will to
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order, a rote imitation of the rules perceived by another 
period: the ancient Greek.
Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis (Friedrich von 
Hardenberg) are generally held to be the first writers to 
give a wide-ranging appreciation of an aesthetic 
disassociated from, indeed opposed to, the clarity of neo- 
classicism. It is true that incipient even in Winckelmann 
are Romantic tensions; as Saisselin notes, "Winckelmann's 
love of ancient Greece was already a Romantic sentiment, a 
nostalgia heralding the poetry of Holderlin or Keats"
(20). Still, Schlegel's "Fragments," "On
Incomprehensibility" and "Letter on the Novel," along with 
Novalis' "Monologue" and "Miscellaneous Writings" (all 
written between 1797-1800), represent a break with neo- 
classicism, and chart out a connection among self, 
language, aesthetics and the world that reimagine the 
relationship between clarity and ambiguity. There are 
three related but distinguishable aspects of Schlegel's 
and Novalis' break that are worthy of note: language, 
inexhaustibility, and freedom of form,
i. Language beyond Communication
In the beginning of his "On Incomprehensibility," Schlegel 
blithely wonders, "Of all things that have to do with 
communicating ideas, what could be more fascinating than 
the question of whether such communication is actually
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possible?" (32).4 Playful as the question is, it throws 
into doubt the teleology of all discourse. That is, can 
language be used to communicate ideas? And if it can't, 
then is there any "use" beyond it? Schlegel's short 
though far-reaching essay carves out for language its own 
metaphysics. It draws attention to the words themselves 
aside from either their "end" (ostensibly communication) 
or authorial intention. One of his goals, he writes, is 
"to demonstrate that words often understand themselves 
better than do those who use them . . . " (33). The 
question of incomprehensibility is tied to the question of 
the words themselves, which appear to have a life of their 
own.
Because comprehensibility does not exhaust language,
Schlegel can only come to the conclusion, however
rhetorically paradoxical, that incomprehensibility,
instead of being an obstacle to human relationships and to
the political order, is actually the "salvation" of them,
and if it is an obstruction to the entire project of
enlightenment, then that project ought to be re-thought:
But is incomprehensibility really something so 
unmitigatedly contemptible and evil? Methinks 
the salvation of families and nations rests 
upon it. . . . Yes, even man's most precious 
possession, his own inner happiness, depends in 
the last analysis, as anybody can easily 
verify, on some such point of strength that 
must be left in the dark, but that nonetheless 
shores up and supports the whole burden and
4 All Schlegel and Novalis references taken from German 
Romantic and Literary Criticism, edited by Kathleen 
Wheeler.
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would crumble the moment one subjected it to 
rational analysis. Verily, it would fare badly 
with you if, as you demand, the whole world 
were ever to become wholly comprehensible in 
earnest. And isn't this entire, unending world 
constructed by the understanding out of 
incomprehensibility or chaos? (38)
The essay assiduously avoids all definitions or taxonomy.
Instead of the expected explication of epistemological
obstacles or logical fallacies that may hinder
comprehension, Schlegel gives a series of involutions that
perform his dictum— truth is not comprehensible, but
paradoxical:
All the greatest truths of every sort are 
completely trivial and hence nothing is more 
important than to express them forever in a new 
way, and wherever possible, forever more 
paradoxically, so that we won't forget they 
still exist and that they can never be 
expressed in their entirety. (35)
Marike Finlay writes that, "To an analytical hierarchy of
distinct and referentially meaningful categories, Schlegel
opposes, in the very practice of defining irony, a
constant flux, process, chaos, and dynamic a-systemicity"
(194). Irony lays bare the gap between language and
being.5 Thus incomprehensibility is not only unavoidable
because of the limits of "rational analysis" inherent in
communication, but that gap— the incomprehensible— may
indeed be the assumed condition of those cultural
institutions (families, states) that have comprehension as
their ostensible goal. Ernst Behler in his German
5 The dramatic irony of Greek tragedy on the other hand 
relies on ambiguity on the part of the characters and 
clarity on the part of the audience.
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Romantic Literary Theory argues for the radicality of this
gesture; contra Hans-Georg Gadamer, he writes:
The early Romantic theory of understanding 
should not be regarded as a historical phase of 
a step into a generally developing history of 
hermeneutics, as has often been maintained, but 
as a much more radical reflection upon the 
possibility of understanding which takes into 
account the amount of incomprehensibility, 
indeed, of not-understanding constituted in 
every act of understanding. (8)
In other words, Schlegel's and Novalis' is not one
hermeneutic among many, but a reflection on the conditions
of communication themselves. In his Monologue, Novalis
draws attention away from the external, referring function
of language— the question of hermeneutics— and bears down
on the internal action of the medium itself:
[N]o one knows the essential thing about 
language, that it is concerned only with 
itself. That is why it is such a marvelous and 
fruitful mystery— for if someone merely speaks 
for the sake of speaking, he utters the most 
splendid, original truths. But if he wanted to 
say something definite, the whims of language 
make him say the most ridiculous false stuff. 
(93)
The internal drive of language is "the essential thing." 
The comprehensibility of discourse is an illusion that 
vanishes when we realize this essential thing: that 
language has "whims," is wayward or vagrant. As Schlegel 
asserts in his "Ideas" 129a, "You're not really supposed 
to understand me, but I want very much for you to listen 
to me" (58).
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ii. The Unending
Because there is a priority given to the deferring 
function of language over its referring function, the 
ironic, critical stance is one of constant activity. This 
is because we and the world are fundamentally 
inexhaustible. As Novalis' "Miscellaneous Writing" 6 
indicates: "We will never understand ourselves entirely, 
but we are capable of perceptions of ourselves which far 
surpass understanding" (84). Schlegel therefore sees a 
necessity in re-casting the "greatest truths . . . forever 
more paradoxically." This need to restate shows another 
aspect of the Romantic position: notions of the unending, 
the infinite, the inexhaustible.6 Schlegel and Novalis 
tie this inexhaustibility specifically to texts and the 
act of criticism. In his Critical Fragment 20, Schlegel 
writes that "A classical text must never be entirely 
comprehensible. But those who are cultivated and who 
cultivate themselves must always want to learn more from 
it" (40). Criticism is not end-stopped; it has no 
conclusive intention.
Just as for Kant the work of art is literally to no 
purpose, for Schlegel criticism has no end, no telos.
That does not mean there should be no criticism; as he 
indicates in Fragment 57, criticism is not necessarily
6 Previous understandings of the infinite appear to have 
been limited to divine attributes, mathematical infinity, 
and the in-principle divisibility of matter (Zeno's 
arrow); predicating infinity of the critical act seems 
quite new.
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dissection, nor is it merely response. Rather, criticism
is a continual dialogue between building and destroying
one's reactions, one's self; Critical Fragment 28 sketches
this attitude: "Feeling (for a particular art, science,
person, etc.) is divided spirit, is self-restriction:
hence a result of self-creation and self-destruction"
(41). The practice of criticism is the ironic stance that
interiorizes that unending, infinite movement of the
cosmos; it replicates in the mind that chaos that is
external to it. Idea 69: "Irony is the clear
consciousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming
chaos" (56). Again, Novalis' Miscellaneous Writing 65:
"The great mind would make of every acquaintance, every
incident, the first item in an infinite series— the
beginning of a never-ending romance" (90).
iii. Vagrancy of Form
Schlegel's and Novalis' writings display an impetus
towards freedom in both subjectivity and expression of
artistic form. The notion of a stable, personal self is
doubted in Romanticism; rather, it is seen less as a
unitary conscious agent than the sub-ject, "thrown under"
manifold forces, many beyond comprehension. Jochen
Schulte-Sasse frames the issue in the Foreword to Geza von
Molnar's Romantic Vision, Ethical Context:
Consequently, early romantic thought addressed 
the basic question: can subjectivity constitute 
itself in a manner free from domination when 
the constricted social context has inevitably 
engraved itself on that subject, both in 
material and linguistic terms? (xx)
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The Romantic reconstitution of the subject took form in 
linguistic terms in the literary method which Novalis, 
Schlegel and others chose to employ: the fragment.7 
Schlegel's Athenaum Fragment 206 has it: "A fragment, like 
a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from 
the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a 
porcupine"8 (48). The fragment form therefore implies a 
skepticism regarding the ability of the human mind to 
comprehend the "surrounding world." As the Ideas 150 
explains: "You can neither explain nor understand the 
universe, but only contemplate and reveal it" (59).
The fragment form allows for maximization of 
compactness. In his Miscellaneous Writing 70 Novalis 
explains:
Our language is either mechanical— mechanical—  
atomistic or dynamic. But true poetic language 
should be organic and alive. How often one 
feels the poverty of words to express several 
ideas at a blow. (90)
Though its goal is to express "several ideas at once," the
fragment is "complete in itself." Moreover, it is not
just the fragment form that displays this freedom; the
novel, the "romantic book" is the most inclusive form
7 Walter Benjamin wrote his Habilitationsschrift, The 
Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism on the 
fragment form. Also, the title of Novalis' work Pollen 
emphasizes the ripe potentiality of this scattered form.
8 As B. Cowan points out, a better translation for 
Schlegel's word "Igel" is "hedgehog"; Peter Firchow's 
"porcupine" ("Stachelsweine") misses the self-containing 
aspect of a rolled-up hedgehog while adding an aggressive 
relation to the exterior world quite opposite to the point 
of the fragment.
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because it is a meta-genre that comprehends elements of 
all. In Critical Fragment 26, Schlegel writes, "Novels 
are the Socratic dialogues of our time. And this free 
form has become the refuge of common sense in its flight 
from pedantry" (40). Because it is a "free form" not 
bound by temporal styles, it can counter "pedantry." If 
opinion is Socratic doxa, then that which runs "alongside" 
it ought to be valorized: the paradoxical. "Critical 
Fragment" 48: "Irony is the form of paradox. Paradox is 
simultaneously everything good and great" (42). The 
Romantics revive the paradox, a form which (in English) 
had enjoyed popularity last at the end of the 
Renaissance.9
The shift from an ideal of beauty such as the one 
presented by "the systematic Winckelmann" (Schlegel's 
jibe, Athenaum Fragment 149), to an understanding 
requiring a freedom of form was prepared for by Kant's 
distinction in the Critique of Judgement between 
pulchritudo vaga and pulchritudo inhaerens (§16, 17). The 
latter, "conditioned beauty," inheres in those things
9 As Rosalie Colie points out in her study Paradoxica 
Epidemica, the paradox as a literary trope enjoyed 
enormous popularity during the Renaissance. Paradoxes 
"play with rational discourse" and often resolve into 
irrationality. Yet they are not mere egregious displays 
of wit. As Colie shows, during the Renaissance they 
assumed and pointed to an understanding of the 
fundamentally mysterious aspects of the world (33ff). 
Colie ascribes their decline in popularity to the rise of 
an empiricism which had little time for mystery (508ff).
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whose form is restricted by purpose— namely, the person. 
"Free" beauty, or vague beauty, on the other hand is not 
fixed by a purpose as human beauty is. Schlegel and 
Novalis take the notion of freedom, the indeterminacy of 
form (vaga, the vague, the vagrant) as a determinate 
element of a new aesthetic sense. Poetry under the 
Romantics takes on almost personal attributes, especially 
Kantian autonomy, and becomes a free subject: Critical 
Fragment 65: "Poetry is republican speech: a speech which 
is its own law and end unto itself, and in which all the 
parts are free citizens and have the right to vote" (42) .
Much of Schlegel's and Novalis' thought can be
summarized in Schlegel's notion of the arabesque. In his
"Letter on the Novel" he asks his interlocutor about
Tristram Shandy:
Now ask yourself if your enjoyment was not 
related to what we often experience while 
viewing the witty paintings called arabesques. 
In case you cannot deny some sympathy with 
Sterne's sensibility, I am sending you a book, 
but I have to warn you about it so that you 
will be careful with regard to strangers for it 
has the fortune or misfortune to be somewhat 
notorious. It is Diderot's The Fatalist. I 
think you will like it and will find in it an 
abundance of wit, quite free from sentimental 
admixtures. It is designed with understanding 
and executed with a firm hand. Without 
exaggerating I can call it a work of art. To be 
sure, it is not a work of high rank, but only 
an arabesque. But for that reason it has in my 
eyes no small merit; for I consider the 
arabesque a very definite and essential form or 
mode of expression in poetry. (75)
10 "The only being which has the purpose of its existence 
in itself is man, who can determine his purpose by reason" 
(69).
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This last line implies that for Schlegel the term 
summarizes both his critical efforts and his method of 
evaluating individual texts. Sandra Naddaff in her study 
Arabesque writes that this eastern term entered the 
western visual arts vocabulary first around 1555, during 
the Italian Renaissance (111). Though it is a 
fundamentally organic style "derived from a denaturalized 
leaf or tendril pattern," its repetitiousness, because it 
is potentially unending, reflects "a concern for the 
infinite and eternal" (113). Schlegel broadens the term 
when he uses it in a narrative context; for him the novel 
as romantic book would display its own linguistic nature 
and freedom of form. Arabesque repetition defers a telos 
and puts emphasis on the medium while paradoxically 
establishing a relation to the eternal in the potential 
for infinite duplication- Because our nature, as Novalis 
writes in his Dialogues, has an "inclination to custom and 
easy habit," it must be brought into critical engagement 
precisely through such devices.
The Beautiful, the Sublime
The Romantic aesthetic that stressed the infinity of 
the finite, depth of feeling, and self-reflection in 
criticism and language over the clarity of neo-classicism 
found parallel expression in the well-known distinction 
between the beautiful and the sublime. Where Kant gives a 
full account of the difference in his third Critique, 
Edmund Burke's treatment in A Philosophical Enquiry into
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the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(1757) would be just as influential for English 
Romanticism. In general, the sublime describes that 
aesthetic quality that evokes fear and awe through its 
presentation of the great, the vague, or the terrible.
Burke's treatise shows its empirical roots, the weak
methodology that Kant later tried to shore up with his
appeal to a subjective law, universally imputed. Much of
Burke's treatise however does anticipate and parallel
Kant's distinctions. In differentiating the beautiful
from the sublime, Burke somewhat contradictorily tries to
retain an appeal to the senses while coming close to
imparting universal aesthetic principles:
Sublime objects are vast in their dimension, 
beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty 
should be smooth, and polished; the great, 
rugged and negligent; . . . ; beauty should not 
be obscure; the great ought to be dark and 
gloomy. - . . (60)
The sublime is associated with darkness, the vast, the
infinite, and the terrible. Kant will indicate the same
forces at work in §28 of his "Analytic of the Sublime."
Some examples of the sublime are:
Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening 
rocks; clouds piled up in the sky, moving with 
lightning flashes and thunder peals; volcanoes 
in all their violence of destruction; 
hurricanes with their track of devastation; the 
boundless ocean in a state of tumult. . . .
(100)
Both Burke and Kant tie the sublime to danger; but 
moreover, Burke indicates that the passion awakened by the 
sublime is evoked not by clear ideas but by obscure ones;
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"In reality a great clearness helps but little towards
affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an enemy to
all enthusiasms whatsoever" (60). It is a sentiment that
finds parallel in Schlegel's "On Incomprehensibility":
once we comprehend something, its sublime aspect
disappears. For Burke, the truly sublime has an
association with the infinite:
But let it be considered that hardly any thing 
can strike the mind with its greatness which 
does not make some sort of approach toward 
infinity; which nothing can do whilst we are 
able to perceive its bounds; but to see an 
object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, 
is one and the same thing. A clear idea is 
therefore another name for a little idea. (63)
Both the German and English arts would be influenced by
this new-found appreciation of the sublime, and
commentators would re-read previous art (much as
Winckelmann did) in light of their preferred critical
practice.
English Romanticism
The English Romantics were conversant with many of 
the same issues that concerned Novalis and Schlegel.
There is in both movements a complication of and 
distancing from the notion of mimesis. Any previous 
poetic discourse naturally had a heightened awareness of 
its own linguistic status and even of polysemy. Dante's 
"Letter to Can Grande della Scala," for example, 
articulated the levels of scriptural interpretation. But 
all such approaches remain classicist in essence; Behler 
writes of these variations on the theme of mimeticism:
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In spite of these and many other deviations, we 
still feel entitled to characterize the 
classical and classicist views of literature as 
a theory of imitation, because of the belief in 
a pregiven reality for poetry, the assumption 
that literature relates to something outside, 
to an already existing reference point in the 
real world. (302)
The English interest in the philosophical issues inherent
in the transcendental idealism that influenced Novalis and
Schlegel was limited. Following Burke more than Kant,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth still raise
some of the same questions. With the movement away from
mimesis there is then a bearing down on the materiality of
language itself, emphasizing in turn both the plasticity
of language and its potential relation to the infinite.
But in the English Romantics there is another concern: the
psychology of the poet, the studying of the creative mind
and not only the analysis of the aesthetic object. The
subject becomes related to the infinite and the sublime in
a new way, with obscurity becoming a criterion of depth.
Coleridge
Much like the mystic Novalis' work, Coleridge's 
prose and poetry contain a theological drive, one more 
certain than Wordsworth's. Coleridge frames the issues of 
infinity, imagination, and form in relation to the 
humanistic, and especially religious, values that were 
familiar to him. In this sense his critique was less 
radical than Novalis' or Schlegel's, yet the thrust is the 
same: the obscure is related to the infinite, to the
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mysterious, the sacred. For example, his long poem The
Rime of the Ancient Mariner concerns the shift in
perspective the mariner-speaker undergoes. The ship is
cursed when the mariner kills the Albatross:
The very deep did rot: 0 Christ!
That ever this should be!
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs 
Upon the slimy sea.
About, about, in a reel and rout 
The death-fires danced at night;
The water like a witch's oils,
Burnt green, and blue and white.
(lines 122-130)
The speaker is hostile to nature, and looks upon it as
wholly other under the harsh light of the sun. The water
snakes themselves are indistinct— slimy figures upon slimy
ground; the gap of sympathy between subject and object is
complete. But later, "By the light of the Moon," the
Mariner sees the obscurity and indistinctness of the
creatures differently, as a luminescence:
Beyond the shadow of the ship,
I watched the water snakes:
They moved in tracks of shining white,
And when they reared, the elfish light 
Fell off in hoary flakes
Within the shadow of the ship 
I watched their rich attire:
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,
They coiled and swam; and every track 
Was a flash of golden fire. (272-281)
The mariner's mind re-creates things in the divine image.
This transformation scene mirrors Genesis, as God creates
world and man from his mind, and later sees them as
"good." Similarly, the mariner re-visions them, and
"blesses them unawares." The recreating mind allows the
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things to be as they are, in all their hiddenness; and 
once he accepts the creatures, the albatross falls off.
It is the acceptance of the experience of the 
indeterminate, the obscure, that allows the ancient 
mariner to be freed from the burdens of his own violent 
history.
The poetry and criticism of the English Romantics 
flow from the same source, thereby to a degree fulfilling 
Schlegel's hope for a unification of philosophy and 
poetry. In the Rime, the creating mind has automatic 
reference to a transcendent God. Coleridge's Biographia 
Literaria confirms this connection, where, in Chapter 
XIII, he describes the linkages that the imagination is 
capable of:
The imagination, then, I consider either as 
primary, or secondary. The primary imagination 
I hold to be the living power and prime agent 
of all human perception, and as a repetition in 
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I am. The secondary I consider 
as an echo of the former. . . . (304)
The primary imagination is an echo of the primordial act
of God's self-naming; Coleridge's notion of the mind's
benediction of created nature is in dialogue with an older
sacred writing, which makes its appeal to obscurity in
overtly theological terms.
Wordsworth
Coleridge's fixing of the obscure into a direct 
lineage of sacred texts is somewhat at variance with 
Wordsworth's more secularized perspective. Lucy Newlyn,
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in "'Questionable Shape': The Aesthetics of
Indeterminacy," writes:
Wordsworth . . . does not use the aesthetic 
category of the sublime merely as a function of 
divinity, but appears rather to offer notions 
of the unreachable as substitutes for God.
(222)
While Coleridge ties the indistinct and the obscure to the 
divine, Wordsworth institutes them in place of the divine. 
Obscurity as an access to sublimity is the recurring theme 
of the dialectic between self and past. In a short lyric 
"My Heart Leaps Up," the speaker's days are bound together 
in "natural piety"; in Book Twelfth of The Prelude of 1850 
the speaker describes "spots of time" (line 208) in which 
"our minds / Are nourished and invisibly repaired" (215). 
During a horse-back ride of his youth, the speaker becomes 
temporarily lost; to depict the sight of the wind-blown 
bluff, "I should need / colours and words that are unknown 
to man, / To paint the visionary dreariness . . . " (256- 
57). The memory however gives back a restorative 
association to overcome the oxymoronic "visionary 
dreariness." Yet the restorative "spots of time" too are 
beyond "words that are known to man," indescribable 
epiphanies from the soul:
The days gone by 
Return upon me almost from the dawn 
Of life: the hiding-places of man's power 
Open; I would approach them, but they close.
I see by glimpses now; when age comes on,
May scarcely see at all; And I would give,
While yet we may as far as words can give 
Substance and life to what I feel, enshrining, 
Such is my hope, the spirit of the Past 
For future restoration. (277-282)
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In Wordsworth then the sublime is interiorized. Man does 
not look to God for restoration, but rather looks within, 
to the self for this healing element, this "hiding-place 
of man's power." These obscure sites recede from the 
conscious life: "I would approach them, but they close." 
Efforts to elaborate on them, do justice in language, fall 
short and can go only "as far as words can give."
The retention of a theological perspective in 
Romantic criticism and poetry confronts one of the 
fundamental contradictions of Romanticism.11 Precisely at 
the time of the disappearance of the gods, there is a 
counter-movement to restore a notion of the "numinous," 
through displacement of the divine by the sublime. 
Ironically, God was the assurance of clarity, of form, of 
resplendence, and yet simultaneously he was shrouded in 
obscurity. When the epistemology of the Romantics, based 
as it was on empiricism and transcendental idealism, 
proved inconsistent with clarity (either as certainty or 
"resplendence of form"), then the dark, the obscure, the 
infinite were transported into the realms that were 
accessible, broachable by these epistemologies: the ego 
and nature.
Not only in its own time but in its rereading of 
Shakespeare and Cervantes the Romantics read with an eye
11 Similarly, the Romantics have a paradoxical attitude 
towards science; they share its empirical approach that 
discerns the concrete, but disdain its reductionist 
method.
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to those qualities that were paramount in their criticism:
Shakespeare becomes stormy and passionate, and Cervantes
becomes the idealistic seeker of sublime experience. Over
and over again the misunderstood character, the affinity
for the abyss, the ability to live without a clear-headed
purpose is given prominence. But perhaps this is a matter
of perspective? ironically, Keats accuses his
contemporaries of having lost a "negative capability," the
ability of "being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,
without any irritable reaching after fact & reason" (43).
Keats compares his contemporaries unfavorably to the
Elizabethans:
Modem poets differ from Elizabethans in this. 
Each of the modems like an Elector of Hanover 
governs his petty state & knows how many straws 
are swept daily from the Causeways in all his 
dominions & has a continual itching that all 
the Housewives should have their copper be 
scoured; the antients were Emperors of vast 
Provinces. . . . (61)
These "vast provinces" become an alluring, undiscovered
and undiscoverable country inconsistent with any
"irritable reaching after fact and reason." The sublime
elements in nature find corollary significance in the
obscure interior landscape of the self; these are the new
"vast provinces."
The American Translation
This undiscoverable country of the English and
German Romantics becomes translated easily into the New
World. America's Puritan origins readied the climate for
such a reception; Romantic concerns with the materiality
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of language, the hieroglyphic, and rhetoric on the one 
hand, and with nature and self on the other, would be 
welcome in a land in which the Puritans hoped to establish 
a civil theology, a New Jerusalem.12 How to read the book 
of nature insofar as it delimits one's future salvation 
takes on a moral urgency.
If America has, as Cornel West indicates, evaded
traditional philosophy of epistemology and metaphysics, it
is in part because of the possibility of the land to be
romantically read as potential, as "teeming chaos." Under
this condition, practical immediacies will be emphasized:
the evasion of epistemology-centered 
conceptions of philosophy— from Emerson to 
Rorty— results in a conception of philosophy as 
a form of cultural criticism in which the 
meaning of America is put forward by 
intellectuals in response to distinct social 
and cultural crises. (5)
Sacvan Bercovitch links this ethical response to the
cultural crisis embedded in the origins of the country,
particularly in the Puritan jeremiad tradition. The
jeremiad, with its emphasis on ethics and rhetoric over
ontology and epistemology, paradoxically thrives in an
indeterminate land. Even early conceptions of America
described it as a land without limitations; for example,
in Donne's Elegy 19 the lover has "license" in this
"newfound-land." Similarly, with the American translation
of Romanticism, when the sign becomes free from things
(Novalis' "the essential thing about language, [is] that
12 See, for example, R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam.
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it is concerned only with itself"), it takes on newfound
importance.
Herman Melville
All of Melville's major works show a concern with
ambiguities of moral action and linguistic expression.
Moby-Dick and Pierre provide salient examples. There are
"unnamable imminglings" surging throughout Moby-Dick} the
inscrutable, fluid, "watery world" surrounds the ship,
Melville's society writ small. Below the sea surface is
even more instability, the unfinished project of the God-
weaver: during Pip's sea-change, his anti-resurrection, he
sees the "unwarped primal world," and "God's foot upon the
treadle of the loom" (347). The indeterminacy of reality
finds its center in the white whale, the object not only
of Ahab's primal vengefulness, but also his curiosity. He
addresses Starbuck:
Hark ye yet again,— the little lower layer.
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard 
masks. But in each event— in the living act, 
the undoubted deed— There, some unknown but 
still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings 
of its features from behind the mask. If man 
will strike, strike through the mask! (144)
More significant than Ahab's revenge or his metaphysics is
the ambiguous epistemology of the "little lower layer,"
where everything in the novel is marked by "devious-
cruising" (468). In his study American Hieroglyphics,
John Irwin reveals this American concern with the "little
lower layer" as he traces the influence of Egyptian
hieroglyphs on American writers of the mid-nineteenth
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century. Writing of The Scarlet Letter, Irwin describes 
the philosophical milieu in which the hieroglyph was 
situated:
The post-Kantian awareness that what man knows 
is not an objective external world, but simply 
the internal structure of his own mind 
projected upon an essentially indeterminate 
ground, the feeling of being trapped in the 
self, the sense of the shattering of all 
absolutes because of the loss of objective 
knowledge— these are what the concept of the 
hieroglyph emblem evokes for Hawthorne. (241)
And a fortiori for Melville: Queequeg's tattoos, the
hieroglyphic markings on the whales' skin, Ahab's
character, the doubloon nailed to the mast, are at once
inscrutable (open to no interpretations) and indeterminate
(open to multiple interpretations). Ishmael, in "The
Whiteness of the Whale" chapter, describes the terror
associated with the vast indeterminateness of the color
white:
Is it that by its indefiniteness it shadows 
forth the heartless voids and immensities of 
the universe, and thus stabs us from behind 
with the thought of annihilation, when 
beholding the white depths of the milky way? Or 
is it, that as in essence whiteness is not so 
much a color as the visible absence of color, 
and at the same time the concrete of all 
colors; is it for these reasons that there is 
such a dumb blankness full of meaning, in a 
wide landscape of snows, a colorless, all-color 
of atheism from which we shrink? (169)
In Moby-Dick such visions are not quite the "clear
consciousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming
chaos" that Schlegel imagined; nor are they altogether the
experience of the Kantian sublime. The whiteness of the
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whale fills Ahab with hatred and Ishmael with horror.
Irwin notes:
but Ishmael's feeling is not so much a horror 
that is vague and nameless as a horror of the 
vague and nameless, a revulsion at the 
ultimately indefinite and uncertain nature of 
the world symbolized by the color white. (286)
If Moby-Dick appropriates the ambiguous into a
scheme where it denotes the noumenal and the theological,
then Pierre; Or, the Ambiguities, because the protagonist
is a writer, pays special attention to the ambiguity of
the aesthetic and the linguistic. Edgar Dryden in his The
Form of American Romance lists the novel's concerns:
the problem of reading; the questions of 
relatedness, of genealogical continuity and 
intertextuality (family structures and 
narrative forms); and, linking them all, the 
larger issues of repetitions and 
representation. (76)
No relationship in the novel lacks complexity. The
opening idyllic and sentimental Saddle Meadows scene is a
foil against which Pierre's increasingly entangled world
unfolds. As Dryden puts it, "the usual view of human life
as a linear, natural, biological process of generation and
procreation is replaced by one that portrays it as a
confusing play of images" (86). Genealogical ambiguity is
matched by interpretive obscurities. Variations of the
title-word "ambiguities" occur twenty-eight times in the
novel, but most often around acts of interpretation, many
centering around Pierre's reading the ambiguous smile in
his father's portraits. It is a Mona Lisa-like smile, and
because it is a representation of the absent father (he
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died in Pierre's boyhood), it becomes a focus of Pierre's 
genealogical and interpretive doubts. The portrait itself 
addresses Pierre: "Consider; the smile is the chosen 
vehicle for all ambiguities, Pierre" (84). Pierre's 
attempts to read the portrait only make himself more 
vague, and send him into reveries: "[T]hus sometimes stood 
Pierre before the portrait of his father, unconsciously 
throwing himself open to all those ineffable hints and 
ambiguities, and undefined half-suggestions . . . " (84). 
The enigmatic smile could express mutually exclusive 
states of mind— rapture, knowingness, or guilt— none out 
of character for the somewhat disreputable father. It is 
Pierre's inability to read the smile that sends him into 
late-night musings. In the end all this "play" has fatal 
consequences, with Pierre reading and misreading the signs 
and symbols around him, only stopping with Pierre's— and 
the novel's— simultaneous death. The novel itself seems 
to "make one pervading ambiguity the explanation of all 
the ambiguous details" (224).
William James
The recent resurgence of interest in America's only 
native philosophy, pragmatism, bears witness to the 
importance of the ambiguous in present discussions in both 
literature and philosophy.13 For William James (1842-
13 For example, Giles Gunn in his Thinking Across the 
American Grain lists Frank Lentricchia, Willard Quine, 
Clifford Geertz and Cornel West as among those broadly 
influenced by pragmatism (2).
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1910), philosophy-as-"conceptualism" is "irrelevant" to
life (366). Like Soren Kierkegaard, James rejects any
system that would imply Hegelian completeness, and
emphasizes instead experience's discreteness and
ambiguity. The world is not presented to us as clear and
distinct. Rather, as he notes in A Pluralistic Universe,
every experience is a microcosm:
Here, then, inside of the minimal pulses of 
experience, is realized that very inner 
complexity which the transcendentalists say 
only the absolute can genuinely possess. (363)
The world is experienced not as "monism," but as
"pluralism"; the only way to appreciate this adequately is
through a "radical empiricism" that acknowledges the
plenitude of experience. A description taking into
account such acknowledgment will be incomplete:
The word "and" trails after every sentence. 
Something always escapes. "Ever not quite" has 
to be said of the best attempts made anywhere 
in the universe at attaining all-inclusiveness. 
(367)
Over against the project of traditional philosophy, what
he terms "intellectualism," James employs thick
descriptions of conscious life that take into account
mutability and variety, a method of description that
anticipates and indirectly influences later phenomenology.
The words "and," "more," "overflow," "excess" recur
throughout his writing:
Every smallest state of consciousness, 
concretely taken, overflows its own definition. 
Only concepts are self-identical; only "reason" 
deals with closed equations; nature is but a 
name for excess; every point in her opens out
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and runs into the more; and the only question 
. . .  is how far into the rest of nature we may 
have to go in order to get entirely beyond its 
overflow. (364)
James includes empirical science among those Procrustean 
systems that would refuse to take the vague as vague; even 
"science" can become a Baconian "idol." It is discredited 
as "mushroom knowledge," which, though having made 
extraordinary discoveries, is a knowledge young and short­
lived. James at once embraces empiricism and yet trusts 
it only as one evidence among many. This skeptical 
attitude does not lead to quietism, however; on the 
contrary, it is precisely this fluid inexactness of the 
world that demands a response. Therefore James' work 
represents a movement away from the epistemological to the 
ethical, or rather more broadly, the practical, a practice 
that does not exclude the body, as previous 
"intellectualism" had, but rather incorporates it. "Our 
body itself is the palmary instance of the ambiguous" 
(205). The lived embodied life is precisely what our 
experience consists of. Finally, as the name conveys, 
pragmatism is a philosophy of practical action.
William Gavin quotes James himself in describing his 
project: "the re-instatement of the vague to its proper 
place in our mental life" (1). An adequate appreciation 
of the vague is an existential necessity; that is, for 
James, life is very much an unfinished project, which 
demands the participation of the subject. In The Will to 
Believe, he notes that the world as we see it "is only one
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portion of the total universe," and "there stretches 
beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we know 
nothing positive." Epistemology does not exhaust 
ontology. Gavin writes: "In our terms, metaphysically for 
James, reality is not only broader than the (presently) 
known; it is broader than the knowajble" (134).
Ultimately, James is concerned to avoid premature 
systematization of thought which excludes the openness and 
richness of the world. Indeed, he associates this
unknowable quality, about which we can know "nothing
positive," with surplus, with richness, and he sounds much 
like a Romantic in the way he speaks of this 
undiscoverable realm. This unnamed vastness has always 
been with us he says: as Gavin summarizes, "Vagueness, is 
not, ontologically speaking, a fall from grace" (179).
That is, life has always been an undetermined project. 
There has never been a point of originary clarity, a 
primal ontology which has since become occluded. Rather, 
the world over against the conscious mind is a ripe, full 
potency out of which we must make our life. In face of 
the potentiality of life, with all its vagueness, we must
make choices, project our lives in front of us. This pre-
ref lective or "affective" dimension in James which avoids 
premature systematization, "comes close to catching the 
basic feature of reality, namely its ambiguity" (Gavin 
173).
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
Chapter III. Extension and Reaction: 
Modernist Clearings
Even if no overarching, determinate definition in 
the sense of genus/species can be attached to the 
"modern," this does not mean that one element of modernism 
cannot be delimited.1 This chapter will trace modernism's 
part in the continuing shift in appraisal of ambiguity and 
clarity. To summarize the line of thought thus far: 
generally speaking, in the pre-Romantic Western tradition, 
clarity had universal approbation while genuine suspicion 
was attached to ambiguity. As the previous analysis 
argued, for the ancients as well as the medievals, clarity 
served as motive for thought and action. In epistemology, 
clarity as certain foundation was a possibility for 
Descartes as well as for Augustine one thousand years 
before. Similarly, ethical investigation involved the 
discovery of general moral laws that provided the clear 
basis for individual action as well as a general 
casuistry. By and large, aesthetic theory and practice 
saw the goal of art as the making pleasingly clear and
1 It is perhaps a particularly modem phenomenon that all 
talk of "the modern" must start with disclaimers regarding 
the necessity, irrelevance, unavoidability, impossibility, 
or uselessness of the word "modem." James Olney writes 
that while other terms from literary history conjure up 
definite associations, "modernist" has no such power:
"Modernist tells us nothing, offers us no essential clues 
to the nature of the literature that it pretends to 
modify" (450). Most critics imply a real, if fugitive, 
essence to the modern. Michael Levenson's pragmatic 
approach seems best: "As a rough way of locating our 
attention, 'modernism' will do" (vii).
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intelligible the disparate and confusing welter of 
experience.
Ambiguity, particularly in rhetoric and logic, was 
the cause of fallacy; in ontology, it was unformed being; 
in epistemology, the stage prior to the light of 
knowledge, and therefore the source of doxa, opinion. It 
had no discernible place in art— indeed was considered an 
anti-value. Usually ambiguity was seen in terms of 
privation: it was simply the lack of clarifying order, in 
other words, chaos. Wherever ambiguity occurred, it was 
re-worked to a point of clarification. It was, finally, 
clarity, in all of its guises, that was the goal of much 
pre-Romantic cultural activity.
But William James' emphasis on experience led him to 
conclude that the basic feature of reality is its 
ambiguity; if the cosmos did not offer the comfort of a 
secure ontology, it did present a world of possibilities. 
There are, however, counter-currents. Melville was a 
reader of the German Romantics, and is representative of a 
consciousness of the pitfalls of the romantic attraction 
to ambiguity: the abysmal solitude of the isolato, the 
vagrancy of the orphan, the suicidal tendencies of the 
romantic spirit. The modernist movement was part 
extension, part rejection, of romantic concerns. But one 
conspicuous way in which the modems set themselves 
against the romantics is through the modernist gesture of 
"clearing." Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), originator of the
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phenomenological movement, provides one way of transition 
that accounts for the modernist rapprochement with 
clarity, a clarity that manages a unique formulation, 
particularly as it appears in literature.
Husserl's philosophical work began as a rejoinder 
from a mathematician to the psychologists. It was as a 
response to criticism that his grounding of mathematical 
laws was excessively psychologistic that he published his 
Logical Investigations (1900-1901). There, abandoning any 
psychological underpinnings for math or logic, Husserl 
criticizes severely those who would derive the laws of 
logic from the working of the human mind and therefore 
make the discipline of logic ultimately a branch of 
psychology, a position widely held at the time. "In our 
psychologically obsessed age, few logicians have been 
quite able to steer clear of psychological 
misinterpretations of logical principles . . ." (121). To 
make logic subservient to empirical psychology is to 
destroy its foundations, rendering what should be a 
necessary science an empirical one.
Against a psychologism that argues that because 
logical processes take place in the mind they are 
reducible to mental phenomena, Husserl contends that the 
laws of logic (along with ideal objects such as musical 
tones, geometric figures and meaning-units) have an ideal 
existence and an a priori necessity free from all 
"empirical vagueness" (99) of induced psychological
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axioms. Thus while it is true that, as James would say, 
our quotidian experience is not given to us as clear and 
distinct, it is nevertheless the case, Husserl argues, 
that on some occasions we can readily perceive necessary 
logical laws, and indeed "Truth": "[T]he most perfect 
'mark' of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as 
immediate intimation of the truth. In the vast majority 
of such cases we lack such absolute knowledge of truth 
. . . " (61), and yet we can and do perceive with clarity 
those laws. Husserl criticizes all attempts to render 
non-psychological phenomena psychological. Husserl's 
critique entails finally a rejection of all forms of 
relativism, especially "specific relativism" (relativism 
based on membership to a certain species, e.g. 
anthropologism).
Though Husserl's main concern is to reestablish for 
logic a stable ground, his Investigations has implications 
for epistemology, metaphysics, and linguistics. His 
reaction against the romantic temptation to psychologism 
and anthropologism has scope broader than philosophy, and 
is indicative, if not representative, of the clearing 
gesture that is characteristic of modernism. And while it 
appears that the Cartesian appeal to apodeictic certainty 
seems not to have survived Husserl (indeed, he can perhaps 
be seen as the last great articulator of Platonic 
idealism), the spirit of reaction against romantic and 
pragmatic empiricism perdures in the modernist gesture of
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clearing. Five such moments of clarification are worth 
examining as indicative of this larger movement: 
philosophical clearings, tradition, abstraction, style, 
and epiphany.
i. Philosophical Clearings
Earlier it was noted that clarification was the goal 
of much pre-romantic cultural activity. In philosophy, 
clarity was not only the end-point of activity, but the 
beginning: not only omega, but alpha. For example, after 
having entertained several different theories regarding 
the nature of the soul, Aristotle clears them away to 
begin anew:
Let the foregoing suffice as our account of the 
views concerning the soul which have been 
handed on by our predecessors; let us now 
dismiss them and make as it were a completely 
fresh start. . . . (554)
It is a gesture repeated in much philosophy; negative 
criticism of other positions, pre-conceptions, judgments, 
all give way to a methodological clearing. The linear 
basis of Descartes' Second Meditation, with its metaphor 
of razing a house and its foundations, is perhaps the most 
famous instance of clearing away. As Brodsky Lacour has 
remarked, Descartes' clearing leaves the invisible, non­
extended geometrical point which serves as starting-point 
for the line which is the subject, "I."
Similarly, Husserl's phenomenology, especially as 
formulated later in his 1913 Ideas, demands a prescinding 
from the question of the real existence of beings. What
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is open to illumination is only the appearance-quality of
the objects.2 A true phenomenological description will
"bracket" "anticipatory ideas of every kind" (105), all
pre-conceived notions, even the very existence of the
being in question. This epoche provides the basis for
philosophy, and yet, Husserl claims, it is distinct from
all previous clearing gestures in philosophy:
If I do this, as I am fully free to do, I do 
not then deny this "world," as though I were a 
sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as 
though I were a sceptic; but I use the 
"phenomenological" emoxr), which completely bars 
me from using any judgment that concerns 
spatio-temporal existence (Dasein) . (110)
Such an epoche is a display of methodical indifference;
all theories and judgments are put in brackets, "untested
but also uncontested" (112).
In a very real sense then, the romantic dream of the 
synthesis of philosophy and poetry reaches its fruition 
with modernism. Schlegel's Critical Fragment 114 argues 
for the unity of the disciplines: "all art should become 
science and all science art; poetry and philosophy should 
be made one." Something parallel to philosophical 
clearing can be seen in modernist aesthetics. The 
clearing gesture that had long been an element in the 
western philosophical tradition is appropriated by 
literary modernism. It has already been noted here that
2 Josef Seifert traces a turn in Husserl's thought from an 
understanding of phenomena as thing-in-itself to phenomena 
as mere appearance-quality. See Back to the Things 
Themselves.
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Brodsky Lacour argues that Descartes' attempt at gaining a 
standpoint from which to draw the line of the self finds 
expression in modernist linearity. But perhaps the most 
significant clearing gesture modernism employs has to do 
with its relationship to tradition,
ii. Tradition
If the word "modem" implies an emphasis on the new 
and a discarding of antecedents, then surely each age has 
modern aspects. But it is not only that modernism more 
fully thematizes the question of tradition than 
previously? it is also that the modems express this 
desire for the new in an apparently contradictory manner.
For while they clear away the past in order to find 
autonomy, they do so, as several critics have pointed out, 
by returning to remote origins.
The modern attitude towards tradition has a synoptic 
text, found in T. S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent." Herbert Schneidau, in his Waking Giants, 
comments that this essay is "the nearest equivalent to the 
Communist Manifesto" for modernism (203). Eliot attempts 
to situate the new into dialogue with what had gone 
before. The modern attitude should, he argues, not be one 
of one-directional passivity; if tradition "consisted in 
following the ways of the immediate generation before us 
in a blind or timid adherence to its successes,
'tradition' should positively be discouraged" (4).
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Tradition ought not be rote imitation, but active 
incorporation.
It is easy to take Eliot's position for the opposite
of what it intends, to see him as requiring scholarship
over novelty. Yet Eliot's position does not advocate the
subsuming of the new in the old. That is rather, as
Umberto Eco points out, a medieval disposition toward
innovation. Eco, referring to Thomistic innovations in
medieval philosophy, writes that it was typical that new
discoveries occurred
under cover of silence and indifference. What 
mattered was to stay within the tradition, not 
to innovate. Innovation might occur, but 
without show. This was one of the most 
widespread and implicit of the methodological 
criteria of Scholasticism. (118)
Such an attitude privileges tradition over innovations,
with tradition consuming the new. For Eliot, however, the
movement is reversed, as the new appropriates the past.
By calling up the "presentness" of the past, the artist
cuts the "now" off from the causal chain of the past, and
opens it up to investigation and exploitation. Here is a
distinct mode of being traditional, one that requires a
radical separation from the past even as it demands that
the new communicate with the old.
Hannah Arendt notes that there are two different and 
perhaps simultaneous responses possible to the loss of a 
tradition. One may despair over the sudden deracination, 
or one may also find comfort in being put in a privileged 
epistemological position:
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With the loss of tradition we have lost the 
thread which safely guided us through the vast 
realms of the past, but this thread was also 
the chain fettering each successive generation 
to a predetermined aspect of the past. It 
could be that only now will the past open up to 
us with unexpected freshness and tell us things 
no one has yet had the ears to hear.3
It is this potential for "freshness" that the modems
sense. When one is no longer situated in a "home," when
the line of tradition is broken, there is sorrow over the
world lost to one. But if it is tragic, it is also
potentially freeing. For that very isolation grants a
freedom to precisely accept the tradition, which, because
it is no longer "responsible" for the present, can "tell
us things no one has yet had the ears to hear."
Thus cut off from previous tradition, the moderns
respond in a paradoxical manner: by re-tuming. Schneidau
describes the hold that the "atavistic" urge has on the
modern mind. Reacting against Victorian progressivism and
Darwinian evolution theory, the modems looked not to
their immediate successors, but their ancients, not to the
father, but to the grandfather. As Schneidau points out,
moderns drew on contemporary anthropological findings,
especially Jane Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of
Greek Religion and J. G. Frazer's The Golden Bough. This
atavism enabled a radical change of perspective:
This embrace of the archaic started many trains 
of thoughts, eventuating in a new fascination 
with such phenomena first as roots, and then as
3 Quoted in D. S. Came-Ross, Instaurations 11.
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objects of interest themselves. Now we have 
come full circle. Words like primitive have 
become in many contexts (the most important 
ones) more honorific than pejorative; this is 
an index of a great paradigm shift, and no more 
far-reaching intellectual revolution has 
occurred in the Western world. (23)
This revolution foregrounds an equivocation on the word
"original"; while for the Victorian it might have meant
"never before done, novel," for the modernist it was more
likely to mean "at the origin or beginning."4 The return
to the original becomes an attractive option in face of
present predicaments. Jeffrey Perl, in The Tradition of
Return, writes that the modernist desire to return
partakes in a general nostalgia; this nostos, he writes,
this "impulse to 'return' is rooted in the intuition that
problems have origins" (34). We reconsider a relatively
unproblematic former age in order to set the present
right. Homer's Odyssey provides Perl with the
historiographical pattern of that drive home to a less
complex, peaceful origin. Perl traces the impact this
urge to return had on modernist writers ("In my end is my
beginning"), and the political implications of the
apparently inevitable disillusionment with the return.5
The seinsvergessenheit Martin Heidegger speaks of in 
"The Origin of the Work of Art" hints at this occlusion of 
the original by the subjectivist strategies of modern
4 Ian Watt makes the same distinction in The Rise of the 
Novel 17.
5 Perl calls the violence that returns engender the "Book 
24 phenomenon," after Odysseus' slaughter of the suitors.
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history, and indicates another way in which this return is
made. The original, indicates Heidegger, can manifest its
truth if it is allowed to. His notion of truth as
aletheia, un-forgetfulness or "unconcealedness," depends
not on the correspondence between mind and thing, but the
opening of the thing. Aletheia is therefore "the
uncovering of being" (59):
Truth occurs precisely as itself in that the 
concealing denial, as refusal, provides its 
constant source to all clearing, and yet, as 
dissembling, it metes out to all, clearing the 
indefensible severity of error. Concealing 
denial is intended to denote that opposition in 
the nature of truth which subsists between 
clearing, or lighting, and concealing. (55)
There is here expressed a nostalgia for a primordial
clearing, a clearing which can occur through art, which as
techne "never signifies the action of making" but is
instead a "bringing forth of beings in that it brings
forth present beings as such beings out of concealedness
and specifically into the unconcealedness of their
appearance" (59).
The moderns then were seemingly faced with two 
possible options: either passively accept "tradition," and 
as an Allen Tate poem has it, "set up the grave / In the 
house? The Ravenous grave";6 or accept a progressive view 
of history, and posit the present as the superior 
accretion of what has gone before. Most moderns rejected 
these options, however, and chose a third: to cut
6 "Ode to the Confederate Dead," in The Fugitive Poets,
William Pratt, ed. 69.
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themselves off from history, and by so doing, make the 
past available for present-ation. One important 
expression of this was the return of the original, which 
made its appearance as the desire to appropriate the past 
in order to command it, a paradox most clearly seen in the 
two most important modernist theorists: Eliot and Pound.
Their newness takes the strange shapes of encyclopedism 
and translation (Eliot studied Sanskrit as a Harvard 
undergraduate, and Pound worked in twelve languages). In 
both, the attempt to gather up the past and exert 
direction over it presupposes precisely the estrangement 
of the past which is such a hallmark of modernist 
literature,
iii. Abstraction
Perhaps the most obvious instance of the clearing 
gesture that I say is an element of modernism is the 
movement toward abstraction in art. Michael Levenson's 
treatment of abstractionism in his A Genealogy of 
Modernism will help focus the discussion. Using T. E.
Hulme as a nexus of modernism's labyrinthine concerns,
Levenson argues that abstract art, in both its literary 
and plastic expressions, is a reaction to and criticism of 
previous traditions.7 It distances itself self­
consciously from previous art (compare J.M.W. Turner, or
7 Meyer Schapiro's "Introduction of Modem Art in America:
The Armory Show" in his Modem Art is a succinct 
introduction to abstract art. For an exhaustive study on 
literary abstractionism, see Charles Altieri's Painterly 
Abstraction.
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the Impressionists he anticipates, with Kandinsky, for 
example). There is a dismissal of chiaroscuro, of 
shadings and gradations of light, in favor of bold 
heraldic colors, clear sharp lines, and geometric shapes.
The movement denotes not just a parochial shift in art 
history, but a broad cultural action at work. In this 
movement, Levenson sees one figure as central not only for 
Hulme's thought but for this entire cultural shift:
Wilhelm Worringer.
In 1908 Worringer published his doctoral
dissertation, Abstraktion und Einfiihlung, a critique of
the theory of empathy in aesthetics, what Worringer
dismisses as "objectified self-enjoyment" (95). The urge
to abstraction (Abstraktionsdrang) with its lack of
concern for audience feeling, was diametrically opposed to
this view.8 Worringer elaborates:
the urge to abstraction finds its gratification 
in the beauty in the life-denying inorganic, in 
the crystalline or, in general terms, in all 
abstract law and necessity. (Levenson 95)
This urge to abstraction displaces the sentiment of
romantic empathy, which is, Worringer writes, "a happy
pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the
phenomena of the outside world" (95). As important,
however, is abstractionism's indictment of the humanism
which western, representative art presupposes. Any
reference whatever to the human subject implies for Hulme
8 Compare to Novalis' "Miscellaneous Writing" 70: "poetic 
language should be organic and alive" (90).
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a dangerous narcissism. Levenson traces Hulme's growing
consciousness that romanticism is only symptom and logical
conclusion of all western humanist aesthetics:
The romantic/classical opposition is simply not 
identical with the humanist/anti-humanist 
opposition— not in ordinary use, not in Hulme's 
use. Once Hulme saw humanism as the root of 
the problem, he ceased to regard the 
romantic/classical division as fundamental.
( 9 8 )
Only a position outside these conventional cultural 
oppositions such as "romantic/classical" could save 
western culture. Such was the position of Byzantine,
Egyptian and Oriental art; all are less mimetic, less 
humanist and less bound to a provincially anthropocentric 
ethos. For Hulme as well as Worringer, this is the 
significance of abstractionism: that it holds out the hope 
of a revitalized culture based not on vitalism, but on 
pure form. One way to view this movement is the 
transition from image to icon, where the icon's 
transparency to another reality makes no pretension to 
reality itself. Abstractionism is a clearing from, among 
other things, the anthropocentrism that Husserl argued 
against. Only the viewer's or audience's complete 
alienation from the art object on a representational level 
could guarantee autonomy for both.9
9 This alienation from the art object finds literary 
expression in Viktor Shklovsky's notion of 
"enstrangement."
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iv. That Modern Style
"Don't talk to me about politics, I'm only 
interested in style."10 If James Joyce is singular among 
moderns for his (ostensible) aversion to politics, he is 
not unique in his concern for style. Indeed, Herbert 
Schneidau identifies it as one of modernism's more 
original contributions.11 And though it seems the word 
has often been associated with the new (as in the 
thirteenth-century poetic movement "dolce stil nuovo," for 
example) the modems import a particular degree of 
distinction to its usage. Joyce's comment then may 
indicate not that politics and style are mutually 
exclusive, but that in modernity even political questions 
have stylistic presuppositions.
Such seems to have been Ezra Pound's thought. One 
might be accused of saying that since Pound says so much, 
it is easy to find support for a variety of opinions.12 
But one perduring element in his work (having lasted from 
his tutorship under Ford Madox Ford in 1909 until at least 
the late 1930's) is this high regard for clarity of style.
Thus the significance of a poem such as "In a Station of 
the Metro" may be less the way it represents mimetically 
the fragmentariness of the age, than the way it shows the
10 Quoted in Umberto Eco's The Aesthetics of Chaosmos, 86.
11 Lecture at Louisiana State University, April 5, 1996.
12 Pound's critical and political opinions change rapidly 
and radically, to say the least. See Perl, Schneidau and 
Hugh Kenner's The Pound Era for mappings of the 
vicissitudes of his thought.
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luminosity that clear, simple presentation affords.
Schneidau writes, "Pound was dedicated to an essentially
fragmentary poetics . . . not— as in the standard
classroom explanation— because he believed that a
culturally fragmented age demanded such a thing," but
because the crystalline moment was a good in itself. That
is why, Schneidau continues, "Pound moved for stark and
suggestive isolation, positing an aesthetic of arrested
attention" (228-229). This signaler and crystalline
quality has been pointed out by D.S. Came-Ross, who
opposes Pound's univocal simplicity to polysemous writing:
The thing, however concretely rendered, always 
"stands for" something else supposedly more 
important. But Pound is not polysemous; his 
first level doesn't point beyond itself. (213)
If, as Eliot writes in "The Dry Salvages" in The Four
Quartets, "we had the experience but missed the meaning,"
Pound's poetry seems to doubt that we even had the
experience. His poetry does not proffer an array of
meanings, but tries rather to regain an original
experience that has been lost.
Though Pound's early work (under the influence of 
Provengal poetry) tended towards elaboration and 
ornamentation, his later poetry came to embrace a leaner 
aesthetic. Influenced by Ford Madox Ford, "by 1912-1913 
Pound had adopted a vehemently anti-rhetorical critical 
perspective . . . "  (Levenson 106). He demands for poetry 
a "hard" language: an illustration. In the very beginning 
of his ABC of Reading (1934), Pound writes, "No man is
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equipped for modem thinking until he has understood the 
anecdote of [Louis Rodolphe] Agassiz and the fish" (17). 
Pound relates the story: the "great man" tells the
student to describe a sunfish; the student tries and 
falters. His scientific summary of the fish's qualities, 
then a four-page essay, are rejected in turn. "Agassiz 
then told him to look at the fish. At the end of three 
weeks the fish was in an advanced state of decomposition, 
but the student knew something about it" (18). What 
exactly that was, Pound does not say. But to judge from 
much of what follows in the rest of ABC, what the student 
learns has to do with de-composing, decreation, stripping 
away, and getting to the skeletal structure of things, 
especially words. "Good writers are those who keep the 
language efficient. That is to say, keep it accurate, 
keep it clear" (32).
Pound's dictum, "Dichten = condensare" (36) seems to 
be an outgrowth of his reverence for the unadorned "prose 
tradition" of Ford. Referring to Stendhal's style, Pound 
writes:
his so-called dignity of style, a la Louis XIV, 
and all that trail of what they call poetic 
ornament, is vastly inferior to prose if you 
are trying to give a clear and exact idea of 
the "mouvements du c a e u r if you are trying to 
show what a man feels, you can only do it by 
clarity. (97)
Perhaps nowhere is this desire for the skeletal, or the 
inner form of a thing, better shown than in Pound's essay 
"Machine Art" (1927-1930). In a section called "The Form"
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Pound writes: "we find a thing beautiful in proportion to
its aptitude to a function" (69). This appears to be no
mere functionalism, however. Maria Luisa Ardizzone notes
in her Introduction to Pound's Machine Art, the poet
replaces a mimetic (specifically Platonic) notion of
beauty with an aesthetic associated with the laws under
which a thing functions:
The critique of the concept of form is the key 
point on which Pound attacks one of 
metaphysics' strong points: beauty as the 
contemplation of an ideal realm, beauty as 
ideal form. Pound transforms this concept of 
beauty into the notion of form as law. (19)
Function helps focus attention, unencumbers art from
unnecessary reference to ideal realms. Even the example
Pound uses points to this desire for skeletal clarity, a
clarity rendered almost to the point of desiccation.
Speaking of the aesthetics of the automobile, he dismisses
all distracting concern for "traditional aesthetics,
feeling for furniture, upholstery, carosserie . . . "(69).
Instead, "the best firms exhibit the chassis. And the
chassis is indubitably the more interesting phenomenon"
(70).
Yet if Pound requires clarity in the language and 
other arts, it is a clarity dissociated from the taxonomic 
pedantry of the neo-classicists or scholastics. And even 
if "Literature is language charged with meaning" (28), it 
still must be shaped by the exigencies of clearness. That 
is why Pound asserts the practicality of language, writing 
contra Novalis that "Language is the main means of human
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communication" (32). Clarity is generated by efficient 
operation.
If what exactly Poundian clarity consists of is not 
apparent, its motivation seems more discernible. Though 
we've seen that anti-humanism plays some part in modernist 
aesthetics, it did not overwhelm all sympathy. Well 
before he made a commitment to fascist politics, Pound was 
concerned with the relationship between the arts and 
politics: Hulme died in the trenches, as did (on the
German side) one of Husserl's students, Adolph Reinach.13 
The general slaughter of World War I was a young memory, 
when, in "A Problem of (Specifically) Style" (1934), Pound 
suggested a correlation between thoughtless language and 
strife:
Even the death of the last survivors of the 
clogging and war-causing generation that 
preceded us, will not bring a new and illumined 
era unless at least the elite of ours or (that 
being unlikely) the next, make some effort to 
understand the function of language, and to 
understand why a tolerance for slipshod 
expression in whatever department of writing 
gradually leads to chaos, munitions-profiteers, 
the maintenance of wholly unnecessary misery, 
omnipresent obfuscation of mind, and a 
progressive rottenness of spirit. (122)
For Pound as well as Joyce, the statement "I'm only
interested in style" becomes wholly political, not
dissociating art from politics, but tying them together
more intimately. In fact, in modem literature, when all
else is "bracketed," what is left is often only style:
13 See Paul Fussell's The Great War and Modern Memory for 
how the war is remembered in literature.
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  cop yrigh t ow ner. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
9 7
thus its importance. Henry Sussman writes that it is no
accident that twentieth-century philosophy places
"enormous weight" on style:
Style becomes not mere aesthetic accompaniment 
or convenience, akin to the interior design of 
an office. It embodies and expresses the 
theoretical possibility of the discourse whose 
traits it provides. (81)
And if modem style is anything, it is plain and clear.
Pound writes: "Without just style, expression, no clear
idea, no law, no society having a decent order, no
amenity, no clean relations with things, ideas, or people"
(121) ,14
v. Culture as Detritus: Claritas as Epiphany
The atavistic urge that Schneidau describes 
evidences itself in James Joyce. Stephen Dedalus' much- 
noted redefinition of Thomistic claritas seems to partake 
of the urge to return— but here to original texts. 
Describing aesthetic perception in Thomas, Stephen tells 
Cranly:
The radiance of which he speaks is the 
scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing. 
This supreme quality is felt by the artist when 
the esthetic image is first conceived in his 
imagination. The mind in that mysterious 
instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading 
coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality 
of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic 
image, is apprehended luminously by the mind 
which has been arrested by its wholeness and 
fascinated by its harmony is the luminous 
silent stasis of esthetic pleasure. . . . (213)
14 Such a position made Pound vulnerable to the aesthetic 
promise of Italian Fascism. See Paul Morrison's Poetics 
of Fascism. Chapter Five.
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Umberto Eco, referring to Joyce's Stephen Hero, describes 
this resurgence of a medieval aesthetic expression into 
modernist writing in terms of the shift between two world­
views, from medieval unified cosmos to modernist 
fragmented chaos:
Although the epiphanies in Stephen Hero, 
identified with a discovery of reality, still 
retain a connection with the scholastic concept 
of quidditas, the artist now builds his 
epiphanic vision from the objective context of 
events— by connecting isolated facts in new 
relationships through a completely arbitrary 
poetic catalysis. (Chaosmos 26)
Eco sees Joyce proffering an essentially romantic answer
to this cultural break-up, a "conflict of a traditional
order and a new vision of the world" (3 0 ).15 Stephen uses
his inherited Catholic terminology
only to sustain a romantic idea of the poetic 
word as revelation and the poet as the only one 
who can give a reason to things, a meaning to 
life, a form to experience, a finality to the 
world. (23)
Thus the movement from claritas to epiphany outlines the
displacement and replacement of world-views:
The medieval artist was the servant of things 
and their laws, charged to create the work 
according to given rules. The Joycean artist, 
last inheritor of the romantic tradition, 
elicits meaning from a world that would 
otherwise be amorphous and, in so doing, 
masters the world of which he becomes the 
center. (29)
15 Much has been written in this regard on temporality. 
Georges Poulet in his Studies in Human Time describes the 
shift from an understanding of time as continuum to its 
partitioning; these "chaplets of time" cure the 
presupposition for the modernist "arresting" of moments.
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Morris Beja in his Epiphany in the Modem Novel notes that
though epiphanies make their presence felt in pre-modem
literature, they occur in modernist literature to a unique
degree. He calls epiphany
a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether from 
some object, scene, event, or memorable phase 
of the mind— the manifestation being out of 
proportion to the significance or strictly 
logical relevance of whatever produces it. (18)
Epiphany is therefore not epistemological like anagnorisis
(discovery), but spiritual, yet deracinated from any
theology. In a culture of debased tradition, epiphany is
a secular, romantic replacement for religious revelation.
Its focus is on the minutiae of quotidian life; for all of
its spiritualization, there is in modernist epiphany a
bourgeois fascination with the texture of tangible
feelings and objects, similar to that found in a realist
novel. Ashton Nichols agrees, and in The Poetics of
Epiphany argues that "Joyce systematizes a means of
bestowing significance on objects and mental states that
would have previously been considered trivial" (12).
Nichols goes on to assert that this valorization of 
the ordinary has its roots in Wordsworth. Yet perhaps 
Nichols' and Eco's genealogies are too "traditional" in 
that they make antecedents causes of later phenomena, and 
thereby tie Joyce's notion of epiphany too closely to the 
romantic notion of genius. Eco supposes that Joyce's use 
of Thomistic categories constitutes only a framework 
inherent in his residual Catholicism, one that allows him
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
100
to speak of the psychology of poetic creation while 
simultaneously distancing himself from that framework's 
rigorism. Yet this emphasis on Joyce's (and Stephen Hero- 
Dedalus') background blinds Eco to Joyce's participation 
in the larger movement here outlined. However suggestive 
Eco's insight into the continuities of Joyce's modernism 
with romanticism, it effaces the difference between the 
romantic and modern aesthetics of clarity. Surely one of 
the "nets" Stephen Dedalus will "fly by" is the 
stultifying romanticism of empathy- When Joyce speaks of 
epiphany, he means it in stylistic and ontological ways as 
much as in psychological, and in fact ironizes Dedalus' 
romanticism.16
It is agreed however that the modernist epiphany is 
very far from the possibility implicit in the clarity of 
abstract laws, where existing things are illumined by 
participation in the ontology of a total cosmos. Rather, 
modernist epiphany is the clarity of the immediate, 
contingent object. Joseph Conrad in the 1897 "Preface" to 
The Nigger of the "Narcissus" is prescient of the tensions 
inherent in modernism.17 The artist, Conrad writes,
"descends within himself," appealing to "our capacity for 
delight and wonder," to "our sense of pity, and beauty, 
and pain; to the latent feeling of fellowship with all
16 This ironization of epiphany as artistic insight I 
think is present even in Portrait: for example, see the 
mock-heroic tone of the pandying-scene of the first 
chapter, and Stephen's adulation of Shelley, for example.
17 My reading here is to some extent indebted to Levenson.
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creation": all tasks important to the romantics (145). On 
the other hand, the artist must "attempt to render the 
highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by 
bringing to light the truth, manifold and one, underlying 
its every aspect." Conrad vacillates between the desire 
for empathetic "solidarity"— the keyword of the "Preface" - 
-and harsh though just illumination of "facts."
Modernism, therefore, finds itself perched between 
the two poles of enacting romantic "solidarity" (the 
dangers of which Conrad's novel explicates) and discovers 
the "one illuminating and convincing quality— the very 
truth of [facts'] existence." Because the object— what he 
terms the "rescued fragment" is itself contingent, 
isolated from all participatory ontology, the 
epiphenomenon of clarity which supervenes on those 
"fragments" is all the more ephemeral. Condensed in 
Conrad's assertion is a crisis view of aesthetics in 
conversation with a crisis view of history:18 thus the 
contradictions of modernist aesthetics. Its anti-humanist 
urge demands an abandonment of all aesthetics of empathy, 
yet one of its main concerns is the revivification of 
culture, the shared matrix of feeling and form. It is 
concerned with total clear form, yet its ontology demands
18 See Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of 
History" (1940) in his Illuminations for such a crisis 
view : "The true picture of the past flits by. The past 
can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the 
instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again"
(255).
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attention be paid only to fragments. It discards any 
optimism associated with Victorian progressivism, but 
realizes that the atavistic, the return phenomenon, 
confronts the modem not with the hoped-for clarity, but 
with the runic and the oracular, a world like Oedipus', 
where Eliot's Madame Sosostris becomes the best possible 
reader.
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Chapter IV. The Aesthetics of the Vague: 
"Conviction and Taste" in Henry James's 
The Ambassadors 
Transition: Taxonomy, Exemplification
A transition is needed between the foregoing 
historical survey and the subsequent examination of 
specific literary texts.1 Even within the limited scope 
and competence of the present study, clearly the terms 
"clarity" and "ambiguity" undergo certain shifts in 
application. Yet it is apparent that there is no 
originary meaning of the terms existing free of historical 
vicissitudes; there is no occluded arche of the terms we 
are responsible for retrieving, even were we able to do 
so. Meaning is dynamic, where even in the present 
ambiguity and clarity have an active relationship to each 
other, one vacillating between contrariety and 
complementarity. Such dynamism is no excuse for 
obscurity, however, and there is a profit in arresting the
terms for a moment, even if such a taxonomy breaks down in
the study of the texts.
Clarity seems to have resolved around three 
predominant topoii i. clarity as a dramatic process—
catharsis as clarification; ii. clarity as a specific
aesthetic value, the luminosity supervening on a thing as
1 The first three chapters may be considered a "history of 
the ideas" of clarity and ambiguity. This is said however 
with some awareness of the problematic ontology the phrase 
involves (that is, whether these "ideas" exist outside of 
individual personal consciousness or are transmitted 
through time inter-subjectively, and therefore 
contingently).
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radiance, be it medieval (on "form,") or modern (on the 
"fragment"); iii. clarity as a self-evidence from which 
one may derive certain knowledge.
Ambiguity has similarly been used here in the widest 
sense, and encompasses: i. strict ambiguity— the existence 
of two possible references for one word; ii. vagueness— in 
William James's thought, for example, the fluidity of the 
world over against the conscious mind; iii. polysemy— for 
medieval exegesis, for example, the existence of multiple 
meanings in a text (especially a literary text).
This study has tended to draw together these diverse 
meanings in order to place the two terms in dialogue with 
each other in the hopes of outlining a larger movement 
between them, and sketching reasons for shifts in their 
evaluation. But juxtaposing the two for contrast does not 
therefore mean that the groupings are arbitrary and merely 
nominalistic. It is no accident that Aquinas regards 
clarity as an aesthetic value at a time when the mind was 
thought to be meaningfully related to the ratio of a 
thing. Such was the predominant understanding at least 
through Winckelmann. Conversely, ambiguity is eschewed in 
a system (the Stoic, for example) that assumes the 
intelligibility of ethical choice, and takes on positive 
significance only when there is a lack of cultural 
consensus regarding fundamental aesthetic and
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epistemological issues.2 The shifts in evaluations of the 
terms, therefore, reflect shifts in epistemological and 
aesthetic understandings.
To display this dynamic between the terms at work 
requires a turn to the specific literary works. And yet 
it seems the texts themselves cannot be merely 
exemplifications of either these terms or the larger 
movement. It would be impossible to trace the 
multifarious shiftings of the terms in the few texts 
examined. In addition, as the German literary critics 
indicate, one may question at some level the ability of a 
literary text to "exemplify" anything but itself.3 This 
in fact is one of the questions that the transmutations 
between clarity and ambiguity evinces. For if M. H.
Abrams and others are correct in seeing a shift away from 
a mimetic understanding of art during the Romantic period, 
then such a shift certainly questions what the end of art 
is, and questions too the possibility of clarification in 
art. This chapter will attempt to lay out what types of 
clarity literature affords considering this shift, doing
2 Similarly, Elizabeth Bruss in her Beautiful Theories 
sees a relation between the rise of critical theory after 
WW II, with its "multiple interpretive strategies," and 
"the breaking up of the appearance of consensus in the 
culture as a whole . . . " (17ff).
3 Regarding exemplification, Hillis Miller points out the 
difficulty Kant has in reconciling the empirical nature of 
exemplification with the abstract moral law he precisely 
wants to free from such contingencies (Ethics of Reading 
24ff).
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so, paradoxically, by focusing on one of Henry James's 
most ambiguous novels, The Ambassadors.
It is something of a cliche that James's fiction is 
ambiguous, and that his last novels especially frustrate 
interpretive efforts. In terms of the historical 
development of the terms sketched in the first three 
chapters, the reason for this should be somewhat apparent.
James is an inheritor of Romantic aesthetic assumptions;4 
many of his novels enact the meeting of the beautiful as 
the vague (which had become one of the tenets of Romantic 
aesthetics) with the promise of art to clarify (a promise 
assumed to be fulfillable at least since Aristotle's 
privileging of poetry over history).5 This is done in 
James under the auspices of the generic requirements of 
the novel, "the most independent, most elastic, most 
prodigious of literary forms."6 The Ambassadors will be 
taken as symptomatic. It traces the steps and mental 
operations of Strether as he interprets the aesthetic and 
moral phenomena he encounters, all of which prompt him to 
ask these fundamental questions: what is the profit and 
cost of narration? What is the relationship between a 
narrated life and a lived-through life? How does one make 
ethical choices (clarity) in the face of possibility
4 For broader discussions, see Charles Schug's The 
Romantic Genesis of the Modem Novel, especially Chapter 
4; also Daniel Fogel's Henry James and the Structure of 
the Romantic Imagination.
5 Poetics 9.3.
6 Henry James, Preface to The Ambassadors, 15. All 
references taken from the Norton Critical Edition, 1964.
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(ambiguity)? How does the aesthetic as the vague
influence those ethical choices? In all, the novel will
help us see whether clarity can manifest itself in
literature at a newly ambiguous time.
Ambiguity in James: Critical Reception
After his first puzzling interview with Chad,
Strether sits at a cafe with Chad's friend John Little
Bilham and asks:
"What game under the sun is he playing?" He 
signified the next moment that his allusion was 
not to the fat man immersed in dominoes on whom 
his eyes had begun by resting, but to their 
host of the previous hour, as to whom, there on 
the velvet bench, with a final collapse of all 
consistency, he treated himself to the comfort 
of indiscretion. (110)
The short scene has elements typical of many in The
Ambassadors. It contains the first dialogue in about one
hundred lines, yet Strether begins with a question, as if
nothing in the previous text has been settled; it is
backward-glancing ("of the previous hour"); Strether uses
a metaphor that is mistaken as literal by someone else
("what game": Strether does not mean "dominoes"—
significantly, a game of "black and white"— but the more
gray and vague social game); there is a "final collapse"
of both logical categories ("consistency") and moral
propriety ("indiscretion").
James's fiction is laden with such scenes, and
critics at least since Edmund Wilson's essay "Ambiguity in
Henry James" (1934) have investigated the role of the
ambiguous in his fiction. Wilson's essay on "The Turn of
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the Screw" is actually a quite straightforward Freudian
reading, with the central character, the governess, a case
of projected sexual frustration:
When one has once got hold of the clue to this 
meaning of The Turn of the Screw, one wonders 
how one could ever have missed it. There is a 
very good reason, however, in the fact that 
nowhere does James unequivocally give the thing 
away: almost everything from beginning to end 
can be read equally in either of two senses.
(105)
Wilson settles the ambiguity through extra-textual "clues" 
given by James, making ambiguity an ultimately resolvable 
stylistic device employed to garner suspense.7
But for Shlomith Rimmon true ambiguity cannot be 
resolved. In her The Concept of Ambiguity— the Example of 
James, Rimmon gives an exhaustive taxonomy of logical 
ambiguity, distinguishes it from related phenomena, and 
interprets several of James's works. Ambiguity as Rimmon 
defines it is the existence of mutually exclusive yet 
"copresent and equitenable" (and therefore undecidable) 
interpretive possibilities (9). Strict ambiguity must be 
distinguished from vagueness (a term that admits of 
varying degrees), and multiplicity of meanings or 
indeterminacy (which need not be mutually exclusive).
Rimmon's definition in the context of the present 
study seems unhelpfully narrow; it is actually quite close 
to the Stoic definition, but lacks the ethical
7 Appendix B of Dorothea Krook's The Ordeal of 
Consciousness in Henry James treats the reception and 
criticism of Wilson's article (370-389).
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relationship and import the Stoics assume. Further, she 
too firmly separates ambiguity from related phenomena such 
as vagueness and indeterminacy. Rimmon makes the 
distinctions so strong in the hope that her treatment will 
"stop endless debates among critics, debates motivated by 
a compulsion to choose between mutually exclusive 
hypotheses, when the very phenomenon of ambiguity makes 
such a choice impossible and undesirable" (xiii).
Regardless of the alleged value of the desire to "stop 
endless debates," this hope could only be carried out by 
definitively labeling a particular text "ambiguous" in her 
restricted terms; this would only shift the debate to 
determining which (apparently few) texts fit this narrow 
category.
Alternately, Ralf Norrman, in his study The Insecure 
World of Henry James's Fiction: Ambiguity and Intensity, 
treats the stylistic elements of ambiguity in James's 
fiction. He distinguishes five types: pronoun ambiguity, 
which makes references unclear; end-linking (connection of 
linguistic elements in successive sentences, through 
repetition, for example) which suggests a timid narrative 
casting back; emphatic affirmation, a version of 
"protesting too much"; linguistic "formulas," stock 
phrases which produce an incantatory effect on reality; 
and most importantly, chiastic inversions such as "Fair is 
foul and foul is fair," which indicate most radically that 
James's world "is a world characterized by insecurity,
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which is manifested in style in ambiguity-and-intensity-
creating devices" (185). This last is the most
significant form of stylistic ambiguity:
In a chiasmus the two halves are each other's 
inversions; each other's mirror-images. The 
direction within a chiasmus is towards the 
middle. It is reflected there.
Chiasmus is therefore typical of 
narcissistic people. . . . (187-88)
Norrman considers chiasmus in James's fiction central and
especially pathological, for it indicates metaphysical
uncertainty that makes any action "dread-ful."8
As valuable as these studies are, when they attempt 
to place Jamesian ambiguity in a larger context, they 
emphasize epistemological and linguistic issues. For all 
the critical attention James's stylistics garner, 
relatively few works address his situation in a broader 
history of aesthetics, or in the context of the history of 
ideas. For their own valuable purposes, they take 
"ambiguity" narrowly, failing to engage what impact the 
valorization of ambiguity has on its interlocutor,
8 Other treatments of Jamesian ambiguity include Charles 
Thomas Samuels' The Ambiguity of Henry James— not an 
interpretive, but an evaluative work. Samuels goes 
through much of James's oeuvre; ambiguity seems for him 
identical with successful technical complexity. "In his 
confused novels, James makes us expect clear advocacy or 
derogation and then either fails to validate or actually 
blurs his own distinctions. The ambiguous books reflect 
such errors but don't succumb to them. The complex novels 
avoid them entirely" (8). The Ambassadors is James's best 
novel, for "In no other novel does James make such peace 
with things as they are" (204). Jean Frantz Blackall's 
Jamesian Ambiguity and The Sacred Fount does not treat 
ambiguity per se, but rather only as an aspect of The 
Sacred Fount, which she sees as transitional between 
James's "experimental" phase and the last three novels.
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clarity. Since the purpose of this study is to outline a 
larger shift than can be accounted for by these specific 
studies, it is useful to reconsider Jamesian ambiguity, 
for The Ambassadors is the site of a clash of two notions 
of ambiguity: ambiguity as multiplicity of interpretive 
possibilities, and ambiguity as vagueness (but as we shall 
see, a specifically aesthetic vagueness). In the 
background of these two ambiguities is catharsis as 
clarification, the hope that art (the story) can help 
clarify life. The novel enacts the internal disharmony of 
the promise of the literary to clarify under the auspices 
of an aesthetics of the vague. To display this 
confrontation, four areas will be investigated: the 
beautiful as the vague; the story as seduction; 
recognitions; and repetition.
The Beautiful as the Vague
Henry James' s The Ambassadors unfolds the drama of 
consciousness of the fifty-five-year old American Lewis 
Lambert Strether. He is sent by a widowed Woollett matron 
to retrieve her estranged son Chad, who had become 
entangled with a woman, a woman Strether assumes is "base, 
venal— out of the streets" (45). Chad is expected to run 
the family business, and Strether is expected to have Mrs. 
Newsome's hand should he succeed in his embassy. He finds 
Chad deeper them he expected, and Marie de Vionnet more 
refined and sincere than he had anticipated. However,
Strether later discovers in the "Cheval Blanc" scene that
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what the two share is at base an ordinary adulterous 
passion. In turn, his efforts to have Chad salvage the 
relationship fail, and Strether realizes he must return 
home defeated.
One level of Strether's drama is his confrontation 
with an aesthetics of the vague. The distinction between 
an ideal of beauty and an understanding requiring a 
freedom of form is reflected in, for example, Kant's 
distinction in the Critique of Judgement between 
pulchritudo vaga and pulchritudo adhaerens (§16, 17). The 
latter, "conditioned beauty" inheres in those things whose 
form is restricted by purpose— namely, the person: "The 
only being which has the purpose of its existence in 
itself is man, who can determine his purpose by reason" 
(69). "Free" beauty, or vague9 beauty, on the other hand, 
is not fixed by a purpose as is human beauty. Schlegel 
and Novalis take the notion of freedom, of indeterminacy 
of form, as a determinate element of a new aesthetic 
sense. The coordinates of James's approach to the 
intersection of aesthetics and ethics resound with this 
Kantian insight.10
9 "Vague" comes from the Latin vagus, "wandering." 
Etymologies are of course empirical and highly contingent, 
but James's heightened sense of diction in general, in The 
Ambassadors in particular (seen in the "international 
theme," and the Preface's drawing attention to the alleged 
poverty of the English language and the necessity of 
"clutch[ing] exotic aids" [5]), justify their study.
10 My use of Kant here is selective and perhaps out of 
context, but I think this distinction is a convenient and 
discrete entrance into the labyrinthine thought of the 
third Critique, whose theme is the way "Aesthetic factors
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Although the specific term pulchritudo vaga seems to
be a coinage of Kant, the association of the vague with
the beautiful has a long semantic history. Italo
Calvino's chapter "Exactitude" in his posthumously
published Six Memos for the Millennium, gives the Italian
connotation:
I might mention in passing that as far as I 
know Italian is the only language in which the 
word vago (vague) also means "lovely, 
attractive." Starting out from the original 
meaning of "wandering," the word vago still 
carries an idea of movement and mutability, 
which in Italian is associated both with 
uncertainty and indefiniteness and with 
gracefulness and pleasure. (57)
Calvino goes on to criticize the Italian lyric poet
Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) for his valorization of the
"vague." The point remains however that Leopardi was
fully romantic in that valorization. This association of
the vague with the beautiful forms the background against
which the dialectic between ethics and aesthetics is
worked out in The Ambassadors. The novel is full of
ambiguity and vagueness from the beginning; even the
title-word ambassador implies duplicity. In general the
muted though brutal dialectic that the "international
theme" contains partakes in the contentiousness of
nineteenth-century dialectical systems such as those of
Hegel, Marx and Freud.11 It is precisely this subtle
play a decisive role in [the] teleological mediation 
between nature and freedom," according to Paul Crowther in 
"The Significance of Kant's Pure Aesthetic Judgement," 
British Journal of Aesthetics.
11 Peter Brooks 134.
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violence that Strether encounters in his journey, for 
throughout the novel he is besought by an aesthetics of 
vagueness that opposes the moral clarity of Calvinist 
Woollett.
An aesthetics of the vague, based on the
dissociation of beauty not only from ethics but also from
form, promises, in short, freedom, "a consciousness of
personal freedom as [Strether] hadn't known for years"
(17). This promise begins to be uneasily fulfilled as
soon as Strether lands in Europe:
He was prepared to be vague to Waymarsh about 
the hour of the ship's touching, and that he 
both wanted extremely to see him and enjoyed 
extremely the duration of delay— these things, 
it is to be conceived, were early signs in him 
that his relation to his actual errand might 
prove none of the simplest. He was burdened, 
poor Strether— it had to be confessed at the 
outset— with the oddity of a double 
consciousness. There was detachment in his zeal 
and curiosity in his indifference. (18)
The same double-consciousness which oppresses Strether in
Woollett allows him a certain freedom in Europe, while the
vagueness, the purposelessness, of the time lets Strether
do as he will. That "these things" might be complicating
factors appears to be an intuition that the narrator
(rather than Strether) entertains. For now it is left for
Strether to enjoy the delay.
The indulgence of freedom is a constant concern in 
the novel. Strether in Europe no longer feels encumbered 
by the strictures of Woollett; his (or rather James's)
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ficelle Maria Gostrey12 intuits that Chad wants to be free
of his lover, to "shake her off" (108); Madame de
Vionnet's daughter Jeanne declares to Strether:
Oh, but I'm almost American too. That's what 
mamma has wanted me to be— I mean like that; 
for she has wanted me to have lots of freedom. 
She has known such good results from it. (154)
It is typical of the doubling of the novel, of the
dialectic of the "international theme," that though
Strether clearly associates Europe with freedom, there is
a counter-movement that precisely sees America as the true
arena of freedom. In addition to Jeanne's remark, Maria
Gostrey says of Americanness: "Surely nothing that's so
pressing was ever so ill defined" (86-87). For Strether,
however, Woollett is not free, and proffers only the
provincialism of moral certitude. Strether's journey in
the first chapters of the novel is therefore entirely
liberatory.
At this point, so much is made apparent to Strether,
yet his freedom has the drawback of centering exclusively
around aesthetic experience. He impulsively allows his
new acquaintance Maria Gostrey to show him about the walls
of the medieval English city Chester:
The tortuous wall— girdle, long since snapped, 
of the little swollen city, half held in place 
by careful civic hands— wanders in narrow file
12 Critics often point out the significance of the names 
in the novel: Maria Gostrey ("go stray") is paired with 
Marie de Vionnet; Lambert echoes with Lambinet and 
Balzac's Louis Lambert (23); Newsome is a homonym for "new 
sum." The street-names (Scribe, Belle-Chase, Boulevard 
Malesherbes) further the embedded allegory.
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between parapets smoothed by peaceful 
generations, pausing here and there for a 
dismantled gate or a bridged gap, with rises 
and drops, steps up and steps down queer 
twists, queer contacts, peeps into homely 
streets and under the brows of gables, views of 
cathedral tower and waterside fields, of 
huddled English town and ordered English 
country. Too deep almost for words was the 
delight of these things to Strether; yet as 
deeply mixed with it were certain images of his 
inward picture. (24)
After it is parenthetically made the "girdle" which holds
the city together, the wall is personified as a pedestrian
observer. It "wanders" (vagrantly?) "paus[es]," "peeps,"
"views." As a matter of fact, this sounds very much like
what Strether will do for the next six months; he too will
wander, pause, peep, and view. Walking along the wall,
the "fagged-out" (61) Strether is allowed respite from the
moralism of Woollett and the "success" of Milrose, his
friend and companion Waymarsh. Strether is permitted to
be vagrant. Vagrancy is not something he has ever
permitted himself, however, and after he has looked at his
watch a fifth time, Maria Gostrey notes, "You're doing
something that you think not right" (25). What he is not
doing right is "enjoying." Moreover, the meandering wall
becomes a figure for a particular type of wandering, one
that affords one to "peep" and "view," one that brings
"delight": in other words, narrative wandering. The wall
is the figure of the meeting of wandering and pleasure,
which further sounds like definition of "story." It
includes "queer contacts" that prefigure the contact
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Strether will have much later in the Cheval Blanc scene, a 
contact described as "queerer than fiction" (308).
Descriptions of vagueness coalesce around Chad's 
lover Madame de Vionnet: Miss Barrace says of her, "She's 
various. She's fifty women."(157);13 in Strether's first 
sight of her, she is in a dress "in substances and 
textures vaguely rich" (160). Late in the novel Strether 
enters Maria Gostrey's apartment: "He was sure within a 
minute that something had happened," for he felt Madame de 
Vionnet's presence in the "vague values" of the colors.
She is also connected with fluidity and water-imagery:
Maria Gostrey worries that Chad is trying to "sink" Marie 
de Vionnet (107); it is said that Marie settled in Paris 
and "steered her boat" (139); later Strether must decide 
whether to help her "keep the adventurous skiff afloat"
(220). This connection between water and Madame de 
Vionnet rings with Othello's condemnation of Desdemona as 
"false as water," and prepares the reader for the 
revelation of the truth on the flux of the river.14 
Strether concludes after his final interview with Madame 
de Vionnet: "Women were thus endlessly absorbent, and to 
deal with them was to walk on water" (322).
13 In an interesting parallelism that replaces Madame de 
Vionnet with Mrs. Newsome, Chad later tells Strether, 
"Mother's worth fifty of Sally!" (203), significantly 
using the financial term "worth."
14 David Lodge's "Strether on the River" has the most 
thorough treatment of water-imagery.
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Strether's engagement with this fluid European
aesthetic of the vague requires, typically, that he cast a
cold eye on his life. Strether's concise creed (his
avuncular advice to Bilham), "Live all you can, it's a
mistake not to" (132), is both a sincere admonition from
one who has a sense of having missed out in life and a
somewhat self-indulgent rejoinder from someone who has
chosen to be a critic. The passage has received
exhaustive critical attention; let it suffice to note the
intersection between freedom and the interpretation of
life that this passage evokes. Significantly, the word
"mistake" appears three times (as the "Preface" points out
[1]), thereby foregrounding Strether's failure of life as
a failure of interpretation, his sense of mistaking what
has been presented to him. Leo Bersani notes this nexus
of freedom and the reading of meaning, and goes as far as
to say that James's "subject is freedom,"
but we must understand that word in the sense 
of inventions so coercive that they resist any 
attempt to enrich— or reduce— them to meaning.
James asserts that freedom much more 
confidently in his prefaces than in his 
fiction. (132)
Strether's journey at first amounts to an evasion of the 
glibness of imposed meaning; the vague offers a redress to 
the narrowly linear, ethical, purposive-giving judgments 
of Woollett. As Strether's experiences accrue, they soon 
violate Woollett's smug, self-assured appraisals.
Thoughts commingle and judgment is deferred. Even the 
narrator, for example, seemingly blames Strether for
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"lumping together." Strether speaks to Maria Gostrey
about Waymarsh:
"He thinks us sophisticated, he thinks us 
worldly, he thinks us wicked, he thinks us all 
sorts of queer things," Strether reflected? for 
wondrous were the vague quantities our friend 
had within a couple of short days acquired the 
habit conveniently and conclusively lumping 
together. (39)
There are many things "lumped together" stylistically in
the novel. The absence of commas in lists of adjectives
("She's a tremendously clever brilliant capable woman"
166; "bright clean ordered water-side life" 176), gives
the impression of withholding of judgment, but also the
impression of simultaneity.15 The point of this
simultaneity of presentation is certainly to render
Strether uncertain, who remains our "center of
consciousness," thereby de-centering the reader. Yet the
epistemological concerns do not in general overshadow the
aesthetic ones, and aesthetic experience in the novel
tends to take on the Greek root of the word, aesthesis
(perception). One sense experience reminds Strether of
another, with each shifting diffusely into the next. At
breakfast with Bilham in Chad's rooms, Strether sat
with Mr. Bilham on one side, with a friend of 
Mr. Bilham's on the other, with Waymarsh 
stupendously opposite, and with the great hum
15 Contrast to, for example, the dinner scene in James 
Joyce's "The Dead," in which the substitution of 
conjunctions for commas gives the impression of succession 
as food is being served: "The raisins and almonds and figs 
and apples and oranges and chocolates and sweets were now 
passed about the table . . . "  (137). See also Lodge 193, 
note.
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of Paris coming up in softness, vagueness— for 
Strether himself indeed already positive 
sweetness— through the sunny windows toward 
which the day before his curiosity had raised 
its wings from below. (76)
The diction, the "softness, vagueness," resolving into a
"positive sweetness," makes abstract nouns out of
adjectives; the "-ness" indicates an ill-defined
diffuseness that permeates the diction as well as the
sunny room. Words such as "wonderful," "freedom,"
"beautiful" in The Ambassadors retain their generality,
especially when the object of the unhelpful modifier
"vague."16
Any new experience for Strether offers a variety of
perceptions: Strether's first sight of Chad is as he
enters the box of a theatre:
The fact was that his perception of the young 
man's identity— so absolutely checked for a 
minute— had been quite one of the sensations 
that count in life; he certainly had never 
known one that had acted, as he might have 
said, with more of a crowded rush. And the 
rush, though both vague and multitudinous, had 
lasted a long time, protected, as it were, yet 
at the same time aggravated, but the 
circumstances of its coinciding with a stretch 
of decorous silence. (89)
The rush crowds out the silence, yet is both "protected"
and "aggravated" by it. Strether, it seems, cannot be
left in silence. (Later, after Mrs. Newsome stops writing
him, he meditates, "he had never so lived with her as
during this period of her silence" [195].) Silence
16 See Ian Watt's comment on the use of abstract nouns in 
his "The First Paragraph of The Ambassadors" 471.
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somehow brings to Strether the enormity of presence, with 
his experience always charged in "vague and multitudinous" 
terms. One doubts that it is possible to use 
"multitudinous" without echoing Macbeth's "this my hand 
rather will the multitudinous seas incarnadine."
Shakespeare resounds throughout the novel— Paris contains, 
the "Preface" tells us, "more things than had been dreamt 
of in the philosophy of Woollett" (8). But 
"multitudinous," while attesting to the welter of 
perceptions Strether has, takes on special import in light 
of the bloodied hand imagery discussed below.
Under this assault of the vague and multitudinous,
normal categories of logic seem to desert Strether. When
he confronts Chad and asks him directly if he is in a
woman's "hands," Chad responds:
One doesn't know quite what you mean by being 
in women's "hands." It's all so vague. One is 
when one isn't. One isn't when one is, and 
then one can't quite give people away. . . .
I've never got stuck— so very hard. . . . (100)
The vague defies an either/or construction, and Strether
finds himself precisely not challenging Chad about what
are really straight forward syntactical and logical
questions. Only much later, yet before the final
deflation of the Cheval Blanc scene, does Strether start
to hint that the freedom promised by Chad's vagueness is a
freedom from commitment to Madame de Vionnet; Strether
finally demands to know if Chad wants to return to
America, and presses a little more than before:
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As with a sound half-dolorous, half-droll and 
all vague and equivocal, Chad buried his face 
for a little in his hands, rubbing it in a 
whimsical way that amounted to an evasion, 
[Strether] brought it out more sharply: "Do 
you?" (288)
One of the things Strether so admires about Chad is the 
feeling that he knew "how to live" (which is, ironically, 
the object of the discipline of ethics). But he soon 
realizes that there is a counterpart to the aesthetics of 
the vague, and that it sometimes "amounts to evasion"; an 
aestheticized society can easily become a society 
anesthetized to ethics, where Chad's "famous knowing how 
to live" (312) is actually knowing how to avoid: "He 
habitually left things to others."
Marshall McLuhan, in his essay "The Southern
Quality," contrasts writers of the American South with
those of the North, and elaborates on what Jamesian
society holds dear:
A society held together by a tense will and 
evasive bustle, can never produce a life-style 
with all that implies of passion. It can and 
does produce abundant tourists, museums, and 
houses like museums. And with these James is 
completely at home. (188)
"Evasive bustle" in the service of beauty leads what David
Lodge calls The Ambassadors' language of "heightened
cliche":
All his most sensitive characters speak and to 
some extent think in this way. It is a kind of 
in-group game which consists in managing to 
discuss, or at least to suggest, infinite 
complexities and discriminations in a 
vocabulary that is on the face of it remarkably 
impoverished. (197)
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Here is an "equivocal, " ambiguous, and as Strether finds
out, a duplicitous language. The novel occasionally
allows Strether hints of the distinctions between the
vague as the beautiful and the vague as the, at best,
merely errant, or at worst, the duplicitous. He comes
closest to seeing the difference just after the Cheval
Blanc scene of Book Eleventh; alone and in the dark,
Strether reflects on his gullibility:
It was all very well for him to feel the pity 
of its being so much like lying; he almost 
blushed, in the dark for the way he had dressed 
the possibility in vagueness, as a little girl 
might have dressed her doll. (313)
The observation is a shocking one, and could only have
been made by someone as simultaneously guilty and
conscientious as Strether. The vague as social fiction,
conveyed through the motif of the dress, is innocuous
enough, and is present in other Jamesian fiction: in The
Portrait of a Lady Isabel Archer complains that clothing
is "imposed upon me by society," to which Madame Merle
replies, "Would you prefer to go without them?" (253).
Strether's demystifying shock is compounded by realizing
that because Chad and Madame de Vionnet return with him to
Paris, their "other garments" must be back at their
retreat, leaving Madame de Vionnet "with not so much as a
shawl to wrap around, an appearance that matched her
story" (312). But the image of dressing a doll in
vagueness draws together other unfortunate elements:
Strether implicitly condemns himself for infantilism,
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while the figure also offers a disturbing counterpoint to
Strether's first impression of Jeanne de Vionnet:
What was in the girl was indeed too soft, too 
unknown for direct dealing; so that one could 
only gaze at it as at a picture, quite staying 
one's own hand. (135)
Carrying the hand imagery further, it is in this scene
that Strether finds himself manipulated. But even more,
Strether realizes that his aestheticized gaze has not been
disinterested, and his own hands have not been "stayed,"
but have been "incarnadined" by dressing up lies and
illicit intimacy in vagaries. Strether recommends to
Bilham that he marry Jeanne de Vionnet, explaining that he
will even bequeath him money to do so:
I've been sacrificing so to strange gods that I 
feel I want to put on record, somehow, my 
fidelity— fundamentally unchanged after all— to 
our own. I feel as if my hands were embrued 
with the blood of monstrous alien altars— of 
another faith altogether. There it is— it's 
done. (258)
Strether assures Little Bilham that "This is practical 
politics," advantageous to all around. It is hard to know 
exactly what Strether thinks constitutes his sacrilege, 
for by arranging marriages he becomes more interested, and 
his hands more bloodied. He culpably allows himself to be 
dragged into an increasingly vague, multitudinous, and 
tawdry story. Though the romantic aesthetic of the vague 
promises freedom, it incurs for Strether the danger of 
entanglements in lies.
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"Under the rubric": Narrative Seduction
During their first interview, Madame de Vionnet asks
the intransigent Strether, "Will you consent to go with me
a little?" (147). The appeal of such a journey is obvious
for Strether. Critics point out that Strether himself is
attracted to Madame de Vionnet, and several scenes make
him a substitute for Chad.17 He has just told Bilham to
"live," and the temptation to live vicariously presents
itself, for Chad "know[s] how to live" (282). Yet if the
appeal is apparent to Strether, so too are the dangers.
His moments of appreciation of Paris coincide with an
acknowledgment of deflection from his errand: "But is that
what I came out for?" (107), and later, "Whatever he had
come out for he hadn't come to go into that" (162). His
sense of a purpose endangered is a possibility that nigh-
omniscient Woollett had apparently already envisioned:
It all sprang at bottom from the beauty of Mrs. 
Newsome's desire that he should be worried with 
nothing that was not of the essence of his 
task; by insisting that he should thoroughly 
intermit and break she had so provided for his 
freedom that she would, as it were, have only 
herself to thank. (60)
The "beauty" of the Woollett mandate resides in its stark
sense of purpose derived from moral certainty, one that
ironically "provided for his freedom." (Not
coincidentally, this sounds much like Kant's pulchritudo
17 For two examples among others: at the Cheval Blanc 
scene Strether wants to be in Madame de Vionnet's boat 
(noted by Terrence Cave 454); at Gloriani's party Strether 
wants to "be" Chad (133).
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adhaerens, the beauty of things that have reference to a 
purpose.) This immediacy of moral purpose is conveyed via 
Mrs. Newsome's daughter Sarah to Strether, who observes of 
her and her ultimatum that "she was definite. She was— at 
last— crystalline" (285). Woollett makes its definite, 
crystalline purpose known and is ruthlessly efficacious in 
carrying it out. The crystalline "beauty" of this sense 
of purpose is quite different from the beauty that "so 
complicates" Strether's vision, pulchritudo vaga.
Strether's questioning of purposes echoes with 
Kantian aesthetics. He feels constantly under assault by 
the distracting appeal of the beautiful. Here Kant's 
distinction between "free beauty" and purposive beauty 
meet and conflict in Strether. Strether's "That, you see,
is my only logic. Not out of the whole affair to have got
anything for myself" (344) is essentially a protestation 
of disinterestedness. Strether errs, however, in 
projecting his own disinterest onto others, accepting 
Chad's interest in his lover as "disinterested" (157), and 
thinking (more correctly) that "The pure flame of the
disinterested burned in [Maria Gostrey's] cave of
treasures as a lamp in a Byzantine vault" (240).18 An 
aesthetics linked with the vague operates against ethical 
standards moreso than an aesthetics linked with clarity
18 Maria seems to be the only one who remains 
disinterested, not working to her advantage: "to stay her 
hand from promoting these things, she had, on private, 
difficult, but rigid, lines, played strictly fair" (329).
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(as was Aquinas'); this fact amplifies the tension between 
the ethical and the aesthetic in The Ambassadors.
Strether's deflection from his mission by complicity
in a "story" other than his own has precedence, however,
for the history of the novelistic form contains a variety
of bad readers and critics. Emma Bovary loves romantic
novels and sentimental hagiography; Julien Sorel of
Stendhal's The Red and the Black is by nature and vocation
an imitator (he loves La Nouvelle HeloLse, is a
professional copyist, and mimics the daring Napoleon);
Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim read "light literature" as a boy
and whiles away the time dreaming of heroic exploits;
"Don Quixote" names both the first novel and its first
victim.19 In The Ambassadors there too are seducing
spells and charms throughout, objects under the "spell of
transmission" (146), and people "under the spell of
recognition." At dinner with Maria Gostrey Strether finds
himself charmed, and reflects:
He had been to the theatre, even to the opera, 
in Boston, with Mrs. Newsome, more than once 
acting as her only escort; but there had been 
no little confronted dinner, no pink lights, no 
whiff of vague sweetness, as a preliminary: one 
of the results of which was that at present, 
mildly rueful, though with a sharpish accent, 
he actually asked himself why there hadn't.
There was much the same difference in his 
impression of the noticed state of his 
companion, whose dress was "cut down," as he 
believed the term to be, in respect to
19 More obvious is the case of the fiction as lie. In 
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, to comfort the fiance, 
Marlowe changes Kurtz's last words from "'The horror'" to 
"your name."
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shoulders and bosom, in a manner quite other 
than Mrs. Newsome's and who wore round her 
throat a broad velvet band with an antique 
jewel— he was rather complacently sure it was 
antique— attached to it in front. Mrs.
Newsome's dress was never any degree "cut 
down," and she never wore round her throat a 
broad velvet band: if she had moreover, would 
it have served so to carry on and complicate, 
as he now almost felt, his vision? (42)
The paragraph lays out the terms of the dialectic between
the aesthetic and the ethical; Strether's questioning (and
it should be noted that the novel starts with "Strether's
first question") of the experience of the beautiful takes
its bearings from the opposition. Woollett and Paris,
Maria Gostrey and Mrs. Newsome, and later, respectively,
Mary Stuart and Queen Elizabeth (43) all confront each
other in an almost violent antithesis.20 The "vague
sweetness" of the present is balanced by a "sharpish
accent." The almost legal diction of "the term" and "in
respect to" laughably conflicts with overtly sexual
"shoulders and bosom."
The conflicts here work themselves out before 
Strether as a drama, and overall, Europe's performance 
charms Strether; the well-known dramatic and painterly 
metaphors that James employs indicate both the spectacle 
and the duplicity of make-believe. Things come "as pat as 
in a play" (183); Madame de Vionnet "was, like Cleopatra 
in the play, indeed various and multifold" (160); at the 
Cheval Blanc, her manner becomes a "performance" in which
20 Jeffrey Perl notes that the oppositions in the novel 
are displayed in the military figures that abound, 162ff.
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even she ceases to believe (311). For all the Americans,
Europe is museum, theatre and circus; and while Strether
tends to contemplate from a distance and aestheticize, the
Pocock entourage treats Europe as game. Circus imagery
recurs jarringly throughout the novel; Waymarsh and Sarah
Pocock in particular are fond of the circus (indeed, some
critics think the two are carrying on an affair), while
Jim Pocock prefers the racier Varietes (216). Yet the
circus is not only pedestrian entertainment for American
tourists, for in Chad's hands the imagery takes a sinister
turn. Strether feels himself distracted and seduced:
He could have wished indeed, so far as this 
went, that Chad were less of a mere cicerone; 
for he was not without the impression— now that 
the vision of his game, his plan, his deep 
diplomacy, did recurrently assert itself— of 
his taking refuge from the realities of their 
intercourse in profusely dispensing, as our 
friend mentally phrased it, panem et circenses. 
Our friend continued to feel rather smothered 
in flowers, though he made in his other moments 
the almost angry inference that this was only 
because of his odious ascetic suspicion of any 
form of beauty. (118)
Strether's suspicion of Chad ("What game's he playing?")
is well-founded; Chad's "game, his plan" is to avoid "the
realities of their intercourse in profusely dispensing
. . . panem et circenses" and smothering him with
flowers.21 Strether's last meeting with Chad is
particularly bizarre in the contrast between Strether's
21 Here the aesthetic is linked with violence. For 
another example of flowers used as weapons, see The Aspern 
Papers: "I would batter the women with lilies— I would 
bombard their citadel with roses" (29).
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message, "You'll be a brute," and Chad's circus-like, 
antic reception thereof, which involves an elaborate 
metaphor of money balled up as a soccer ball which he 
mimes kicking. Chad accepts Strether's rebuttal in good 
humor, and reassures him while largely ignoring him. Chad 
is restless, dances "a fancy step" excitedly, and "gives 
the impression . . .  of an irrelevant hornpipe or jig" 
(340).22
Yet Strether should know by that point that Chad's
games, his hornpipe or jig, are not irrelevant, but have
been part of his modus operandi throughout. In fact,
irrelevant, distracting movement designed to sway opinion
and obscure motivations sounds very much like a definition
of Chad's chosen profession: advertising. "It really does
the thing, you know," Chad explains:
They were face to face under the street-lamp as 
they had been the first night, and Strether, no 
doubt, looked blank. "Affects, you mean, the 
sale of the object advertised?"
"Yes, but affects it extraordinarily; 
really beyond what one had supposed. I mean of 
course when it's done as one makes out that in 
our roaring age it can be done. I've been 
finding out a little; though it doubtless 
doesn't amount to much more than what you 
originally, so awfully vividly— and all, very 
nearly, that first night— put before me. It's 
an art like another, and infinite like all the 
arts." (339)
22 Human bodies are described throughout the novel, but 
almost always in repose, and usually only in part (e. g., 
elbows, faces); this final physicalistic vision of Chad, 
who "administered his kick with fantastic force and sent 
an imaginary object flying," is almost unprecedented in 
the novel, matched only by the Cheval Blanc scene, in 
which Strether is "agitating his hat and stick and loudly 
calling out" (308).
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That Chad has "no imagination" (287), that he will leave 
Madame de Vionnet, that he will live up to the "new-sum" 
name are bad enough- But added to these is Strether's 
complicity in it all (had he really "awfully vividly" 
presented this vision to Chad?). What else could be 
advertised than the secret product, the "ridiculous object 
of the commonest domestic use" (48), the product hidden 
from sight throughout the novel? Chad will publicize this 
"vulgar" item, setting up a bizarre literary competition 
in Woollett ("It's an art, like any other") with 
Strether's Review, all with the intent of "ad-verting," 
turning people towards the object, and inculcating desire.
The difference between a literary review and 
advertisement is thus seemingly brought to nil. Strether, 
who has learned the "lesson of social beauty,"23 finds 
that he cannot reciprocate by inculcating others in the 
priority of ethics, no matter how he tries. At his last 
meeting with Chad, Strether takes on the role of teacher 
trying to instruct his student: "He was as grave, as 
distinct, as a demonstrator before a blackboard, and Chad 
continued to face him like an intelligent pupil" (336).
Strether fails; Chad the "social animal" (167) he had so 
admired early in his journey has become something of a 
"brute" (335) before his eyes, and seemingly under his 
auspices. The danger of social fiction purveyed by the
23 The phrase is Wegelin's, in the Norton The Ambassadors 
442.
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language of "heightened cliche" is that it masks desire
and ultimately an "appetite lovely as a tapeworm's."24
Desire blunts moral purpose and renders one a brute.
Critics are quick to fault Strether's vision, with
its elaborate and expansive celebration of the aesthetics
of the vague. David McWhirter, following Denis de
Rougemount and Rene Girard, makes a distinction in his
Desire and Love in Henry James between "love" and
"desire." McWhirter writes that desire
is essentially a narcissistic fantasticizing 
activity of the mind. . . .  [It] is 
necessarily unrequited, for the reciprocation 
of passion would bring a true knowledge of the 
other. . . . (5-6)
For McWhirter, Strether's freedom and imagination are
symptoms of Girardian mimetic (or "triangular," or
"metaphysical") desire. McWhirter argues that James, in
his last three novels, progresses from an embracing of
this pathological narcissism to a renunciation of it in
The Golden Bowl, which finally affirms maxried (and
therefore limited and other-directed) love:
For James's major phase embodies not the 
unified, valedictory summation of a perfected 
art, but an heroic struggle . . . toward a 
self- and life-affirming vision that had long 
eluded him and toward an art capable of 
expressing that vision. (9)
This is a strong if somewhat reductionist case, for
McWhirter tends to demonize The Ambassadors to show a
24 The phrase is McLuhan's, 182.
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progression in James's literary biography-25 But
moreover, it is a mistake to take this new aesthetics of
the vague as identical with rampant mimetic desire; to do
so tends to gloss over the romantic discovery of beauty as
the vague and its fundamental relation to freedom. Even
Kant, who condemns any contaminating inclination in his
ethics, seems apprised of this tension between freedom and
beauty when he writes:
The beautiful prepares us to love 
disinterestedly something, even nature itself; 
the sublime prepares us to esteem something 
highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) 
interest. (Critique of Judgment 108)
A structuralism such as McWhirter's assumes a rigorism in
aesthetics that demands the limitation of desire through
recognition of those structures. But The Ambassadors
presents less an exemplification of the structural
mechanics of the psychology of desire than Strether's open
"field of decidability" that "calls for decision in the
order of ethical-political responsibility."26
Strether's position in this "field of decidability" 
elicits our immediate sympathy (just as he elicits the 
sympathy of the other characters in the novel) and cannot
25 Ross Chambers gives a more measured view when he notes 
in his Story and Situation that nineteenth-century texts 
"identify with extraordinary constancy their narrative 
situation by recourse to a metaphor of seduction" (9). 
Chambers treats only James's "The Figure in the Carpet," 
but his reading applies to The Ambassadors as well.
26 Jacques Derrida, Limitedr Inc 116. Simone de Beauvoir 
discusses the ethics of decision in her Ethics of 
Ambiguity, but from a strictly "existentialist" 
standpoint, and not an aesthetic or linguistic one.
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be dismissed as an example of infantile desire. It is
after the recognition scene at the Cheval Blanc that he
has a realization "under the rubric27 of Postes et
Telegraphes" of his common humanity: that is, of both his
commonness and his humanity in the position he occupies.
That is, he realizes that his ethical "field" is under the
rubrics of aesthetics of vague fictions. He glances
around at the "performers concocting their messages":
The little prompt Paris women, arranging, 
pretexting goodness knew what, driving the 
dreadful needle-pointed public pen at the 
dreadful sand-strewn public table: implements 
that symbolized for Strether's too interpretive 
innocence something more acute in manners, more 
sinister in morals, more fierce in the national 
life. (315)
The over-literariness of the alliteration, the uneven 
comparative (more sinister than what?), the leaving 
unspoken the "something" that is the symbolized, indicates 
a tension between the public and the private, as the 
"dreadful public pen" announces the most private 
intimacies. This is a particularly literary tension:
Chad's secret is now public, and Strether must now write 
and explain the story to Woollett. Strether is no longer 
an editor or critic, but a writer, and something of a 
"showy journalist" at that: "he often wondered if he 
hadn't really, under his recent stress, acquired some 
hollow trick, one of the specious art of make-believe"
27 James's use of the word "rubric," the red letters in 
liturgy that determine the practice of the main text, is 
interesting, and implies Strether is always under some 
"rubric," here, the rubric of a new aesthetic.
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(194). Strether "was mixed up with the typical tale of 
Paris, and so were they, poor things— how could they all 
together help being?" (315). Strether writes the story, 
but he must entertain the possibility that the story, or, 
more broadly, literature "is the place where the possible 
convergence of rigor and pleasure is shown to be a 
delusion" (de Man 50).28
His constant deferral in the hope of reconciliation 
of opposites— rigor and pleasure— leads him to become 
entangled in Chad's "plot." That story has impinged on 
Strether's. As he walks up the stairs for their final 
interview,
Strether paused anew, on the last flight, at 
this final rather breathless sense of what 
Chad's life was doing with Chad's mother's 
emissary. It was dragging him, at strange 
hours, up the staircases of the rich; it was 
keeping him out of bed at the end of long hot 
days; it was transforming beyond recognition 
the simple, subtle, conveniently uniform thing 
that had anciently passed with him for a life 
of his own. (333-34)
The degree to which the transformed Chad had affected
Strether's life can be seen in Strether's self-reference:
he is not "himself," but "Chad's mother's emissary,"
doubly-possessed, doubly distanced from himself. He is no
longer living the story of his own life, but someone
else's.
The novel casts doubt on the ability to know, and 
while this may be a function of Jamesian "relativism"
28 Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," in 
Aesthetic Ideology.
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(Norrman 187), in Strether's case it may instead hint at 
the inadequacy of a juridical model such as Maria 
Gostrey's: "One can only judge on the facts" (45).29 
Life, human motivations, epistemological positions, are 
all uncertain: "For at the end of all things they were 
mysterious" (322). Strether's inability to recognize the 
most important element in his own "story" is echoed by the 
fundamental mysteriousness of the things around him.
Sometimes this mystery is ascribable to the inability to 
see "designs" that lie "behind" objects and actions.
Indeed, "behind" becomes a spatial term denoting the 
invisible realities that govern expression. Waymarsh 
wants to know what is "back of" Strether's coming to 
Europe (32); Strether, speaking of his Review, notes that 
"[Mrs. Newsome's] behind the whole thing" (50); Maria 
Gostrey warns Strether of Chad's change, "There must, 
behind every appearance to the contrary, still be 
somebody— somebody who's not a mere wretch, since we 
accept the miracle." (107); Bilham warns Strether of 
Chad's happy appearance: "Oh, there's a lot behind it"
(111). Perhaps the largest displacement of motives to a 
position "behind" is the will of the dead Mr. Newsome. He 
in fact is behind the desire to have Chad return to 
America, and there is an "opening" that
29 Maria Gostrey immediately contradicts this empiricism 
by guessing a priori ("before the facts") exactly what 
Mrs. Newsome must look like: Strether "blushed for her 
realism, but gaped at her truth" (52).
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his father's will took account of as in certain 
conditions possible and which, under that will, 
attaches to Chad's availing himself of it a 
large contingent advantage. . . . (54)
The will of Mr. Newsome is apparently "behind" the whole
movement of the novel. James's fiction is often haunted
by ghosts, and here the revenant spans the ocean from
Woollett to Paris in the shape of the "father's will."
At other times, however, the mysteries that lie 
"behind" things are put in almost religious terms;
Marshall McLuhan writes that James's "coordinates are 
clearly theological" (187). Incomprehensibility is 
invoked through the diction of the superlative and the 
marvelous: Miss Barrace's signature word is "wonderful";
Madame de Vionnet is "brilliant" (107); both Chad's 
transformation and the Lambinet scene are "miracles"
(309). These are all theological terms, indicating 
contemplation of an almost theological dimension, or at 
least the sublime with which the romantics tended to 
replace the theological.
This diction of the marvelous may help explain why
Strether is indeed seduced by the story of the "virtuous
attachment." Yet his seduction is made more shocking
because he is such a good reader of seduction stories.
Late in the novel he sees his friend Waymarsh with
his buttonhole freshly adorned with a 
magnificent rose. Strether read on the instant 
his story— how, astir from the previous hour, 
the sprinkled newness of the day, so pleasant 
at that season in Paris, he was fairly panting 
with the pulse of adventure and had been with
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Mrs. Pocock, unmi stake ably to the Marche aux
Fleurs. (268)
Whether Waymarsh's "story" includes an actual affair with 
Mrs. Pocock may be disputed, though Miss Barrace joked 
earlier that she herself may be involved with Waymarsh, 
and the diction here, "fairly panting with the pulse" is 
"unmistakable." More significant are both that Waymarsh's 
appearance is put in terms of a "story," and that 
Strether— the critic, the editor— displays here a talent 
for reading such stories. This makes his non-recognition 
of Chad and Madame de Vionnet's story all the more 
shocking; that Strether can be confronted with the 
"unmistakeable" and be so mistaken is the "story of the 
story."
The vagueness of the novel renders reading itself 
mysterious, as "Strether himself is so lost in wonder 
. . . that he fails to read the signs correctly" (Bradbury 
52). A hermeneutics of suspicion is perhaps justified in 
a novel where "plot" and "design" have both innocent and 
sinister meanings: Chad's face implies a "design" (97);
Strether tells Maria, "'It's a plot,' he declared—
' there' s more in it than meets the eye.' He gave rein to 
his fancy. 'It's a plant!'" (105).30 It is not only the 
aduluterous pair that deceive, but the story. In the
30 James is perhaps here signaling a well-known Romantic 
maxim, Coleridge's distinction between "fancy" and 
"imagination."
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"Preface," James attempts to gain some purchase, some
distance from the "imbroglio":
There is the story of one's hero, and then, 
thanks to the intimate connection of things, 
the story of one's story itself. I blush to 
confess it, but if one's a dramatist one's a 
dramatist, and the latter imbroglio is liable 
on occasion to strike me as really the more 
objective of the two. (5)
Here, James implies that the "story of the story" marks an
attempt to take a distance from the narrative line, i.e.
an attempt to get "behind" it. And while a Girardian
reading implies that James is precisely implicated in this
story, the self-reflection of the "Preface" hopes to be
palinodic, a drawing back from the "interest" in the plot.
Leo Bersani notes that the plots of the last three great
novels are "corny . . . compared with those of other
realistic novelists intent, unlike James, on imposing
plots as definitive versions of reality" (142). Bersani
argues that James's preoccupation with style is an attempt
to avoid such intrusions:
His discussion of his books almost only in 
terms of their technical ingenuities and his 
refusal "to go behind" technique to "meanings" 
which technique would merely serve, constitute 
a triumph of composition over depth which is 
more often an aspiration than an achievement in 
the novels themselves. (132)
Bersani's assertion implies that James realizes that some
story lines are false impositions of meaning. But
Strether seems unaware of this, and what is left undone by
James is done by his characters, as they try to patch and
mend, using the "dreadful public pen" to write a plot,
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publicize a story that, as Strether says of himself, is 
"incredible, but . . . true!" And while Girard's (and 
McWhirter's, and to a degree Chambers') model of 
renunciation of desire implies that many nineteenth- 
century novels are indeed about the unmasking of desire, 
thereby holding out the hope that literature can offer the 
possibility of literary self-reflection, Strether himself 
seems more cautious: "I'm fantastic and ridiculous— I
don't explain myself even to myself" (286).31 If the 
story of the story can lead to aesthetic clarification, if 
it can explain itself to itself, it can perhaps do so in 
the recognition scenes of The Ambassadors.
Not Oedipus: "Transforming beyond recognition"32 
It is something of a critical consensus that The 
Ambassadors is about Strether's growth in consciousness of 
the true relationship between Chad and Madame de Vionnet, 
his realization that it is not a "virtuous attachment" as 
Bilham called it, but a "typical tale" of adultery. This 
involves the accompanying deflation of Strether, an 
acknowledgment of his own inadequacy as a reader. Yet 
this summary is flawed on both counts, for Strether
31 Yet at least three things are unclear in Girard's 
thought: a) whether literature expresses only a symptom of 
cultural pathology or also a cure; b) whether literary 
expression (e. g. of unmasked triangular desire) is a 
different type of imitation than mimetic desire; c) the 
status of the works (i.e., the New Testament in Deceit) 
that aid in unmasking this desire (are such texts of a 
different order?).
32 My discussion in this section is generally indebted to 
Terrence Cave's Recognitions.
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already knows Chad is having an affair before the novel 
begins; indeed that knowledge is the reason for Strether's 
trip.33 In addition, he already knows within ten pages of 
the novel, that he is a "failure." His friend Maria 
Gostrey tells him so ("Your failure's general" [5]), and 
his conscience tells him so ("He had failed . . .  in 
everything" [61]). This should signal to the reader that 
the novel is not just the Oedipus plot plus the multiple 
perspectivism romanticism and, later, modernism bring.34 
This serves to show that clarification, whatever it may be 
in the novel, will not be the result of an accretion of 
facts, the cumulative result of a successful 
investigation.
Yet this is precisely how the novel is most often 
read, a strange fact considering its inverted dramatic 
order. Strether starts out knowing exactly what to do—  
his purpose is clear. His charge does not originate in an 
ambiguous oracle as in Oedipus Rex, but in a directive so 
unambiguous that Maria Gostrey intuits it as early as 
England (44). Peter Brooks in his The Melodramatic 
Imagination is therefore only partially correct when he 
writes that the "movement of the typical Jamesian plot is 
from complex and often obscure interrelationship to
33 Noted by Cave 432.
34 For example, Merle Williams in her Henry James and the 
Philosophical Novel draws on phenomenology and 
deconstruction, and still asserts that "the entire 
narrative is geared towards the clarification of concepts 
and interpretive procedures" (25), thereby making the 
vagueness of the novel merely the absence of knowledge.
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crisis," for while there is certainly a crisis, the novel 
starts out from the simple, clear standpoint of Woollett.
One might ask then what the subject of the novel is, and 
why it displays the protagonist's coming into 
consciousness of a fact that he already knows.
The scene at the Cheval Blanc itself has garnered an
immense amount of critical attention, almost all of it
structurally placing it as a clarifying scene in the
development of Strether's knowledge. The scene seems to
be the referent of these lines, in which Strether desires
Sarah Pocock to provoke some "clarifying scene":
He couldn't doubt that, should she only oblige 
him by surprising him just as he then was, a 
clarifying scene of some sort would result from 
the concussion. (247)
Strether gets his wish in the Cheval Blanc scene. It has
been ironically prepared for by several non-recognition
scenes: Strether first mistakes Little Bilham for Chad
(69); at the theatre an anonymous "gentleman" for Chad
(89); then Chad for a "Pagan," then Chad again for a
"gentleman" (102) (these last two following a chiastic
scheme: gentleman:Chad : Chad:gentleman). Strether
mistakes Mamie for Sarah (247); Mamie then mistakes too,
exclaiming "Oh I thought you were Mr. Bilham!" (249).
All these mistaken recognitions make the final one, 
admittedly a "chance in a million," more shocking yet 
somehow more believable. The obviousness of Chad and 
Madame de Vionnet's relationship reveals Strether's 
unearned naivete, a naivetd that allows him to opine early
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in the novel, "'It's innocent,' he repeated— 'I see the 
whole thing'" (158). This naivete is shattered in Book 
Eleventh when Strether takes a holiday in the countryside 
from his "obsession." He sees a young couple in a boat, 
then recognizes them:
Chad and Madame de Vionnet were then like 
himself taking a day in the country— though it 
was as queer as fiction, as farce, that their 
country could happen to be exactly his; and she 
had been the first at recognition, the first to 
feel, across the water, the shock— for it 
appeared to come to that— of what was taking 
place— that her recognition had been even 
stranger for the pair in the boat, that her 
immediate impulse had been to control it, and 
that she was quickly and intensely debating 
with Chad the risk of betrayal. He saw that 
they would show nothing if they could feel sure 
he hadn't made them out; so that he had before 
him for a few seconds his own hesitation. It 
was a sharp fantastic crisis that had popped up 
as if in a dream, and it had only to last the 
few seconds to make him feel it as quite 
horrible. (308)
Strether becomes demystified about the true nature of
their relationship. In that sense the language of tragedy
employed in the scene— "recognition," "shock," "betrayal,"
"crisis," "horrible"— is appropriate. Too many pains
ought not be taken in the correct labeling of the scene,
for there is dispute enough among the best commentators on
the novel: while Lodge calls the scene a peripeteia,
Terrence Cave studies it as a recognition scene
(anagnorisis). My insistence that it be labeled
catharsis-as-clarification may at this point seem perverse
and unhelpful. This difficulty points out the richness of
the scene, our loss of the ability to distinguish these
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Greek terms, or both. Cave helpfully points out, however, 
that while peripeteia is a structural point, anagnorisis 
always has an object, is "intentional" in the 
phenomenological sense. We are left with a fundamental 
discrepancy between Strether's complete, albeit evaded, 
knowledge of the adultery, and what readers perceive to be 
the real efficacy of this "clarification scene." If 
clarification indeed has an object, what then gets 
clarified in the Cheval Blanc scene?
For Peter Brooks, what gets clarified in a melodrama
such as The Ambassadors is not the protagonist's position
in the world in relation to set cosmic laws, but rather
the terms of the conflict in which the hero finds himself.
Brooks therefore opposes melodrama to tragedy. Tragedy is
the art form of a culture of belief, while melodrama
exaggerates moral conflicts precisely because the values
they presuppose are uncertain and fraught; therein lies
melodrama's contemporary value.
A clarity in regard to the use of such an 
aesthetic form as melodrama can foster in us a 
greater clarity about our cultural history, an 
increased understanding of our historical 
position, of "where we are," the kinds of 
problems we have to deal with and the means we 
have for undertaking their imaginative 
"solution." (206)
Melodrama's vision is entirely negative, for while tragedy
can give positive knowledge about reality, melodrama can
only display the importance of the ethical and not make a
determination about what actually is ethical.
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The melodramatists refuse to allow that the 
world has been completely drained of 
transcendence; and they locate that 
transcendence in the struggle of the children 
of light with the children of darkness, in the 
play of ethical mind. (22)
What gets clarified, Brooks asserts, is one's ethical
position. Finally, and most importantly, since there are
no determinate cosmic laws, no actual content displayed,
melodramatic clarification is highly structural and
reflexive:
For melodrama has the distinct value of being
about recognition and clarification, about how
to be clear what the stakes are and what their 
representative signs mean, and how to face 
them. (206)
The ethical is certainly a concern for Strether, but it
must be remembered the context under which his moral
certainty evaporates: under the soft pink glow of the
lamps at dinner with Maria Gostrey, on the labyrinth of
the walls of Chester— during aesthetic experiences. There
is a relationship between Strether's errancy and his
vagrancy, and Strether's melodrama does not involve only
ethical issues, but aesthetic ones. The previous section
already showed the deflecting danger of the story, how the
illusions of Chad, Chad's "life"
was transforming beyond recognition the simple, 
subtle, conveniently uniform thing that had 
anciently passed with him for a life of his 
own. (333-34)
Even late in this novel, Strether is "transformed beyond 
recognition," as if the "concussion" at the Cheval Blanc 
did not simplify, but rather, made it more ambiguous— a
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strange clarification indeed. In fact, the novel up to 
Book Eleventh can be described as one long non-recognition 
scene; the Cheval Blanc scene dispels the fiction of the 
virtuous attachment— the "device is laid bare." Moral and 
epistemological clarification becomes identical with the 
promise of literature. That is, what Strether learns is 
that fiction is both the ground of clarifying beauty (and 
beauty, Kant notes, "prepares us to love") and the site 
where things become transformed "beyond recognition."
Not two pages after the Cheval Blanc scene, Strether 
intuits all this, as he sits "lonely and cold." What he 
sees, alone in the dark, is that there was something "over 
and above the central fact itself, [that] he had to 
swallow:"
It was the quantity of make-believe involved 
and so vividly exemplified that most disagreed 
with his spiritual stomach. (313)
Beyond the adultery, it is the lying fiction, the galling
"invraisemblance of the occasion" (309), and Madame de
Vionnet's "performance" (311), that sicken Strether.
These terms display the distance, only now felt by
Strether, between "make-believe" and the "spiritual
stomach," between the fictional and the visceral. This
distance helps to explain James' s employing the language
of tragedy. James is writing at a time when the
epistemological basis of tragedy ("innocence to
experience") has been lost; the language of the scene is
therefore discordant— not quite ironic, but not quite
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sincere. The Ambassadors cannot be about clarification as 
catharsis; rather it is about the realization of the 
enormous gap between make-believe and reality, between the 
power of fiction to clarify and the freedom linked to the 
beauty of the vague.
James is working out, as literature does, the 
requirements of literature in a specific historical 
context. The historical context since the German 
Romantics required that the aesthetic be associated with 
the vague. The Ambassadors is precisely about the 
clarifying power of the aesthetic at a time when that 
itself associated with the vague. Chad's life was 
transforming Strether's beyond recognition because it is a 
life of fiction— of lies and advertising. Strether's 
position in the cosmos is clarified in only this limited 
sense; Strether realizes that he is (so to speak) a 
fictional character.
This goes to the very heart of the aesthetics of the 
vague. The Ambassadors is not a novel of clarification, 
where the plot begins in ambiguity, and the body of the 
novel occupies itself with the machinations of 
clarification, in which the characters "see," and in turn 
the audience sees. It is not about clarification in the 
Oedipal sense; rather is it about the clear consciousness 
of teeming chaos that is one's ethical position.
Clarification then becomes a structural fact much like 
peripeteia, devoid of any actual content. If, as Brooks
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indicates, melodrama helps to clarify "where we cure," it 
is not clear where we are, even as Strether says in the 
novel's last line, "There we are!"35 
Repetition, Reparation, and Strether's Review
In the beginning of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, Karl Marx writes: "Hegel says somewhere that 
all great historical facts and personages recur twice. He 
forgot to add 'Once as tragedy, and again as farce'
(47)".36 Even if James were not aware of this 
formulation, it is odd that while Strether thinks the 
Cheval Blanc scene is as "queer as farce," he compresses 
into only eleven lines the language of tragedy:
"recognition," "shock," "betrayal," "crisis," "horrible."
This "clarifying scene" is between tragedy and farce; it 
does not in fact lead to tragic clarification of the 
protagonist's knowledge, because he already "knows" that 
particular state of affairs.
Knowledge is quite a problem in the novel, 
especially for Strether, who suffers, Cave writes, from 
"chronic epistemophilia" (433), and to whom Little Bilham 
says, "you're not a person to whom it's easy to tell 
things you don't want to know" (123). Knowledge of facts, 
of states of affairs, in short to know that, seems
35 This may be an answer to Strether's much earlier 
affirmation: "if I miss that [his marriage], I miss 
everything— I'm nowhere" (75).
36 Samuel H. Beer's footnote indicates Daniel De Leon made 
an English translation available in 1897 (47); The 
Ambassadors was serialized in 1903.
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infeasible, even impossible. When knowledge is claimed, 
it is usually in the context of know how, and contains the 
implication of the salacious. Maria Gostrey's eyes 
evaluate Strether, "measuring him up and down as if they 
knew how" (21); Chad "had learned how" to enter a theatre- 
box (91); Sarah Pocock derisively assures Madame de 
Vionnet, "I've been to Paris. I know Paris" (218); 
finally, Strether thinks of the couple on the river, "they 
were familiar, frequent. . . . They know how to do it"
(307).37 Knowledge of fact gives way to acquaintance, 
familiarity, or social knowledge.38 Many critics have 
pointed to the epistemological— the know that— problems in 
the novel.39 Addressing "acquaintance" or knowing how 
takes us in a different direction, but one that also helps 
explain the ambiguity of the novel. One knows how to do 
things by being, like Chad and Madame de Vionnet,
"familiar, frequent": by repetition. In fact, the novel 
echoes Marx's formulation, and is structured as a repeated 
act. But Strether's struggle to negotiate the aesthetic 
and moral realms requires the discernment of two different 
types of repetition: a ritualistic, clarifying one whose
37 Chad's knowing "how to live" savoir vivre, is therefore 
savoir faire.
38 This distinction between two types of knowledge, while 
unacknowledged in English, is reflected in other 
languages: wissen and kennen, saber and conocer, savoir 
and connaitre, for examples.
39 See Norrman's The Insecure World of Henry James, for 
example.
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purpose is governed by reference to origin, and an 
ambiguating one that strays from the origin.
The Preface to The Ambassadors suggests a motivation 
for repetition: it asks of Strether, "Would there yet 
perhaps be time for reparation?" (1). The Preface sets us 
up for a re-reading of the story, be it Strether's life or 
the novel; thus the novel is about Strether's rereading of 
his own life in light of the promise and disenchantment of 
the aesthetic. The senses of nostalgia and loss that 
pervade the novel are due to Strether's remorse over his 
first "reading" of his life. The novel in a sense seeks 
to answer the "Preface," and it is left to the reader to 
discern if this second reading, the "review" that 
constitutes the novel's action, is any less flawed than 
Strether's first attempt at life.
The repetitions in the novel constitute an attempt 
at reparation. It is no accident that Strether at home in 
Woollett edits a "Review," for his vocation (reviewing) 
and his avocation (the journey to Europe) partake of the 
same urge. Even the manner of designating the action of 
The Ambassadors indicates this familiar, recursive 
character: it is a "tale" and a "story" ("Preface" 1, 5); 
it is a "typical tale" (315); it is a "corny plot"
(Bersani 142). It is a simple plot that follows a "type," 
and therefore is repeatable, each repetition similar, 
bearing few surprises. Strether's journey to Europe is a 
repetition, for he has been there before. Once there,
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whenever he enters a significant ritualistic space— the 
fortified boundaries of Chester (24), Notre Dame cathedral 
(170)— he senses and notes that he had been there before. 
The staid Jamesian social web is violated by these small 
irruptions of ritual action.40
There is an urge for repetition in the novel because 
there was previous loss. Among Strether's many losses, 
there were
the young wife he had early lost and the young 
son he had stupidly sacrificed. He had again 
and again made out for himself that he might 
have kept his little boy, his little dull boy 
who had died at school of rapid diphtheria, if 
he had not in those years so insanely given 
himself to merely missing the mother. (61)
Strether's life is already loss before the novel begins;
his "failure is general."41 A chronological urgency
pervades the novel ("Would there yet perhaps be time for
reparation?"), and is at odds with the slow, decorous
simultaneity of the presentation of the prose.42
Strether's carpe diem advice to Little Bilham in
40 This type of repetition, repetition as "ritual," finds 
Strether in priestly functions, sometimes dispensing 
"blessing" (313), and sometimes forced to "curse" (343).
41 Time becomes pressing in the novel: "Strether had read 
somewhere of a Latin motto . . . on a clock. . . . Omnes 
vulnerat, ultima necat” ["all wound, the last kills"] 
(67); "people can be in general pretty well trusted . . . 
with the clock of their freedom ticking . . .  to keep an 
eye on the fleeting hour" (131); "he was like one of the 
figures of the old clock at Berne. They came out, on one 
side, at their hour, jigged along their little course in 
the public eye, and went in on the other side" (342).
42 A famous bibliographic expression of this 
"simultaneity" is the reversal of Chapters 28 and 29 in 
the first American edition of the novel (Harper 1903), 
which went unnoticed until 1950.
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Gloriani's garden is an admonition to precisely not repeat
Strether's life: "Do what you like so long as you don't
make my mistake" (132).
And yet for himself, Strether continues in the hope
that his mission will be another chance for significance,
a chance to repair his loss. He is therefore presupposing
in hopefulness the efficacy of participatory, repeated
action.43 The historian of religion Mircea Eliade
indicates that "traditional" cultures trusted the force of
repetition.
Thus, reality is acquired solely through 
repetition or participation; everything which 
lacks an exemplary model is "meaningless," i.e. 
lacks reality. (34)
For Eliade, ritual gives the plenitude of presence of the
origin, the omphalos, the center. Ritualistic repetition
gains its efficacy by reference to the origin, and
therefore demands a certain shrouding of oneself. One
must be other than the self to become oneself:
This tendency may well appear paradoxical, in 
the sense that the man of the traditional 
culture ceases to be himself (for a modern 
observer) and is satisfied with imitating and 
repeating the gestures of another. In other 
words, he sees himself as real, i.e., as "truly 
himself," only, and precisely insofar as he 
ceases to be so. (34)
This understanding of repetition reaches towards origin
and a reclamation of loss. Strether's journey, or rather
return to Europe, is reparative.
43 Repetition covers much ground; the introduction to 
Hillis Miller's Fiction and Repetition gives a brief 
survey of some of the major positions.
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Alternately, Julie Rivkin, in her False Positions,
describes a different mode of repetition, tying "origins"
to the common James ian theme of renunciation through the
language of "deferment" and "supplement." The movement of
the novel, says Rivkin, is centrifugal, with the
ambassadors (Strether and the Pococks) mediating the
"original" message, standing in place of the origin
(Woollett) but inevitably changing the message. If there
is ambiguity introduced, it is inevitable to the "logic of
delegation" that the ambassadorship entails. The novel
therefore sets up two different "economies" of
representation, a Puritan one of scarcity and reserve, and
a Parisian one of expenditure. Rivkin elaborates:
What this representational logic leads us to, 
then, are the experiential difficulties that 
constitute the novel's central themes and 
action: the problem of missed and vicarious
experience; the plot of substitution, 
deflection and deferral; and the novel's dual 
economy. (60)
The action of the novel traces the loss of the meaning in 
transmission from Woollett to Paris. Rivkin ultimately 
contrasts not just American and Parisian mores, but their 
modes of representation. For example, although Mrs.
Newsome,
makes use of ambassadors, she assumes that her 
business will be carried out as it would be in 
person; her fixity of purpose makes it 
impossible for her to imagine any shift or 
deviation. (68)
The centrifugal nature of the ambassadorial journey
requires an occlusion of original meaning and deferment ad
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infinitum. Rivkin implies that because of
representational entropy, there could never be enough time
for reparation.
It is true enough that there is a continual deferral
of the mission and loss of direction in the novel. Yet
there is at least one instance that shows correspondence
between the original and the repetition. Strether asks
Sarah if indeed Mrs. Newsome feels "insulted" by his
behavior, and the first ambassador confronts the second:
Sarah's answer came so straight, so "pat," as 
might have been said, that he felt on the 
instant its origin. "She has confided to my 
judgment and my tenderness the expression of 
her personal sense of everything, and the 
assertion of her personal dignity."
They were the very words of the lady of 
Woollett— he would have known them in a 
thousand; her parting charge to her child.
Mrs. Pocock accordingly spoke to this extent by 
the book, and the fact immensely moved him.
(278)44
There is, for Strether anyway, a transparency to the 
"charge"; the words' "origin" is instantly perceptible.
The beauty of the Woollett charge lies in its security of 
purpose, its communion with the original.
Though Rivkin's study does account for the general 
sense of loss in the novel by tying it to modes of 
representation, it does a less adequate job regarding 
Strether's own sense of loss; like Girardian analysis,
Rivkin's sacrifices the personal to the structural, the
44 Typographic images abound: Strether is Chad's "critic" 
(96); Chad is a "book" (111); Marie Gostrey is described 
as a typesetter (21).
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ambassador to the embassy. It makes of the novel 
something of a parlor-game, in which conversation is 
inevitably altered through mis-repetition. Rivkin does 
not associate Strether's wandering with aesthetics as this 
study does, but rather with the linguistic, political, and 
financial economy of loss inevitable to the structure of 
ambas s adors hip.
Yet there is a positive element in Strether's 
vagrancy; his loss of direction, his wandering, is 
associated not only with an "economy that encourages 
extravagance" (Rivkin 72), but a specifically aesthetic 
field of repetition. The baroque imagination of James, 
with all of its involutions and digressions, seems on this 
viewing very much the romantic arabesque. In The 
Ambassadors, at Gloriani's party, the "little artist-man"
Bilham labels Strether a collectible example of the 
"rococo":4^
"On the contrary they adore— we all adore here- 
-the rococo, and where is there a better 
setting for it than the whole thing, the 
pavilion and the garden, together? There are 
lots of people with collections," little Bilham 
smiled as he glanced round. "You'll be 
secured!" (123)
Strether is placed in an aesthetic category that values
repetition, convolution and deferral, and therefore is
tied to a romantic aesthetic. This is the second type of
repetition that Strether discovers: repetition that
45 Remy Saisselin calls the rococo the "feminization of 
the baroque" (84).
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acknowledges the possibility of alterabilty in repetition:
vagrancy. Strether does not only discover that the
embassy is deferred, but that he himself is changed:
There had been times enough for a month when it 
had seemed to him that he was strange, that he 
was altered, in every way. (209)
The repetition is distanced from its origin and alters,
not only itself, but Strether; as Jacques Derrida, whom
Rivkin draws on, writes in a slightly different context,
"iterability" does not signify simply . . . 
repeatability of the same, but rather 
alterability of this same idealized in the 
singularity of the event, for instance, in this 
or that speech act. (Derrida, Limited 119)
If Strether at first hopes for a "review," a grounded
repetition (what Eliade would call repetition of archaic
man), he soon discovers the alterability of the Parisian
aesthetics of the vague. Madame de Vionnet's labeling the
recognition scene at the Cheval Blanc, the "clarifying
scene," an "invraisemblance" is then a malaprop; what
Strether saw on the river, the demystifying vision, is the
reality, the semblance that is identical with the self.
Yet Rodolphe Gasche notes of "iterability":
A priori, then, the possibility of iteration 
divides the identity of all units; iterability 
is the impurity of an absence that, from the 
start, prohibits the full and rigorous 
attainment of the plenitude of the unit, and 
that in principle subverts its self-identity.
(213)
Rather then, the scene contains the nearest claim to self- 
identity that the novel will allow. Otherwise, the claims 
to self-evidence in the novel resemble themselves only
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formally, as do vapid tautologies: "We have plenty of 
reasons . . . for everything we do," Sarah Pocock argues,
"I've come because— well, because we do come" (221).
Sarah's chop-logic draws on the law of self-identity and 
the subsumption of the individual under the class ("I" do 
because "we" do) to bolster her case and ground her 
reasons, of which she has "plenty." Yet her claim to 
self-identity and plenitude is actually only evasive 
repetition.
Strether's attempt at reparation becomes a 
repetition that alters despite his intention. Moreover, 
and more importantly, Strether's self-alienation goes much 
deeper, for he discovers (in one of the novel's recurring 
inversions), in the old world the sins of the new world. 
Ritualistic repetition that gains meaning by reference to 
origin is inadequate because the origin is ja schon, 
always already, impure.
Woollett is certainly some kind of primal scene:
Strether confesses to Maria that in the past, behind the 
family's wealth, are the grandfather's "practices" and 
"exploits," and the father, whose name is "Abel," is no 
better than the grandfather. There are then two points: 
the original directive becomes occluded the further it 
gets from Woollett; but in addition, the original springs 
from polluted ("Abel's"?) ground. That ground bears fruit 
in the guise of the unspoken product (the "ridiculous 
object"), which itself is the result of unspeakable
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practices. Woollett claims purity of New World origins, 
but the typology used indicates that impurity was present 
at the very beginning.
Speaking of the general system of infrastructure
that is always the hope of philosophy, Gasche notes of
iterability that
Repetition thus hinges on the structural 
possibility of an absence of the repeated. If 
the unit to be repeated were totally present 
and represent to itself, if it were not 
breached by a certain lack of plenitude, no 
repetition could ever occur. (213)
Repetition therefore presupposes distance from origin.
Strether discovers not only that his repetition, like all
representations, does not have perfect reference to the
origin, but also that the origin itself is not clear, that
Sarah's "charge" ("definite," "crystalline") is associated
with the "impurity" of ambiguity. Strether finds that
America, despite its ostensible purity of origin (the
green cover of the Review?)46 was sullied, imbrued with
blood. Gasche here writes of the ambiguity of the
"general system" in philosophy but his remarks are
relevant:
46 Much can made of any given detail in The Ambassadors—  
colors, for example. Strether's Review is green (50): the 
color of money? the New World? vegetation? If this last 
implies rootedness and intransigence of moral values, then 
perhaps the "salmon-coloured Revue" (246) of Paris is more 
at home in water, the fluid medium associated with the 
"various" Madame de Vionnet's "ship." B. Cowan notes that 
Paris's emblem is a ship, and its motto is fluctuat nec 
mergitur, "it is wavers, but does not sink."
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Yet it is not the sort of ambiguity that would 
be witness to an absence of clarity in the 
process of their determination. . . .
Ambiguity in these senses is always a function 
of presence— that is, of an ultimately self­
identical signification. . . . (Gasche 240)
What Strether discovers again, yet somehow for the first
time, axe the connections among the beautiful as the
vague, the ambiguity of origin and, finally,
contamination.
Regarding this last, when Strether enters Madame de 
Vionnet7s apartment for the last time, into her "beautiful 
formal room," he hears the "vague voice of Paris" from the 
street, and perceives, "The smell of revolution, the smell 
of public temper— or perhaps simply the smell of blood"
(317). It can be no accident that he only identifies the 
smell, apparently the same smell from Chad's apartment 
("something very good" 72), with blood after the discovery 
of Madame de Vionnet's affair; the "smell of blood" 
contains an overtone of sexual impurity. The only thing 
self-identical at the origin is an original sin, which 
paradoxically, is unoriginal, a "typical tale" of sexual 
impurity. Strether's attempt to deviate is not only part 
of the inevitable structure of embassy, as Rivkin argues, 
but a willed desire for the vague and beautiful. What he 
learns is that the baroque involutions ("we adore the 
rococo") of Europe repeat the sins of the New World, and
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spring from the ground from which Abel's blood cries 
out.47
Imagined Ends
Strether's final visit to Chad's apartment continues 
to engage this overall recursive mission. He pauses 
meditatively in the street below Chad's balcony: "He 
stopped short to-night on coming into sight of it: it was 
as if his last day were oddly copying his first" (333).
Strether must wonder if there was ever a chance at 
reparation, or, as he intones after the Cheval Blanc,
"verily, his labor had been lost" (313), whether 
repetition is futile. His last meeting of Chad is 
thoroughly disheartening; Strether tells him he will be a 
"brute" if he leaves Madame de Vionnet. Chad agrees in 
his hollow way, but seems set on his course back to 
America. Strether can do no more than echo: "If there was 
nothing for it but to repeat, however, repetition was no 
mistake" (338).
The desire to repeat unendingly seems to be a main 
complaint against Strether, his biggest "mistake." He is, 
McWhirter writes, a case of the romantic imagination 
trapped in its own vagaries: "[Strether's] entire approach 
to his embassy is one that pretends the experience will 
last forever" (64). Yet Strether's repetition becomes 
more understandable in face of the false endings that
47 Genesis 4.10. In the American novel of New World 
sexual impurity, The Scarlet Letter, the matrons speculate 
that the red letter could perhaps mean "able."
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impose themselves throughout the novel: Maria Gostrey
would serve Strether "til death" (56); "What [Strether]
wanted most was some idea that would simplify, and nothing
would do this so much as the fact that he was done for and
finished" (61); "It probably was all at an end" (280);
"[Madame de Vionnet] shook her head. 'There's not a grain
of certainty in my future— for the only certainty is that
I shall be the loser in the end'" (324). And finally, at
that last meeting with Chad, Strether, "his labor lost,"
repeats that Chad will be a "brute" if he leaves:
Chad preserved his handsome grimace as well as 
the rest of his attitude. "You're not 
altogether— in your great 'solemnity'— kind.
Haven't I been drinking you in— showing you all 
I feel you're worth to me? What have I done, 
what am I doing, but cleave to her to death?
The only thing is," he good-humouredly 
explained, "that one can't have it before one, 
in the cleaving— the point where the death 
comes in. Don't be afraid for that. (340)
Strether is afraid for "the point where the death comes
in." An aesthetics of the vague promises an arabesque
that evades death (and as Chad helpfully notes, the arts
are "infinite"). Strether's aesthetics strives toward
continuing life in the face of false endings.
Strether's success may be disputed. Yet one person 
in the novel does somehow seem to reconcile a sense of 
ending and the need to repeat. Little Bilham's potential 
marriage to Mamie, and Strether's early assurance that "in 
Little Bilham's company contrarieties in general dropped"
(83), indicate that he remains the best hope for the 
imagination, "that faculty . . . often exploited by
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nineteenth-century novelists and their characters to evade 
awkward dichotomies" . . . (Cave 444), a faculty Chad 
noticeably lacks (290). Of course the largest dichotomy 
of the novel is the tension between the moral and the 
aesthetic. Though Strether's hopes for reparation and 
reconciliation are dashed, those same hopes are perhaps 
preserved for the "little artist-man."
The vision of this possible reconciliation of the
moral and the aesthetic is seen quite early in the novel.
Little Bilham takes Strether and Maria Gostrey to his old
studio for tea with another friend:
The comrade was another ingenuous patriot, to 
whom he had wired that tea was to await them 
"regardless," and this reckless repast, and the 
second ingenuous compatriot, and the faraway 
makeshift life, with its jokes and its gaps, 
its delicate daubs and its three or four 
chairs,48 its overflow of taste and conviction 
and its lack of nearly all else— these things 
wove round the occasion a spell to which our 
hero unreservedly surrendered. (84)
The narrator is not unaware of the preciousness of this
scene: the phrase "delicate daubs" is repeated three times
in thirty lines. So too it casts a "spell" on Strether,
who is as we know, susceptible to enchantment. But there
it remains, a binding together of the moral and the
aesthetic, the reconciliation of "taste and conviction."
Strether needs the rest of the novel to learn the costs of
that reconciliation: the "lack of nearly all else."
48 Why "three or four"? There are four people present; 
certainly it would be clear how many chairs there actually 
were at a sit-down tea: a Jamesian "joke" or "gap."
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
1 6 3
Though the aesthetics of the vague is liberatory, it 
cannot quell the desire for a "clarifying scene," and the 
"art [that] makes the coexistence of contradictories 
possible" (Rimmon 234) may in fact be the art of the lie, 
the art of fiction.
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Chapter V. Wallace Stevens' "illustrious nothing" 
Romantic Fog, and "a project for the sun"
The Russian modernist painter Wassily Kandinsky had
only recently started formal art study in Munich when he
wrote a review of the "Secession" exhibition (1899) for a
local paper. The exhibition, he wrote, "give[s] a rough
picture of . . . two trends in contemporary painting."
The first was characterized by the
tiresomeness and monotony of that foggy veil 
which covered these artist's paintings: fog in 
the morning, afternoon, evening, and night, 
with sun and in overcast weather; fog appearing 
in landscape, genre, portrait, a beautiful fog, 
giving that fairy-tale and peculiarly poetic 
impression, but with too often recurring 
persistence as if by order of law, until 
exhausted. Arising now and then on its own but 
most of the time drifting over from Scotland, 
this foggy mood was cultivated in the painting 
of countries all over the world. (731)
Amidst "this international assembly of fogs," the young
student sees hints of a new style, if not a new era, with
"patches of the new light catching on fire in some places"
(733):
And it is just now, perhaps, that a reaction is 
beginning: pure and intense light, purity and 
brightness of colors are beginning to b u m  here 
and there with intense patches among many 
others, immersed as usual in a dull haze of 
paintings. (732)
While Kandinsky grants a technical reason for the
difference between the two trends (a preference for newly-
rediscovered bold tempera over more muted oils), it would
be a mistake to consider the shift a stylistic localism;
164
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
1 6 5
Kandinsky certainly thought what he saw had a wider
significance. He continues:
We are experiencing a more interesting period, 
when art and especially painting is beginning 
to come out of the embryo of a new epoch, where 
everything bright is not just a premonition 
among a few specialists, but a great 
renaissance, for which the approaching 
twentieth century is opening its doors.
(737)
One would say that Kandinsky was prescient, but for the 
fact that his work to a certain degree brought about that 
"new epoch." The excesses of the Romantics, their 
affinity for the divine under the guise of the sublime and 
the organic, for beauty disguised as vagueness, for 
personalism dressed as pathos, might all be grouped under 
what Kandinsky calls "fogginess."
The first decades of the twentieth century provide
other examples of this modernist impatience with an
aesthetics of the vague. In architecture, distracting
ornamentation was effaced amid a preference for "clean
lines and uncluttered surfaces."1 Pound's criticism, as
outlined above, emphasized the political and societal
dangers of obtuse language: no justice without clear
style. William Carlos Williams, while less overtly
concerned with the political, shared Pound's devotion to
the skeletal. Of Marianne Moore, he writes that with her
a word is a word most when it is separated out 
by science, treated by acid to remove the
1 Thomas Leddy describes an overlooked group of aesthetic 
values in "Everyday Surface Aesthetic Qualities: 'Neat,' 
'Messy,' 'Clean' 'Dirty,'" (260).
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smudges, washed, dried, and placed right side 
up on a clean surface. Now one may say that 
this is a word.2
Yet it is one of the fundamental paradoxes of the poetry
of Wallace Stevens that though he claims ambiguity as both
the starting-point and end of poetry, his poems are rife
with the promise and project of clarity: "Phoebus is
dead," but "There is a project for the sun" (208).3 This
dialectic occurs with his first poems ("Chiaroscuro" [OP
3]) and continues until his very last ones ("Of Mere
Being" [398]). Stevens was uniquely situated, and his
poetry remained particularly attuned to this tension.
What is at stake with this dialectic touches on ethics,
epistemology and aesthetics, and Stevens in both his prose
and poetry evidences deep appreciation for what was served
in "choosing sides" in the debate. In "The Noble Rider
and the Sound of Words," he indicates that
a language evolves through a series of 
conflicts between the denotative and the 
connotative forces in words; between an 
asceticism tending to kill language by 
stripping words of all association and a 
hedonism tending to kill language by 
dissipating their sense in a multiplicity of 
associations. (NA 13)
In a sense his life project is a meditation on this
duality and its complex interaction.4
2 Quoted by Stephen Tapscott, American Beauty 136.
3 All citations in Stevens are from The Palm at the End of 
the Mind, except where indicated Opus Posthumous 
(hereafter OP) and Necessary Angel (hereafter NA).
4 Helen Vendler deplores the tendency in Stevens criticism 
to frame issues in terms of oppositions, while employing 
one "despair" versus "desire" (Words 42ff). Harold Bloom
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It will come as no surprise that the poet with such
a consciousness never chooses sides in the debate.
Rather, Stevens moves beyond the mere efficient function
of machine-like verse, and proffers, especially in his
late lyrics, a clarity of a possible poetry. On first
glance, Stevens certainly seems an unlikely champion of
clarity. In a letter to R. P. Blackmur dated November 16,
1931, he writes that:
One of the essentials of poetry is ambiguity.
I don't feel that I have touched the thing 
until I touch it in ambiguous form. Sometimes 
when I felt that I had touched it it was a 
delight to see how far I could bring it back to 
reality. (Stevens, Holly 773)
The statement itself is of course fundamentally ambiguous.
Perhaps it is an ethical statement, an expression of
humility in face of the object, and a rejection of any
appropriating attitude that a desire for mastery over the
object would involve. Or, it could mean that it is indeed
a "fluent mundo" (233), a world that remains a
disappointment to those who seek a certainty in the stable
object, a world of ontological flux. Then again, it could
mean that the perceiving eye (which he so often puns with
"I") must be a restless eye ("It can never be satisfied,
the mind, never" [190]) seeking a new vision of the object
to glean ever-new experiences for an always-changing self.
Criticism on Stevens has from early on seen that one 
of the projects of his poetic praxis was to "ambiguate"
elaborates on the dialectic of opposites (power and fate, 
among others) in the Coda to his The Poems of Our Climate.
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both the poetic vision and ontological stability.5 The 
explication of Stevens' works in terms of ambiguity adds 
to an understanding of literary modernism's grappling with 
the issues of religious disbelief and ethical skepticism.
It remains, however, that one of the qualities that is 
most admired in Stevens is the haiku-like sparseness of 
his verse; as Randall Jarrell note, Stevens' are "cool, 
clear, airy poems" (54).
Wallace Stevens Has Ho Shape
If it is easy to indicate that clarity is found to 
be admirable in Stevens' poetry, it is harder to say 
directly what constitutes this clarity. The conflict in 
The Ambassadors was between the positive elements of an 
aesthetics of the vague which promised freedom, and the 
economy of loss that vagueness participated in and 
inadequately redressed (most notably through repetition).
In this latter sense, ambiguity in James and the Romantics 
in general is parasitic of clarity, accounting for the 
overall sense of melancholy of both the Romantics and the 
moderns. The question arises: does any proffering of a 
poetics of clarity immediately involve nostalgia and the 
tradition of return? Is the modernist aficionado of 
clarity therefore reactionary? The danger seems inherent.
Paul Morrison in his Poetics of Fascism notes that
5 Criticism on Stevens is so extensive that it has merited 
at least one tertiary study: Melita Schaum's Wallace 
Stevens and the Critical Schools. Hillis Miller's 
explication of ambiguity in "The Rock" is perhaps the most 
sophisticated.
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Pound's poetic radicalism . . .  in a paradox 
sadly familiar to students of modernism, proves 
compatible with the most reactionary of 
politics. (19)
Pound's attempt was, as Carne-Ross persuasively argues, to 
gamer an experience of the originary. When Pound invokes 
Ceres in the Cantos, he is really trying to evince the 
goddess uniquely, one actualized time. Seemingly, the 
lyric is then an aesthetic object and not a political one. 
Indeed, its condensation and epigrammatic quality sets it 
against meta-narratives, grand schemes of the "world- 
historical" consciousness. In much critical estimation, 
the lyric is a type of "windowless monad," a "world within 
a world" that would claim relative innocence for itself 
and its purposes. Further substantiating this view is the 
conventional opposition of the lyric to the genre of the 
novel. It is in the novel where, according to Georg 
Lukacs' widely-held thesis, real history and politics are 
worked out.6
Yet this is not the end of the question. For it is 
perhaps because of the emphatic authorial "I" (as the 
monologism of Mikhail Bakhtin would locate the issue) that 
critics have tended to zero in on lyricist rather than 
lyric, poet rather than poem. The lyrical "I" is then a 
sign of the mind's (or ego's) formidable power. And in 
this regard critics are not so ready to excuse or
6 My use of "lyric" and "novel" does not necessarily imply 
an essential form, but nor does it mean that I consider 
such groupings unmotivated, arbitrary, or unhelpful.
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exculpate the poets from historical responsibility as they 
are their poems. Interrogating personal failures has now 
become so standard as to be part of what modernity 
signifies. The case of Ezra Pound is symptomatic, with 
the critical estimation of his canon inevitably attached 
to his association with fascism. T. S. Eliot has suffered 
a milder though similar fate, with the overall critical 
estimation of his poetic project now called into question.
In both his practical non-commitment to rightist politics 
on one hand (usually taken as evidence of duplicitous 
caution rather than faith in democracy) as well as in his 
self-conscious intellectual consent to a conservative 
political program, Eliot's critical fortunes show 
increasing instability.7
Whether because of his Americanness (he was 
consciously not an expatriate), his ordinariness, or his 
upper-middle class mores, Wallace Stevens himself seems 
immune to such treatment.8 No "major man" he, and if he 
was an aesthete, he was abstemious, and seems to gamer 
respect from readers merely for staying in a career he 
disliked for the sake of his poetry. It is likely,
7 See Morrison for a clear and concise reading of Pound 
and Eliot’s politics; the recent flood on Eliot includes 
Kenneth Asher's T. S. Eliot and Ideology and Anthony 
Julius' T.S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism, and the Literary Form.
Eliot's attitude toward the classes is revealed in his own 
early essay "Marie Lloyd," in which it is the middle 
rather than the lower classes that are the target of his 
derision.
8 Marjorie Perloff, however, sees some of Stevens' poems 
moving from "fluent mundo" to (monologic) crystal.
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however, that he evades criticism because his poetry 
rarely makes a claim in the way Pound's does. In this 
sense, the avowal of innocence in imagism seems to be 
precisely the problem. If lyric has a claim on the 
original, if it professes to invoke Ceres, then it can 
demand a certain authority. To take an example: the 
direct address comes easy to some modern poets, yet while 
H. D. can employ the vocative with some authority,
Stevens, typically, instead writes a poem about the 
vocative, "On the Manner of Addressing Clouds" (56). He 
seems convinced of the impossibility of addressing the 
ding an sich, the immediacy of experience, and is as Helen 
Vendler writes, a "second-order poet rather than a poet of 
experience" (40).9 For Stevens language is a fiction, but 
that is no surprise, as all is fiction: "It is never the 
thing but the version of the thing" (268), and even 
repetitions change. Indeed, his poem "The Good Man Has No 
Shape" may be his own "epitaphium," or perhaps a warning 
to himself to make only guarded claims: with "feathers in 
his flesh" and an "empty book to read" the unnamed 
bird/poet/prophet is mocked merely because "[h]e said a 
good life would be possible" (283). Given this guarded 
stance, a conscious poetic project to "touch a thing in 
its ambiguous form," and the poet's lived reticence, there
9 This is the understanding of modernity that usually 
accompanies studies of Stevens. As Louis Dupre indicates, 
this understanding of modernity "subordinates direct 
experience to a second order of epistemological 
foundations " (Pos tmoderni ty 294).
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is reason to dwell on Stevens' clarity as it partakes in 
the larger drama of modernism. In Stevens there is a 
redisposition of clarity as mere machine-like stripping of 
encrustation, to a clarity as luminescence, a luminescence 
"beyond belief." What can it mean for a disbeliever to 
use the words "gold" and "aureole"; for a skeptic to talk 
about the "brilliance" of a scene; for an anti-naturalist 
to talk about "the vigor of glory"? To this end, a 
presentation of four topoi of Stevensian clarity: a 
clearing away from history; the figure of the giant as an 
ersatz clarity; the recognizable poem; and finally, 
negative ekphrasis.10 
A Clear Poem and No History
In response to a questionnaire from The Partisan 
Review in 1939, Stevens wrote, "The material of the 
imagination is reality and reality can be nothing other 
than the usable past." Replying to a more specific 
question about Henry James and Walt Whitman, he noted,
"neither of them mean anything to me" (OP 309). The two 
answers summarize well "the American scene" for Stevens, 
whose poetry bears the marks of the tension between the 
desire to summon and to clear away the past. His poem 
"Ghosts as Cocoons" likewise displays this tension, for 
the poem is not a presentation of past-ness, as the 
"ghost" of its title would indicate, but rather is an
10 My emphasis here will fall on the later lyrics, but it 
seems to me they concentrate themes Stevens labored with 
his entire career.
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invocation to newness: "Come now, pearled and pasted,
bloomy-leafed" (128). But then there is always reason
enough for Stevens the poet to distrust history. Future
generations inevitably mistake what went before, as they
do in "A Postcard from the Volcano":
Children picking up our bones
Will never know that these were once
Quick as foxes on the hill. . . . (127)
It is a poem of cultural detritus, of the inevitable 
ossification of life. The community which was there 
leaves only its bones, its speech ("our speech") and its 
style ("The look of things . . . what we felt / At what we 
saw"). The generations share speech, but the children 
"Will speak our speech and never know," using it to 
condemn the speaker's style. It is the story of de­
generation, the passing of one generation to another and 
the loss thereby incurred. And yet perhaps the speaker's 
generation was once in the same position as the "children" 
bone-pickers, so that we do not know if loss occurs due to 
moral failure, or merely due to transition between the 
quick and the dead.
Ossification may be a natural metaphor for the 
cultural process of getting clear to what is significant 
(let us remember Pound's fish), a clearing away of 
tradition. In his later poetry Stevens continues this 
meditation, familiar enough to all poetry, but he seems to 
wring a new dynamism from the past. "Reality Is an 
Activity of the Most August Imagination" gives the view of
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the landscape from a speeding automobile. It begins with 
the backward glance of memory:
Last Friday, in the big light of last Friday 
night,
We drove home from Cornwall to Hartford, late.
It was not a night blown at a glassworks in 
Vienna
Or Venice, motionless, gathering time and dust.
(396)
The first stanza's "Last Friday," "last Friday night," and 
"late" all emphasize that in reading this we are cast back 
into a specific time that has passed. As well, the 
opening situates the poem spatially between two specific 
Connecticut cities. There is a temporal glance backward, 
but also a spatial one; literally, the drive from Cornwall 
to Hartford is directly easterly. In order to see the 
"westward evening star" one would have to look backwards.
The drive forward is remembered as a glance backward, and 
further, its importance is constituted by the glance 
backward.
However, the second stanza defines this moment of 
observation by negation— "it was not"— to the effect that 
last Friday's experience is opposed to and lifted out of 
the flow of history, especially European history. That 
history— the history bracketed by negation— "gather[s]
. . . dust" like a souvenir, a word that functions in 
other poems as an ironization of the past. Thus the two 
stanzas are strongly opposed: one is real, one is 
imagined; one past brought near, and one pushed to the 
distance; one is American, one European.
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The two juxtaposed moments, however, have at heart a 
likeness that operates against the defining dis-simile.
Both night sky and glassworks are brilliantly luminescent.
On that stretch of highway, there is "The vigor of glory, 
a glittering in the veins, / As the things emerged and 
moved and were dissolved," with "the veins" a possible 
homonym for "heavens." The unnamed "things" seem to shine 
precisely in their evanescence, as they appear to fade in 
the distance, change forms, or dissolve into nothingness 
from the perspective of the speeding car, whose violent 
movement seems to discharge the light. A night "blown at 
a glassworks in Vienna / Or Venice" gathers "time and 
dust"; this night rather disperses them through a violent 
scattering. It is as if the "crush of strength," and the 
"grinding going round," are necessary for the 
luminescence, the "vigor of glory" to be released from 
things as "An argentine abstraction." If "Night's 
moonlight lake was neither water nor air," then it was 
most likely fire, as the essential property of the past is 
discharged as a fiery luminescence.
It is significant that the glance cast backward does 
not turn the speaker to salt. That is the danger of Lot's 
wife, a fate perhaps hinted at but averted in "[t]here was 
an insolid billowing of the solid," a supervalence on the 
solid. Instead, the poet and poem, both of which are 
backward-looking, are transformed into not a salt crystal, 
but an "argentine abstraction" as they go from Com-wall
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to Hart-fdrd, from the past as a wall or blockage (like 
the "blocking steel" of "Anecdote of the Prince of 
Peacocks") to the past as a fording, a crossing. Such a 
crossing has its own brilliance, as it does in "The River 
of Rivers in Connecticut." This poem takes place just 
previous to the crossing, while the speaker is still on 
"this side of Stygia" before the trees forget, and "lack 
the intelligence of trees" (386), before they cross Styx.
The past— here a mythical past— is again evoked by 
dissimile.
Thus the urgency of modernism to appropriate a 
"usable past" often took the form of a distancing, but not 
quite forgetting, an operation of cutting oneself off from 
historical causality, of clearing away. In "A Clear Day 
and No Memories," that mere absence, in a sense, 
withdraws, leaving a clear but "shallow spectacle," a 
clarity having no reference to ambiguity. That is, while 
ambiguity seemingly always has a relation to its lost 
arche clarity, Stevens in his last lyrics moves toward a 
luminescence that is not a nostalgia for, or a 
reinstatement of, that lost ideal of clarity (the root of 
the modernist atavistic urge). As indicated, though this 
movement necessarily involves a glance backward, its 
essence is a moving forward "under the front of the 
westward evening star." This dual motion is much like 
that described in Walter Benjamin's commentary on Klee's 
"Angelus Novus," which
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shows an angel looking as though he is about to 
move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth 
is open his wings are spread. This is how one 
pictures the angel of history. (257)
This fixed contemplation is, in "A Clear Day," of the
shallow spectacle. It is not, however, superficial, but
rather central, with "shallow" taking up its etymological
relation to the Greek skeletos. But here there is less
desiccation than the bristling vigor of "Reality."
Stevens has already, in "As you leave the Room," accused
himself of aridity:
I wonder, have I lived a skeleton's life,
As a disbeliever in reality,
A countryman of all the bones in the world?
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten becomes
Part of a major reality. . . . (396)
The answer is embedded in the "Now, here" and it is a
"now,here" a nowhere devoid of absence, the "scenery" of
"A Clear Day," where the scenery is the drama:
No soldiers in the scenery,
No thoughts of people now dead,
As they were fifty years ago,
Young and living in a live air,
Young and walking in the sunshine,
Bending in blue dresses to touch something,
Today the mind is not part of the weather.
(397)
The mind is not part of the weather because it is a thing 
apart, subject neither to the weather's change nor 
history. That is, there is a clarity of the day because 
there is no memory; the soldiers are evoked, but not 
invoked. As Steven Shaviro notes, "the past is affirmed 
without being rendered present" (193), such that it does
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not have to be denied. Space relations, so important in 
all of Stevens' poetry, ("One is not duchess / A hundred 
yards from a carriage" [OP 86]) are here collapsed. All 
pluralities— soldiers, thoughts, dresses, meanings— are 
resolved into a wholeness without depth, delivering no 
knowledge except of nothingness. The pluralities all 
collapse into a oneness, a "shallow spectacle, / This 
invisible activity, this sense." While Stevens of 
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" could only 
elaborate a "small part of the pantomime" (20), here in "A 
Clear Day" he allows himself a full drama of memoryless 
"Invisible activity." "A Clear Day" answers "Postcard," 
by presenting a drama of knowledge of nothingness against 
the children's not-knowing.
Notes Toward a Supremacist Fiction?: Stevens' Giantism
The preference for evoking rather than invoking 
history may say something about the comparative weakness 
of Stevens' lyric "I." Thus, if the self's desire for 
clarity becomes identified with the monological, an 
identification that worries readers of modernism, then 
seemingly Stevens is in the clear, so to speak. Yet the 
reticence so often associated with his poetry is belied by 
the figure of the giant that appears with some regularity 
in his poems. Yet the giant hardly appears in his corpus 
before it is both challenged and lampooned in "The Plot 
Against the Giant" (22). The first two girls will 
"check," and "abash," with smells and colors. The third
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girl will "whisper / Heavenly labials in a world of
gutturals" so as to "undo" him, indicating that the
appearance of the giant will be challenged in the field of
communication— labials and gutturals. Thus the monologism
of the giant is checked, and he never says a word. But
later in Stevens, the giant reappears, here, in Stevens'
most well-known poem, "Anecdote of the Jar." The poem
gives one view of a rather dogmatic event:
I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness 
Surround that hill.
The wilderness rose up to it.
And sprawled around, no longer wild.
The jar was round upon the ground 
And tall and of a port in air.
It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush 
Like nothing else in Tennessee. (46)
Whatever reticence Stevens displays in a poem such as
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" is absent here;
the speaker-subject appears confident of his project. The
object here— the wilderness, nature— is manfully
constrained. And formally, an equivocity or multivocity
of vision is supplanted by the straightforward and
uni vocal form of the anecdote. Seen in this way,
"Anecdote" reaffirms a commitment to the Romantic image,
with the virile poet imposing an art on nature. Almost
all critics study the poem as an Americanist re-writing of
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Keat's "Ode on a Grecian Urn."11 One may quibble about 
the degree of success of the project, with "great success" 
on one end (the pre-existent round form of the jar makes 
the wilderness dogmatically sur-round it), and "middling 
success" on the other (the wilderness resists, is "no 
longer wild," but still manages to "sprawl"). The regular 
iambic tetrameter is broken up by the dactyls "slovenly," 
"wilderness," and "Tennessee," but overall, the art takes 
dominion "everywhere."
Some critics, notably Frank Lentricchia and James 
Longenbach, see Stevens as pointing out here the dangers 
inherent in any imposition from above. The speaker here 
is Ariel become policeman.12 Longenbach expresses the 
same sentiment when he writes of another poem: "the entire 
point of 'The Idea of Order at Key West' is to expose the 
dangers of single-minded dogmatism" (163). Yet it is not 
so apparent that the giant is, or is always, the 
incarnation of this dogmatism, the temptation to the 
nostos, or a strong claim to access to pure clarity as 
original experience. In "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," 
the giant appears distinct from MacCullough, who seems to 
be Stevens' figure of fixed fashioning:
11 Helen Vendler goes so far as to say the poem is "not 
comprehensible, in manner or form, unless it is taken to 
be centrally about Keats' poem" ( Words 45), a strange 
comment, considering it must be one of Stevens' most 
formally independent poems.
12 See Lentricchia's discussion in the Introduction to 
Ariel and the Police; also Longenbach, Chapter 13.
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The pensive giant prone in violet space 
May be the MacCullough, an expedient,
Logos and logic, crystal hypothesis,
Incipit and a form to speak the word 
And every latent double in the word,
Beau linguist. But the MacCullough is 
MacCullough. (213)
Ever the linguist who can only assert a tautology of
selfhood, it is MacCullough, not the giant, who "imposes
orders as he thinks of them" (229). "But to impose is not
/ to discover" (230). Indeed Stevens condemns art as will
to power: "The essential fault of surrealism is that it
invents without discovering." (OP 203).
There is here and elsewhere in Stevens a hint that 
giantism satirizes the Romantic mind's control over 
nature, disputes poesis as origin of order (or, more 
sinisterly, as expression of a libido dominandi, an 
unblessed "rage for order" [98]). For example, in 
"Anecdote," note that the "I" "place[s]" a jar on a hill 
in Tennessee, as if he reaches onto the hill itself. In 
"The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain" the actor 
"recomposed the pines," "shifted the rocks." In stanza XI 
of "Thirteen," "he" rides not through Connecticut, but 
"over" the state. The mentioning of the specific states, 
Tennessee and Connecticut, implies a forceful political 
action. In all these, there is a looming, gigantic 
figure, seemingly that of an artist, that towers over a 
territory and delimits, or changes it. And yet if there 
is a lust for "dominion," its effectiveness is not
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
1 8 2
ensured, for Stevens' giants are not incapable of being 
checked, abashed, and undone. The timorous quality of 
this giantism softens the monologism of the speaker's 
project in "Anecdote."
One thrust of Stevens' criticism since Joseph 
Riddel's Clairvoyant Eye emphasizes his humanism, his 
interest in man as fiction-maker, and Stevens is aware in 
"Anecdote" that art, the entire project of taming the 
wilderness, is anthropomorphic. He opposes the man-made 
jar to wilderness (with its moral slovenliness), to bird 
and bush. This opposition is thematized such that 
giantism becomes the monstrous and ironic hyperbole of 
humanistic anthropomorphism. The placing of the jar 
proffers (or rather satirizes) the artist-as-giant that 
gives order through a jar that takes dominion.
A view toward the form of the poem appears at first 
to be more evidence of the actor-speaker's monologism.
The speaker-actor is not only forceful in his manipulation 
of the jar and wilderness, but also in casting the poem in 
a specific form, the anecdote. Anecdotes are a highly 
manipulable form. In fact, in his essay "The Man Who 
Mistook His Hat: Steven Greenblatt and the Anecdote," 
critic John Lee criticizes "new historicism" precisely for 
its dependence on this suggestive form. To Lee, the 
anecdote, especially the personal anecdote, is a little 
too resonant: "Their small narrative size allows them to 
be easily manipulated by a master narrative" (299). It is
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not just that the anecdote is easily transportable, but 
also that despite the implicit claim that anecdotes are 
small "slices of life," they usually are given strongly 
symbolic functions. One is usually supposed to generalize 
from a small anecdote, and deduce toward a covering 
principle. The use of the definite article "the" in the 
title— which implies a general applicability— instead of 
the indefinite and empirical "a" further indicates that 
the poet means to have his anecdote represent a 
"normative" jar-event.
Yet there is another side to "anecdotes" that 
operates against a will-to-power, and makes them somewhat 
palinodic, rendering problematic an overtly political 
reading. Anecdotes were originally private, alternate 
histories that are not given around publicly (an-not+ 
ekdotos-given out). Thus in the last stanza, the 
domineering affirmation of "It took dominion everywhere" 
retreats with the negatives of the last two lines, and the 
giantism of the poem seems to withdraw. The not-giving of 
bird or bush ties the etymology of the form— anecdote—  
with the function of the jar. But what of this give-and- 
take? If a parallel is being made between the anecdote 
and jar, what is it?
It is the transportability of the two— the jar and 
the anecdote— that seems especially unstable, and must 
give pause to a reading which makes the poem an allegory 
of the working of art(ists). Were one to follow Derrida,
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one could say the jar is a sign, the event is the 
anecdote, the context is the surrounding wilderness. The 
"event" seems to be the attempt to give a unity to the 
slovenly "context" that surrounds signature— the jar. But 
a sign's significance cannot be extricated from its 
context, and its value lies in its iterability in other 
contexts. This deracinating function is precisely what 
Lee finds troublesome. Greenblatt uses this highly 
transportable, context-dependent form and can manipulate 
it, perhaps towards sinister purpose.
The simple allegorization of the poem as art-event 
is further weakened by the mode of the jar's reflecting.
One would think that we are being given a mirror held up 
to nature. The jar as artwork seems to have the poem 
expressing faith in a classical view of mimesis; but the 
anecdote form undercuts this, and the jar becomes an in­
significant object that, being "gray and bare" does not 
reflect, and therefore does "not give of bird or bush."
The surface, because it "does not give," appears non- 
ref lective, more tain— the non-reflecting back— than 
mirror.13 So on the one hand, the jar's position as 
anamorphic14 center of the slovenly wilderness indicates
13 Brooks and Warren think the jar is a gray crockery pot 
(non-reflective, common-named), while Roy Harvey Pearce 
notes that there was in 1918 a line of clear glass canning 
jars called "Dominion" (transparent, proper-named) of 
which Stevens could have been aware (see Macleod 23ff).
Rodolph Gaschd uses the word "tain" to indicate the unseen 
condition of reflection.
14 The jar is an instance of cylindrical anamorphosis, a 
"trick" painting popular in the Renaissance, in which a
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that it should bring the distorted wilderness into 
representation. On the other hand, its form as anecdote 
and its description as "gray and bare" belies any promise 
that it will give any such form. Is this giant's effort 
merely a non-sign in a wild context enacting a non-event?
Stevens it seems offers arguments against his own
poetic project, and any idea of order will remain
provisional so as not to become a will to order. From his
first poems, Stevens exposes and betrays the singular
maker of the Romantic image. In "Six Significant
Landscapes" man appears to be the measure of all things:
I measure myself 
Against a tall tree.
I find that I am much taller,
For I reach right up to the sun,
With my eye;
And I reach to the shore of the sea 
With my ear. (16)
This hymn to man ("My mind to me a kingdom is") is
interrupted by mere irritation as the poem continues:
"Nevertheless, I dislike / The way the ants crawl / In and
out of my shadow" (16). In "A Primitive Like an Orb" the
poet as source of clarity finds elaboration in a
meditation on nature and culture, the raw and the cooked.
The "primitive" of the title hints at the original, the
primordial, but our first vision is of high culture. The
first stanza's tone tends toward sarcasm:
But it is, dear sirs,
A difficult apperception, this gorging good
distorted plane is brought to representation in a round 
mirror.
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Fetched by such slick-eyed nymphs, this essential 
gold,
This fortune's finding, disposed and 
re-disposed
By such slight genii in such pale air. (317)
The Romantic poet as "slight genii" takes up the effete 
"pious egress" of "The Virgin Carrying a Lantern" (85).
They mine "essential gold" from the "cast-iron" of our 
lives and works. It is perhaps Stevens' version of 
Marianne Moore's "I, too, dislike it." Yet these figures 
have the "separate sense" to see the fleeting "huge, high 
harmony" of poems, that only "was there" and is gone. But 
the tone changes in the third stanza, and lends an almost 
epic sound to the adventure:
What milk there is in such captivity,
What wheaten bread and oaten cake and kind,
Green guests and table in the woods and songs
. . . .  (317)
It is suddenly "a space gown wide" of which "the 
clairvoyant men . . . need no proof." This "central poem" 
plays part in a huge high mythology, as it "mates" with 
the world (stanza VI). Just as the "central poem" gains 
elaboration through relation to an entire cosmos of earth 
and sky, a figure looms:
The muscles of a magnet aptly felt,
A giant, on the horizon, glistening,
And in bright excellence adorned, crested
With every prodigal, familiar fire. . . . (319)
He is an "abstraction given head, / A giant on the 
horizon, given arms, / A massive body and long legs, 
stretched out." The bodied giant is similar enough to 
share genealogy (a "parental magnitude") with the "lover,
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believer, and the poet," but foreign enough to inspire.
This movement toward abstraction (it is a "giant of 
nothingness") is the necessary outcome of the "miraculous 
mutiplex of poems," a congruence of forces that resolve 
toward wholeness. The status of this wholeness is, 
however, unsettled. Yet while Vendler sees Stevens' 
tendency to abstraction as idealized intellectual desire 
(Words 29), Stevens does not merely posit a fictive 
Platonic form as some sort of pedagogical tool for his and 
his reader's use. The giant, looming both on the horizon 
and at the center, has too much mass, and is too foreign- 
seeming to be an arid incarnation of our desires.
Yet in the last stanza with "That's it", this 
massy being is either decisively concluded or derisively 
dismissed. The speaker lets the believer, painter and 
poet continue their crafts, which the poem would have us 
believe is Kraft, power. The giant seems to be for 
Stevens (and for the believer, poet, and painter)
"required, as a necessity requires" (383). It is a 
coalition of both the source of order, "patron of 
origins," very much like ourselves, yet at the same time 
it is the anti-humanist, monstrous, (that "imposes power 
by the power of his form"). The orb of the title, both 
clairvoyant eye and "sphere of influence," reflects the 
strain in Stevens that distrusts the personalistic despite 
its humanist fictionality, the "happy pantheism" Gottlieb 
Worringer so criticized. The giant is a coalescence who
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appears at stages, a figure of reconciliation without 
actual union, between humanist fiction and anti-humanist 
abstraction.
Poems that Represent Recognizable Poetry
The historical question of how and why clarity
reasserted itself in modernism generally (and in Stevens
specifically) is distinct from, but not unrelated to, the
broader question of whether or not literature follows the
course Robert Frost described in his well-known
formulation:
It begins in delight, it inclines to the 
impulse, it assumes direction with the first 
line laid down, it runs a course of lucky 
events, and ends in a clarification of life—  
not necessarily a great clarification, such as 
sects and cults are founded on, but in a 
momentary stay against confusion. (18)
The previous chapter on James' The Ambassadors showed that
a belief that literature furnishes such a clarification
was rendered problematical, to say the least. In this
section Stevens' poetry shall be discussed in terms of
representation. It could be said that there are two
representative elements at work in his poetry. Some of
Stevens' poems are actually, and primarily about things.
His early "Depression before Spring" is about sexual
disappointment:
The cock crows 
But no queen rises.
The hair of my blonde 
Is dazzling,
As the spittle of cows 
Threading the wind. (36)
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Before spring, before green fertility, there is a call to 
vitality from the cock, but the "ki-ki-ri-ki" of the 
rooster brings no cooing “rou-cou." The straightforward 
simile between "The hair of my blonde" and the "spittle of 
cows" indicates and invites both sexual hunger and mild 
disgust. However, there is no hope of achievement, as the 
thread is broken, and the final deflation, "no queen comes 
/ In slipper green" echoes the gentle self-mockery of 
Wyatt's "They Flee from Me." "Depression Before Spring," 
because it is primarily referential, exhibits only one 
representational element; its main energy, its fundamental 
gesture, is toward prose reality.
There is another representational element in 
Stevens' poetry I want to discuss; a parallel with 
architecture will help. Karsten Harries' commentary on 
the nature of architectural representation is useful here 
in the context of literary modernism. In his recent 
study, The Ethical Function of Architecture, he 
investigates the possibility of an architecture that 
expresses a cultural ethos in a "postmodern" present of 
cultural dissensus. He argues that "architecture" is 
distinct from "buildings" not merely because of superadded 
ornamentation; they differ more fundamentally in 
representative structure. A building, to be architecture, 
must not only be a building, but ought to represent a 
building.
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This means on the one hand that a building should 
fulfill certain historical expectations; a church should 
not only "be" a church, but should "look like" a church.
Yet Harries argues that reference to, or quotation of, 
other historical styles is not adequate to fulfill this 
representational function, as playfully vapid postmodern 
architecture shows. Rather, a building must relate in 
history to a normative ahistorical ideal. How 
architecture is to accomplish this task in an age lacking 
any such unanimity regarding ideals forms the bulk of 
Harries' treatment.
I want to argue that a similar self-representation 
is at work in much of Stevens' poetry. His poems not only 
are poems, but represent poems; they not only fulfill 
requirements to be poems, but they are also like poems. 
Understanding this helps in envisioning Stevens' poetic 
project; as well, it helps to frame much criticism on 
Stevens, for as his earliest readers realized, Stevens 
poems are often about poems. This does not mean merely 
that Stevens' poetry references other poems. In fact, 
though Harold Bloom rightly sees Stevens as firmly 
ensconced in the American poetic tradition, Stevens seems 
to take philosophers and artists as often as poets for his 
interlocutors. Nor is this to say that Stevens' poetry 
merely fulfills certain expectations of appearance. What 
is denoted here is rather a facet of Stevens' overall 
representative strategy. Stevens, in his prose (if that
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is to be trusted), indicates that he himself was 
attempting to signal the overall recognizability of his 
project:
My intention in poetry is to write poetry: to 
reach and express that which, without any 
particular definition, everyone recognizes to 
be poetry, and to do this because I feel the 
need of doing it. (OP 240)
Though his poetry begins in a felt need, it takes the
representative expectations of an imagined audience
("everyone") into consideration. Stevens' last long poem,
"An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," displays this dual
function of presenting something and representing itself.
The first stanza starts:
The eye's plain version is a thing apart,
The vulgate of experience. Of this,
A few words, an and yet, and yet, and yet—
(331)
The oxymoronic "plain version" (etymologically a "flat
turning") indicates the twists and revisions the next
thirty cantos undergo, as the poem (so many "few words"),
traces the speaker's encounter with an ordinary, plain
city, here named (with some irony) "New Haven." But if
the plain city were transformed:
Suppose these houses are composed of ourselves,
So that they become an impalpable town, full of 
Impalpable bells, transparencies of sound,
• • •
In a movement . . .  of the mind. . . . (331)
This is all a turning, a "version" of idealism, but this 
transparency, "this movement of the mind" is averted, 
changed into a different type of transparency, not of the 
mind alone:
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Reality is the beginning not the end,
Naked Alpha, not the hierophant Omega,
Of dense investiture, with luminous vassals.
(337)
Reality is not the ornate full elaboration, but the
beginning. And "We keep coming back and coming back / To
the real," a version of unmediated vision:
The poem of pure reality, untouched 
By trope or deviation, straight to the word,
Straight to the transfixing object, to the 
object
At the exactest point at which it is itself, 
Transfixing by being purely what it is,
A view of New Haven, say, through the certain 
eye,
The eye made clear of uncertainty, with the 
sight
Of simple seeing, without reflection. We seek 
Nothing beyond reality. . . . (336)
Though we seek the "poem of pure reality," we ultimately
"do not know what is real and what is not." As many
critics have noted, "reality" takes on a variety of
meanings in Stevens' poetry; sometimes it is what is
constituted by mind, other times what is over against
mind. Here it is enough to note that this is not merely a
weak skepticism at work; we do know enough about reality
to know that it contains a "faithfulness" and a
"tendance"— a holding. Images of holding in "An Ordinary
Evening," "our sepulchral hollows," the squirrel's "tree-
caves" are like the "honey hived" in "Credences of
Summer," repositories of reality. But the repository of
the Ecclesiast, the "text that is an answer, though
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obscure" (343), cannot suffice, and attention is next
drawn to an alternative: the poem.
The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the res itself and not about it.
The poet speaks the poem as it is,
Not as it was. . . . (338)
Criticism on Stevens has long pointed out that Stevens is
a "self-conscious" poet. Joseph Riddel, in the first
major study of Stevens' poetry, could already in 1965
write that "It is hardly news that Stevens' investigation
of reality discovers it in poetry" (261). Similarly,
Harold Bloom sees one of the fundamental tensions in
Stevens' poetry as the claiming of his own poetic standing
in light of his predecessors, in finding an original
expression in a "repetitiousness of men and flies," (and,
presumably, of older poets) (383). "Ordinary Evening"
suggests the centrality of poetry to human affairs, and to
civic life in New Haven, and that, "Together, said words
of the world are the life of the world" (339). But more
than that, the poem is a showing of itself. "Ordinary
Evening" is not allegorical— a story about something else,
but more primarily an evidencing of itself. It is a poem
that represents itself in an "endless elaboration," and is
recognizable as poetry:
This endlessly elaborating poem 
Displays the theory of poetry,
As the life of poetry. A more severe,
More harassing master would extemporize 
Subtler, more urgent proof that the theory 
Of poetry is the theory of life,
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As it is, in the intricate evasions of as,
In things seen and unseen, created from 
nothingness,
The heavens, the hells, the worlds, the longed-for 
lands. (349)
The canto takes up a theology of poetry similar to that in 
"A Primitive Like an Orb": "We do not need to prove the 
existence of the poem. / It is something seen and known in 
lesser poems." Stevens performs a sort of argument from 
design, and in "Ordinary," with its references to creation 
ex nihllo, "seen and unseen" ("visibilium et invisibilium" 
of the Christian churches' Credo), and "heavens" and 
"hells," the language is unguardedly theological. This is 
not to supplant God with the "huge high harmony," (that, 
rather, was a struggle of "The Idea of Order at Key 
West"), but to evince the way poems show— not theophany, 
but "logophany." Convinced of the centrality of poetry, 
and yet working with its "tropes and deviations," Stevens 
seemingly in this last of his long poems, in the autumn of 
his life, stores up the real in poems. Or rather, reality 
becomes re-stored:
The glass of the air becomes an element—
It was something imagined that has been washed 
away.
A clearness has returned. It stands restored.
It is not an empty clearness, a bottomless 
sight.
It is a visibility of thought,
In which a hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see 
at once. (351)
"The glass of the air" takes up the "tall and of a port in 
air" of "Anecdote of the Jar," and perhaps even Williams' 
comment on Moore. But here the containing, the "tendance"
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is a restoration, literally a "standing up again." What 
is restored is not the "transfixing object" of VI; rather, 
it is the poem itself. As Harold Bloom has pointed out, 
the images of transparency in "An Ordinary Evening" take 
up the Emersonian concerns of selfhood in his essay 
"Nature":
In the woods, we return to reason and faith.
There I feel that nothing can befall me in 
life,— no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my 
eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing on 
the bare ground,— my head bathed by the blithe 
air and uplifted into infinite space,— all mean 
egotism vanishes. I become the transparent 
eyeball; I am nothing; I see all. . . . (24)
But here in "Ordinary Evening" the transparency that is a
"visibility of thought" refers to the poem itself rather
than the "harassing master," the strong poet, the
transcendentalist in the woods. The "plain version," the
"flat turning" of the poem's opening line, is nothing
other than the "endlessly elaborating poem." Thus the
poem is neither "naked Alpha" nor hierophant Omega," but
hierophant Alpha, the showing of itself that elaborates.
Just as cubism makes no gesture towards any realism, and,
as E. H. Gombrich notes, "counter[s] the transforming
effects of an illusionist reading" (234), thereby
troubling simple notions of recognition, so Stevens'
poems, so recognizably poems, are best when (as in "An
Ordinary Evening in New Haven"), they make no gesture to
an "illusionist reading" of the prosaic.
This is not to say the poem lacks a referring 
function. Certainly it is about, as Helen Vendler
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indicates in her On Extended Wings, the theme of 
desiccation, of old age as the "dilapidation of 
dilapidations" (341). Nor are the poems merely instances 
of the law of self-identity— the poem is itself. What 
occurs here is a substantial transformation of the idea of 
clarification as catharsis in literature. Aristotle in 
his Poetics, as will be remembered, accounted for the 
pleasure of art by its recognizability. This accounting 
ties recognition to mimesis, for one enjoys because one 
recognizes a certain situation. But in the poetry of 
Stevens, the primary function of recognition is not of 
states of affairs, but, so to speak, of poems as poems.
His poetry doesn't represent only snow men, feelings, 
blackbirds, an American city, etc. His poems represent 
poems; they look like themselves.
This recognizability of the poems as poems is no 
small matter, as "Angel Surrounded by Paysans" shows 
(354). In this poem of non-recognition, the "angel of 
reality," the "necessary angel of earth" tries to explain 
to the countrymen what he is: no such easy self-evidence 
here as for the Gospel angels. Even when these 
expressings of poetry take place "word by word" (97), they 
need elaboration. In "The Poem That Took the Place of a 
Mountain," there is a transcription word for word, 
verbatim:
There it was, word for word,
The poem that took the place of a mountain.
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He breathed its oxygen.
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of 
his table. (374)
In what sense can a poem "take the place of" a mountain?
In "The Rock" there is a similar displacement: "In this
plenty, the poem makes meaning of the rock" (364); but
what is the place of a mountain? The first line, "There
it was, word for word," indicates a direct transcription,
an isomorphic relation between the mountain and the poem;
the one copies the other, "word for word." The second
stanza, "He breathed its oxygen, / Even when the book lay
turned in the dust of the table" leads to a reading-
inspired transport. Then, from the third stanza the poem
traces a memory of how the speaker once arrived at a place
where he could see and recognize "his unique and solitary
home." The reading of the poem is parallel to this
experience of recognizing.
The poem takes the place of a mountain in that it 
affords him this vista. At one time "he had needed / A 
place to go to in his own direction." What specific 
desire prompts this need is unclear; what is clear is that 
the place— the mountain, the interior landscape— itself 
had to be changed by him before it could yield the view.
He had "recomposed the pines, / Shifted the rocks, and 
picked his way among clouds" to find the right scenic 
"outlook." There, lying on "The exact rock where his 
inexactnesses / Would discover, at last, the view toward
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which they had edged," "gazing down at the sea," he could 
see home.
Here, as in other of his late poems ("Looking Across 
the Fields and Watching the Birds Fly," and "Of Mere 
Being," for example), Stevens finds home to be at the 
liminal edges of things. Here, he looks over a rock, down 
at the sea, and can "Recognize his unique and solitary 
home." Yet how can the sea, as perhaps either the 
boundless or the unconscious, be his unique and solitary 
home? How can something as protean and inexact as the sea 
be the reader's singular home? Did "they" (he and his 
"inexactnesses"?) artificially recompose the land "For the 
outlook that would be right" only to gaze and the fluid, 
dis-composed sea? Further, "recognize" implies he has 
made this trip at least once, while "at last" may indicate 
that it was a singular and final event. Whether the 
experience was unique or recursive, here the poem and the 
mountain it "took the place of" are places from which to 
contemplate one's origins, one's home. The poem becomes 
recognizable as a place that can afford a vista, a vista 
of a recognizable home, and that displacement is the poem 
that "makes meaning of the rock."
Similarly, in "The World as Meditation," this 
recognizability is questioned by the poet-spouse herself, 
Penelope. Penelope weaves by day ("She has composed") and 
dissembles by night in anticipation of her husband 
Ulysses' return.
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She would talk a little to herself as she 
combed her hair,
Repeating his name with its patient syllables,
Never forgetting him that kept coming 
constantly so near. (382)
Hanging over this scene, and articulated in Penelope's 
weaving and unweaving, is the concern that she precisely 
won't recognize Odysseus. Indeed, Homer's Penelope tests 
Odysseus extensively, and even in bed voices concern that 
he is unrecognizable. In the Stevensian poem— as endless 
elaboration, as place of recognition, as place of non­
recognition— there is less figurative energy directed at 
representing the objects them at the proffering of poetry 
itself.
Negative Ekphrasis
It is hard to read Shakespeare's The Tempest and not 
assume that it is his last work, and that this matters.
Wallace Stevens is no exception to the temptation to read 
poets in terms of literary biography. After the "Farewell 
to an idea" of "The Auroras of Autumn" (308), and Seventy 
Years Later of "The Rock," it is hard not to conclude that 
Stevens consciously wrote with a sense of an ending, and 
that despite his avoidance of the purely eschatological, 
when the vocabulary of clarity (clearness, gold, 
spectacle, glittering, transparent, luminous, etc.)15 is
15 Marie Borroff indicates that sound-symbolic words such 
as "glitter" and "dazzle" "are inherently sensory and 
specific," and such frequentatives "literally designate 
some sort of rapid motion or change" (97).
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
200
used in the later poems, it takes on different meaning 
than it had earlier in his career.
Certainly "clear" and "sharp" words had been used
before. A glance at Stevens' heavily anthologized
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" confirms most
emphatically that the poem is about some form of clarity;
it contains windows, sun, glass, ice, circles, as well as
the words "lucid," "pierced," "light," and "sharply"; all
these instances of clarity resist a reading that would
stop at the ambiguity of its multiple perspectivism. The
poem's concerns culminate in stanza number XI, the only
one that enacts a drama:
He rode over Connecticut 
In a glass coach.
Once, a fear pierced him,
In that he mistook
The shadow of his equipage
For blackbirds.
One would expect a "glass coach" to be glass-like, i.e.,
to be transparent. This is apparently not the case, for
this coach casts a shadow— the "shadow of his equipage"—
that "he" mistakes for blackbirds. For the birds to
pierce him with fear, they must be sharp; no vague thing
can pierce, as a sudden recognition. What would pierce
him with fear would be whatever in a transparent coach
casts a shadow. Thus it is possible that the shadow of
his equipage refers not to the coach, but to another
"equipage" belonging to him: his own body. He mistakes
the shadow of his own body, sitting in a transparent glass
coach, for blackbirds, and that terrifies him; he is
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literally afraid of his own shadow. The blackbirds seem 
to represent the fugitive aspects of his own equipage: his 
own body, his own mortal nature, his mortality. Only when 
one looks out the window of a glass coach does one see 
with perfect clarity a piercing fear, one's own death.
Nothing resists vision like blackbirds— even their shadows 
arrest the eye, are opaque through the transparent glass.
Here clarity is still primarily tied to 
epistemology, especially self-knowledge; if we cannot know 
the fugitive object (literally, "flying"), we can at least 
know our limits. Such is the direction in "The Motive for 
Metaphor":
You like it under the trees in autumn,
Because everything is half dead.
The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves 
And repeats words without meaning.
In the same way, you were happy in spring.
With the half colors of quarter-things,
The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds,
The single bird, the obscure moon— . (240)
Stevens seemingly anticipates criticisms of his poetry,
and here accuses himself, as in "As You Leave the Room,"
of the barrenness of his "motive for metaphor, shrinking
from / The weight of primary noon": aridity and half-
measures.
Yet for Stevens clarity is not a mere stripping away 
of all ornament, and criticism of his poetry as arid and 
lifeless would have given him pause. In a short essay on 
philosophy, Stevens criticizes Leibniz's theory of monads 
for precisely this lack of heart:
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Yet the idea seems to be completely lacking in 
anything securely lofty. Leibniz was a poet 
without flash. . . . It is worth while stopping 
to think of him because he stands for a class: 
the philosopher afraid of ornament. (OP 269)
Rather than merely being the lack of ornamentation, rather
than having its origin in a nostalgia for a lost ideal of
originary, Stevens' use of clarity, I want to argue, is a
kind of negative ekphrasis. His poems use the vocabulary
of clarity in order to describe not an art-object, but a
place where his poems can take place. "Description
Without Place" takes up the seem/be contrast of both
Hamlet ("Seems, Madam? Nay, it is. I know not seems")16
and Notes: "It is possible, possible, possible. It must /
Be possible (230).
It is possible that to seem— it is to be,
As the sun is something seeming and it is.
The sun is an example. What it seems 
It is and in such seeming all things are.
(270)
Of all the many examples of seeming that might be, one
place opens up a possibility:
There might be, too, a change immenser than 
A poet's metaphors in which being would
Come true, a point in the fire of music where 
Dazzle yields to a clarity and we observe,
And observing is completing and we are content 
. . . .  (272)
This "without place,"— not quite utopia— remains in the 
realm of possibility. It is a change more immense than
16 Two "seems" framing two negatives, a palindrome, and 
the verbs "to know" and "to be": a truly Stevensian line 
in Shakespeare.
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metaphor, a place where "being would / Come." It is a 
site oriented toward futurity, "fresh / In the 
brilliantest descriptions of the new day, / Before it 
comes, the just anticipation" (275).
This no-place is an artifice, a creation of man.
Murray Krieger describes ekphrasis, the description of a
plastic art in verbal form, this way:
What is being described in ekphrasis is both a 
miracle and a mirage: a miracle because a 
sequence of action filled with befores and 
afters such as language alone can trace seems 
frozen into an instant's vision, but a mirage 
because only the illusion of such an impossible 
picture can be suggested by the poem’s words. .
. . This peculiar— and paradoxical— jointly 
produced experience of ekphrasis allows it to 
function as the consummate example of the 
verbal art, the ultimate shield beyond shields.
(xvii)
This mixture of wonderment (miracle) and illusion (mirage) 
seems to describe Stevens' clarity of place, this "golden 
vacancy" (271). Yet Stevens is describing more the 
photographic negative of ekphrasis; rather than fullest 
embodiment, flat clearing is evoked, with no "befores" or 
"afters": "In flat appearance we should be and be, /
Except for delicate clinkings not explained" (271), and,
"I should name flatly" (232). I want to say that this 
poetry of pure affirmation of an "illustrious nothing"
(270) is seen in the clearing away of a space where the 
poem can occur. This explains much of what is thought of 
as Stevens' aridity; there is a tension between the need 
for clarity ("It must be abstract," and "this shallow 
spectacle") and the stuff of poetry, such that any
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invocation operates against the stated goal. What is 
evoked is potential.
Thus "A Clear Day and no Memories" does not only 
indicate a clearing away of the past, but a positive 
clearness of vision of a space that can be used in action.
An early vision of this "field" is given in "American 
Sublime." Beginning with "How does one stand?" the poem 
goes on to imply that the sublime is not a matter of 
posture (posture, after all, seems significant in 
paintings of the sublime), but rather,
the sublime comes down 
To the spirit itself,
The spirit and space,
The empty spirit 
In vacant space.
What wine does one drink?
What bread does one eat? (114)
This vacant space is here strongly associated with desire
and need, and perhaps has epic resonances of Aeneas'
arrival at the vacant space in which his prophecy of eaten
plates would be fulfilled. Yet even here, there is a
sense that the poem offers a vacant place for action to
take place, whether out of desire or, in the case of
"Domination of Black," fear. That poem begins with a tone
of melancholy contentment:
At night, by the fire,
The colors of the bushes 
And of the fallen leaves,
Repeating themselves,
Turned in the room,
Like the leaves themselves 
Turning in the wind. (14)
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The colors of the leaves— we assume the reds, yellows and
oranges of fallen leaves and fire-flame— flicker in the
room and as well mimic the motion of wind-swept leaves.
The tone then shifts abruptly: "Yes: but the color of the
heavy hemlocks / Came striding." Other colors in the poem
merely repeat themselves, turn in circles, but black
strides. Even if "hemlock" were not associated with
poison, the verbal "striding" and the memory of "the cry
of the peacocks" would still lend a menacing air to the
"color of the heavy hemlocks." The middle stanza
describes the remembered peacocks:
The colors of their tails 
Were like the leaves themselves 
Turning in the wind,
In the twilight wind.
They swept over the room,
Just as they flew from the boughs of the 
hemlocks 
Down to the ground.
I heard them cry— the peacocks. (14-15)
This stanza is enclosed or framed by the two stanzas that 
describe the striding color, just as black encloses "the 
room" the speaker is in. The confusion over the referent 
for "they" is not helped by the interjection "the 
peacocks" to clarify the referent of "them." Confusion 
turns to fear as the peacocks' tails sweep across the room 
as the birds drop from the hemlocks, with the rhyme "down 
to the ground" reiterating their plunge. In this middle 
stanza, in this transport, he not only "remembered" the 
peacocks' cry, he "heard" them.
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This remembrance in the middle of the poem addresses 
the motivations of the cry of the peacocks. Three 
possibilities are presented: the twilight, the leaves, and 
the hemlocks. The first and last possibilities are 
dismissed rather perfunctorily (one line each); however, 
eight lines are spent on "the leaves themselves / Turning 
in the wind, / Turning as the flames / Turned in the fire.
. . ." What is it about the turning of the leaves that 
would cause the peacocks to cry? Or is the narrator 
falling into the pathetic fallacy, thinking that the 
peacocks' cries are motivated at all? Exactly which the 
cry is "against" is of course left unsaid. There is 
however a contrast between the cyclical turning of the 
leaves and straightforward striding of black, a contrast 
that may indicate that the peacock's concerns are 
different from the speaker's. The peacocks may cry 
against the hemlock, but it is the color of the heavy 
hemlock that seems to occupy the speaker.
What dominates, as Riddel indicates, is time (42).
This explains the peacocks who mournfully cry against the 
end of things (twilight, leaves, or hemlocks), but it does 
not fully explain the speaker's fear. It is not just the 
terminus of things that seems to disturb him so, for the 
poem begins with an ending. The night itself— the end of 
day— is already fully present from the opening words: "At 
night. . . . "  Rather, it is the color of night, the fact 
that black is the background of all color, of all light,
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that it is the background of even the planets, and 
therefore a cosmic background, that frightens him. The 
main reason why he "felt afraid" is the realization that 
the fire will die, leaving black; the twilight will become 
full black night; the planets will gather and turn, and we 
assume expire, like the leaves, leaving black skies.
Black is the background, and frames the room, dominates 
the window he looks out of, envelops the poem, covers the 
cosmos; it will stride in and all else will exit, leaving 
"the nothing that is" (54). The fear is the fear of the 
jblackground.
The poet's concern here is as much for the
background as it is for mortality, and "Domination" has
the beginning already of this "space grown wide" of the
later lyrics (317). The monstrous "striding" of the black
is a showing or pointing (from monstrare) of this wide
space. In the later lyrics this description, becomes a
"vigor of glory" in "Reality," and an "Invisible activity"
in "A Clear Day." In "The Plain Sense of Things" there is
a return to a simplicity of perception of this "plain":
After the leaves have fallen, we return 
To a plain sense of things. It is as if 
We had come to an end of the imagination,
Inanimate in an inert savoir. (382)
Its vision of trees "unleaving" echoes Hopkins' "Spring
and Fall;" mortality touches all things, both natural
leaves and the made houses:
It is difficult even to choose the adjective 
For this blank cold, this sadness without cause.
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The great structure has become a minor house.
No turban walks across the lessened floors.
The greenhouse never so badly needed paint.
The chimney is fifty years old and slants to one side.
(383)
However, this is not simply an occasion for meditation on 
mortality: that is a sadness with cause. The poem evinces 
the imagination's need for some kind of stripping, an 
exfoliation. "It is as if / We had to come to an end of 
the imagination" to find ourselves in a space that does 
not have embellishment of the mind. But once there, how 
to describe, think, or act? "It is difficult to choose 
the adjective" precisely because to do so would violate 
the "plain sense" that is sought. That is, the 
imagination's activity— the "fantastic effort" (or rather, 
the "effort of fantasy") is accretional, and presents the 
danger of encrustation. That the simplification involves 
diminishments— the lessened floors, among others— is the 
tragic aspect of cultural criticism and transmission.
It is the unleaving that forms the occasion for 
thinking about this broader cultural stripping. Moreover, 
the temporal span involved, "The chimney is fifty years 
old and slants to one side," and the repetitiousness of 
"men and flies" indicates that the main concern is 
generational re-evaluation: for fifty-year "repetition" 
substitute "generation." That is, what should "we" (not 
the poet alone) who have returned to this "plain sense" 
re-imagine? Ought we preserve the imagined world of the 
previous "repetition," try to rebuild the "great
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structure," re-engage the "turban"? Or should we let it 
all go, despairing as Gloucester of King Lear (who has his 
own "space grow wide" in his heath) does: "As flies to 
wanton boys, are we to th' gods"?
The "plain sense" calls for the necessity of the 
imagination, which gives not reflections and tropes, but 
the "great pond," the transparency of water, without all 
of its detritus ("reflections, leaves, / Mud,"); it all 
had to be imagined. This clear, non-reflecting pond- 
vision has been prepared for in "An Ordinary Evening."
The summer
buzzes beyond the horizon or in the ground:
In mud under ponds, where the sky used to be 
reflected.
The barrenness that appears is an exposing.
It is not part of what is absent, a halt
For farewells, a sad hanging on for remembrances.
(350)
To see things without imagination's attributions, seeing 
the "plain sense," seeing the cleared space where a poem 
can take place, requires the imagination. In fact the 
more plain the sense, the more imagination is required, 
just as to see clear water requires more "fantastic 
effort" than to see water with its "waste of lilies." Yet 
the necessity does not seem to be merely a formal one, a 
sine qua non. It is a necessity that demands, or more, 
requires (literally, "asks again") what repetitions, what 
reflections "will suffice." This is a complete clarity, 
water without mud, mirror without tain, or as "Ordinary 
Evening" had it, "a bottomless sight."
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Though this reading of Stevens as a poet describing
open spaces of luminous potency favors visionary elements,
it appears that sightedness stands "man-locked" in his
poetry. Other approaches see a similar potentiality; both
Harold Bloom and Steven Shaviro favor Nietzschean
readings. Bloom also places Stevens in the
transcendentalist tradition, such that "'beyond' in
Stevens is where the self must go to find itself more
truly and more strange" (98), an Emersonian "crossing a
bare common." Shaviro sees the positive blankness of
Stevens' lyrics as affirmations that fulfill
what Nietzsche describes as the highest aim of 
art: "to be oneself the eternal joy of 
becoming, beyond all terror and pity— that joy 
which includes even joy in destroying." (208)
These readings would read more "potency" where I see
potential, emphasizing the will's power, while in the last
lyrics there seems to be a measure that is "without human
feeling," a coming to the end of the aching desire of "The
Poems of Our Climate." The "Clear water in a brilliant
bowl, / Pink and white carnations" are beautiful, but
"Still one would want more, one would need more,
More than a world of white and snowy accents" (158). Such
an ache is missing in Stevens' final poem "Of Mere Being."
The blackground of "Domination of Black" is re-visioned
almost as gold-ground:17
17 Or, as Vendler puns, "Domination of Gold" (Words 67).
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The palm at the end of the mind,
Beyond the last thought, rises
In the bronze decor,
A gold-feathered bird
Sings in the palm, without human meaning,
Without human feeling, a foreign song.
You know then that it is not the reason
That makes us happy or unhappy.
The bird sings. Its feathers shine.
The palm stands on the edge of space.
The wind moves slowly in the branches.
The bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down.
(398)
The palm in "Of Mere Being" is the "place without 
description": in fact, "place" is etymologically related 
to "palms" of hands, and palm trees are so-called because 
they look like hands. (Similarly for Stevens, "Oak Leaves 
are Hands" [197]). The palm is "at the end of the mind," 
it is "beyond the last thought" and therefore after 
thinking. There have been in Stevens previous attempts at 
transcendence, going beyond, most notably in Notes. There 
was there "a point, / Beyond which fact could not progress 
as fact," and "a point / Beyond which thought could not 
progress as thought" (229). Here there is something of an 
achievement; thought has led the mind there, so that the 
palm, the place, is a gift given (by hand?) at the end of 
mind's thoughts. From this bronze decor, the ordinary, 
something extraordinary arises (like the gold in the 
"cast-iron of our lives" of "Primitive"). The golden bird 
sings a song that is foreign, and if it is "without human 
meaning, / Without human feeling," then it is so because
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it is wholly other, at the edge of the space demarcated by 
the mind.
The scene that arises in the bronze decor is still 
familiar; it is composed of birds, palms, wind, but all 
are seen under an a-rational aspect: "You know then that 
it is not the reason that makes us happy or unhappy." The 
first two stanzas contain the action: the palm "rises," 
the bird "sings." But in the third stanza things are 
detained by realization and contemplation: a realization 
that beyond the concatenation of thought, there is an 
experience of a remote song, a song which shows that the 
reason is sequential and yet neutral with regard to 
happiness. Here the poem slows. The sentences shorten.
The tone indicates a lifting beyond the realm of actions 
to the realm of contemplation. There is a simultaneity of 
presentation, such that things in the "decor" appear to 
become weightier: the palm "stands," the wind "moves 
slowly," the feathers "dangle down." Though critics often 
make the connection to Yeats's "Sailing to Byzantium", 
this is a clearing beyond an ekphrasis of a golden bird: a 
description without place.
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In his preface to Paul Valery's Eupalinos (a mock
Socratic dialogue), Stevens writes:
Mallarme and Valery announce a new climate of 
thought. They want clear enigmas, those that 
are developable, that is to say, mathematical.
. . . Eupalinos is a work of this "clarity of 
details." This is its precise description. In 
it Valery made language itself a constructor. 
. . .  (OP 297)
Stevens then quotes Valery's Socrates directly:
What is there more mysterious than clarity?
. . . What more capricious than the way in 
which light and shade are distributed over 
hours and over men? . . . Orpheus like we build, 
by means of the word, temples of wisdom and 
science that may suffice for all reasonable 
creatures, this great art requires of us an 
admirably exact language. (OP 298)
Valery is typically modem in his advocacy of "exact
language," but it is no coincidence that his course
returns him to the origin of the "enlightenment project,"
Socrates. Stevens' approving quotation ties him to
Socrates' goals if not his methods, for as an American he
eschews Socrates' faith in dialogue (preferring solitude),
the divine (preferring imagination), and reason ("You know
then that it is not the reason / That makes us happy or
unhappy" [398]). Stevens realizes that to identify the
quest for a clarity with certain knowledge is no longer
possible, and further, that to be hot for certainties not
only goes against the American grain, but is, like the
"blocking steel" of Berserk (84), pathological. The
modernist reaction entails an attempt to find such a
clarity distinct from the rationalism of the
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Enlightenment. When it fails, it fails politically, 
mistaking a particular figure for a "gold flourisher"
(208). Stevens avoids this fate perhaps because he thinks 
that whatever clarity is, "it must be abstract."
The issue necessarily involves ambiguity, for the 
problem for literary modernism came framed largely in 
theological terms; once the divine— the sine qua non of 
clarity— is repudiated, the occult as the ambiguous 
becomes the receptacle of reverence. As Colie indicates, 
the content of the paradoxes of each age reflects the 
dominant discourse: in Renaissance, philosophy; in 
Romanticism, God and God substitutes; in modernity it is 
language that is the register of cultural crisis. The 
Romantic deontological turbulence enacted by its poetry 
left modernism with only the aesthetic object of the text.
Stevens and James do their part to render 
problematic the epistemology of aesthetics. If they are 
indeed seeking some type of clarity that is not identical 
with epistemological obsession, then they in a sense mark 
the end of a knowing-dominated era. In this sense,
Empson's taxonomy in Seven Types of Ambiguity may be seen 
as a symptom of a diminished understanding of 
clarification rather than its cure. The more radical 
polysemy of dissemination, like Novalis' pollen, holds out 
the promise of an advent, a clarity of the about-to-be-new 
based on figurative energy of ambiguity. Or, perhaps not.
Mark DeLancy indicates that, despite protestations to the
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contrary, deconstruction is still in the tradition of the 
interpretive stance that clarifies "opaque texts" (193).
And if we accept Stevens' working definition of clarity as 
a waiting for possibility, then perhaps Jurgen Habermas is 
correct in his assessment of postmodernism as modernism's 
unfinished business.1 Indeed, it looks like we'll be 
stuck with modernism for a very long time.
Yet clearly, despite Husserl's broad attempt to 
reinvigorate interest in an invisible realm of meanings 
and ideal objects, modernism rejects any recourse to a 
Platonic ground of the real. But too there is a post- 
Kantian and post-Romantic dismissal of the mind's ability 
to transform raw data into determinate categorical 
knowledge. Modernism then can be seen as an attempt to 
re-imagine form, that which informs objects and subjects 
such that it can be discharged as what Walter Benjamin 
calls aura.2 This Stevensian "form gulping after 
formlessness" (307) is an attempt to get back to what the 
Greeks called proto hyle, prime matter, so that we may all 
be "Connoisseurs of Chaos" {PM 166). This form after 
formlessness constitutes the main contradiction of 
modernism.
The role of the critic then is to make clear the 
ambiguous text, to re-interpret the hermetic in terms of 
the present. If it is true, as Valery's Socrates
1 See Dupre's "Postmodernity or Late Modernity?"
2 See "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction."
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indicates, that the vocation of clarifying demands that we 
be "Orpheus1ike," then it requires a subterranean journey.
And it is there perhaps that modernist "visibilities of 
thought" find their place in Hades' "darkness visible," 
and clarity is very much with us as an oxymoronic (and 
vaguely eschatological), interpretive project.
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